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In order to know God, your knowledge must change into unknowing, into a forgetting of 
yourself. – Meister Eckhart1 
 
 
Addressing itself to this nothing…adoration flashes as the signal of an absolute outside, of a nihil 
in which all nihilism loses its “-ism” (its supposed completion without further reference) in order 
to open infinitely onto a non-completion delivered from any horizon of accomplishment. 
Addressing itself, therefore, to this outside which cannot be said “as such.” – Jean-Luc Nancy2 
 
                                                     
1 Eckhart, Sermon IV, in Pfeiffer, Franz, Meister Eckhart trans. C. de B. Evans (London: John M.Watkins, 1924), 
21. 
2 Nancy, Jean-Luc, Adoration: The Deconstruction of Christianity II trans. John McKeane (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2013), 74. 
  1 
ATTUNEMENT 
 
 
 
He does only one thing: he opens his arms. – Kierkegaard1  
 
KIERKEGAARD states that the culmination of his authorship is the “Discourses at the Communion 
on Fridays.” In the preface to a collection of such discourses he writes, “a gradually advancing 
author-activity that began with Either/Or seeks here its decisive point of rest at the foot of the 
altar.”2 At the end of the authorship stands the abased Christ whose wounds gape open and 
whose arms spread agape before the believer, as do the arms of the statue of Christ that 
overlooks the altar in Our Lady’s Church in Copenhagen where Kierkegaard worshipped and 
took communion. In these final discourses, Kierkegaard writes, “language seemingly bursts and 
breaks in order to characterize God’s greatness in showing mercy.”3 The bursting and breaking 
of language is owing to the intensity of “longing” or “sorrow” [Sorg]4 that the eucharistic meal 
incites with the breaking of bread. The first of the communion discourses is based on Luke 
22:15: “I have longed with all my heart to eat this Passover with you before I suffer.” 
Kierkegaard opens with a prayer that acknowledges to God, “longing is your gift.”5 He prays that 
“when longing grasps hold of us, oh, that we may also grasp hold of the longing; when it wants 
to carry us away, that we may also surrender ourselves.”6 To surrender to the longing that is the 
                                                     
1 PC, 19. The following paragraphs were written in remembrance of the women with whom I shared communion in 
a Davidson County jail in Nashville, TN on Sunday evenings from 2012 to 2014.   
2 Kierkegaard, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays trans. Sylvia Walsh (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2011), 125. In PV, Kierkegaard describes the movement of his authorship as proceeding “from the 
pseudonymous Either/Or, through Concluding Postscript, with my name as editor to Discourses at the Communion 
on Fridays.” (5-6).  
3 Kierkegaard, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 79. 
4 CD, 251. 
5 CD, 251. 
6 CD, 251. 
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gift of God is to surrender to God, “because in the longing the eternal is, just as God is in the 
longing that is for him.”7  
The eucharist does not mediate God objectively. It does not render God an object of 
knowledge. The eucharist—to use a term that will be central in this dissertation—“reduplicates” 
God subjectively, in and as longing. It repeats the wounded Christ, the Christ who longingly 
gapes open in the Spirit, singularizing believers before the shattering mercy of God. What 
matters here is not one’s knowledge of God but the longing to be known and loved 
unconditionally, to be seen and witnessed and heard in such way that one’s sin is not exposed 
and ridiculed but hidden away in a love that knows no judgment, a love that knows nothing. 
Such longing explodes or “bursts” all transactional accounts of sin, grace, atonement, repentance, 
confession, forgiveness, and eucharist. Objectively, sin is nothing for God. God demands or 
requires no placation, no appeasement, no public or private shaming, no accounting or 
explanation—nothing. God sees sin only subjectively, as the acid shame that bathes a disturbed 
soul who has sinned and been sinned against, a shame that pins the self to itself in crippling 
despair. God in Christ through the Spirit is the longing to release that shame into the quiet yet 
infinitely awake peace and joy of “self-forgetfulness.” That longing, which is a longing to be to 
be in touch with absolute kindness, is one’s “knowledge” of God, a knowledge that is no 
knowledge at all—it “affirms nothing”—but a movement of forgetting, a forgetting or release of 
oneself. Writing about the woman who anoints Jesus with her tears, Kierkegaard writes:  
She affirms nothing, she acts: she weeps, she kisses his feet…she has nothing to do but 
weep…She sits weeping at Jesus’ feet. She has entirely forgotten about herself, forgotten 
every thought that might inwardly disturb her; she is quite still, as still as the sick child 
that is quieted at its mother’s breast where it cries itself out and forgets about itself…She 
has entirely forgotten herself, forgotten her surroundings with everything there that might 
have disturbed her, for, since they were almost designed to remind her in fearful and 
painful ways about who she was, it would be impossible to forget such surroundings if 
                                                     
7 CD, 260. 
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one did not forget oneself. But she weeps, and as she weeps she forgets herself. Oh, 
blessed tears of self-forgetfulness, such that as she weeps she is not even once reminded 
of what she is weeping about, so completely has she forgotten herself.8 
 
This moment is everything for Kierkegaard, the moment of forgetting oneself, letting go 
of oneself before Christ. Everything Kierkegaard writes leads up to this. It is a profoundly 
apophatic moment that affirms nothing, that affirms nothing. Christ does not satisfy any desire 
for knowledge. Christ incites a desire, a passion, for nothing. He incites a longing or sorrow in 
which knowledge is infinitely released. In that longing, which is the heart’s long surrender into 
grace, God is. God is the wound of sorrow for a self suffocated by identity, by the self’s 
reduction to a known quality, such as “criminal,” “good,” “evil,” “male,” “female.” By letting go 
of that suffocated, determined self, the self becomes nothing, nothing captured in knowledge, 
and so is given the freedom to become itself, a self rather than an identity. This is the gift of an 
immense power out of which one may rise up against a world overrun by violence, exploitation 
and an economy of misery and shame, apophatically declaring: You cannot tell me who I am! If 
Christianity is not opening onto this power, it is worthless: “So only that one went worthily to the 
Lord’s table who went there with heartfelt longing and went from there with increased heartfelt 
longing.”9  
Kierkegaard’s authorship in its concluding gesture opens onto an exorbitant, bottomless 
economy of gift. The more the gift is given, the more there is longing for the gift, for longing is 
the gift, is God as gift that will never exhaust or satisfy itself, holding itself eternally open in the 
face of a world that, bent on closure, blasphemes the Spirit.  
                                                     
8 Kierkegaard, Spiritual Writings: A New Translation and Selection. trans George Pattison (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2010), 273. 
9 CD, 261. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: NOTHING IS BETTER THAN SOMETHING 
 
 
 
Only finitely is it true that something is better than nothing, where the infinite is concerned, the opposite 
holds—nothing is better than something. –Kierkegaard1 
 
 
i 
The organizing claim of this dissertation is that Kierkegaard’s authorship is premised upon an 
apophatically conceived and enacted idea of God or the absolute. God is, for Kierkegaard, 
“absolutely different,”2 and as such is unnamable and unknowable as any kind of object, 
radically withdrawn from conceptual delimitation: “God cannot be an object.”3 Crucially, this is 
owing not simply to the finitude of the human subject, but to the nature of the absolute itself, 
which Kierkegaard describes as “pure subjectivity”4 [rene Subjectivitet] and “infinite 
reduplication”5 [uendelig Fordoblelse]. God eludes any position one could take up towards God, 
either in thought or in existence. God is beyond—or absolved of—determinate being. God 
remains an elusive “nothing,” and therefore thought and existence are marked by an ineradicable 
“passion,” the loss of grounding and finality that Kierkegaard equates with both “suffering” and 
“joy.”     
The mark of this apophaticism, which I would suggest is the heart of Kierkegaard, is an 
ethical-religious radicality. The relation of the self to God is a bottomless opening, an open-
ended movement of longing and passion that refuses closure. The apophatic here is essentially a 
                                                     
1 JP, 4905 
2 PF, 44. 
3 JP, 1349. 
4 JP, 1449. 
5 JP, 4571. 
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critique of closure and totality, totality as closure, in favor of an infinite beginning that holds 
itself in and repeats the instant of opening or birth. In the movement of faith, “one goes in a 
certain sense backward, toward the beginning…The beginning is this art of becoming silent.”6 
“The absolute,” on these terms, does not name the dialectical production of the ideal meaning of 
reality, as in Hegel, in which any beginning is real only as the beginning of some determinate 
end or telos. Kierkegaard’s absolute names, rather, the absoluteness of the silent beginning, a 
beginning not aimed at any determinate end. In the instant of this silent beginning there is an 
abandonment of conceptual, teleological meaning and an opening onto what, following Jean-Luc 
Nancy, I might call the passion of sense, or the sense of passion, an infinite engagement with 
existence without teleology, without concept, without ground—in short, without why.  
Two figures of this apophatic passion constantly recur in Kierkegaard’s authorship: the 
lover and the dancer, both figures of absolute movement, the movement of abandon that eludes 
any discursive capture. In the movement of this passion, “the passion of the infinite,”7 the self is 
split open in an instant of beginning by and before what cannot be named or appropriated by 
thought: “language breaks down, and thought is bewildered.”8 The apophatic in Kierkegaard is 
not primarily an epistemological or ontological problematic concerned with an unknowable 
object called “God.” It is an existential exigency, an infinite engagement with “the nothing that 
interlaces existence.”9 God, one could say, is nothing other than this: that this “nothing” does not 
reduce to a nihil-ism but is lived with abandon, with sorrowful longing and bewildered joy.  
This dissertation will follow the apophatic in Kierkegaard into the existential enactments 
of “faith,” “hope,” and “love,” which are openings of the absolute in existence, the becoming 
                                                     
6 WA, 11. 
7 CUP, 203. 
8 EO 1, 230. 
9 EO 1, 291. 
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absolute of existence. In Kierkegaard’s hands, each of these is a movement of infinite 
reduplication, an absolute relation to the absolute: “And what, then, is it to be a self? It is to be a 
reduplication [Fordoblelse].”10 Religious subjectivity, which is a “repetition” or 
“reduplication”—a “reduplicating repetition” [fordoblende Gjentagelse]11—of the infinity of 
divine subjectivity, is a movement of limitless relation and bottomless openness. What is always 
at issue “before God” is a negation that opens existence, absolutely: the “wound of negativity”12 
that, by virtue of “the absolute’s own resistance,”13 is held open without closure. Kierkegaard 
writes, “And my task is this: to proclaim what boundless reality every person has in himself14 
when before God he wills to become himself.”15  
___ 
There is only one book length study that treats Kierkegaard explicitly as a negatively theological 
thinker, David Law’s Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian.16 While Law helpfully situates 
Kierkegaard’s apophaticism in relation to its patristic and medieval precedents, arguing in fact 
that he is “more apophatic than the negative theologians themselves,” Law does not discuss what 
I take to be Kierkegaard’s negatively theological core, namely, infinite reduplication, which is 
                                                     
10 PC, 159.  
11 EUD, 169. 
12 CUP, 85. 
13 CUP, 459.  
14 In this dissertation, I have chosen to let Kierkegaard’s gendered use of language, which typically renders both 
God and the human being in exclusively masculine terms, stand. I do not regard the move to change an author’s 
pronouns on their behalf in order to reflect a more desirable gendered imaginary to be helpful. This move, it seems 
to me, simply passes over the problem; it does not engage it. Better to let the problem remain glaring in order to 
force engagement with the issue. The issue of gender in Kierkegaard is interesting and complex. His authorship 
performs both a patriarchal and heteronormative imaginary as well various kinds of possible openings beyond it. 
This dissertation will not engage the issue of gender directly, although I hope the path I take through Kierkegaard 
here sets the stage for such an engagement. My own reading of Kierkegaard resonates significantly with that of 
Alison Assister in her book Kierkegaard, Eve and Metaphors of Birth (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015). 
With Assister, I find Kierkegaard’s thought to be dominated by the moment of birth or beginning, and I would 
follow her in allowing this to to upset or “unsay” any rigidified gender imaginary. Assister traces Kierkegaard’s 
obsession with birth to Schelling; I want to trace it further back to Eckhart and even further to the female mystics 
who were Eckhart’s teachers. 
15 JP, 6917. 
16 David Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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the conceptual (un)ground of the articulation of both God and the self as “nothing.” This, it 
seems to me, is a significant limitation. He also distances Kierkegaard from Neoplatonic 
apophatic theologies, a move that needs qualification. Law attributes Kierkegaard’s apophaticism 
to an “existentialism”17 that is completely separate from any Neoplatonism, even if they share 
similar apophatic “results.” While it is true that Kierkegaard’s “existentialism” does have 
emphases that move along different trajectories than “an emphasis upon the One and the problem 
of multiplicity”18 traditionally understood, this is not the whole story. Let me unpack this in 
order to set up in more detail the trajectory of this dissertation. 
ii 
First, Neoplatonism cannot be reduced to the problem of the One and the many understood as a 
cosmological principle of procession and return. Meister Eckhart, for instance, who will be an 
important conversation partner in this dissertation, prioritizes inwardness or interiority as the site 
of relation between the soul and God, relativizing any focus on a cosmological scheme. 
Kierkegaard belongs to this trajectory, one that extends from Eckhart through the Lutheran 
pietism that funds central currents of his thought.19 In Eckhart, Neoplatonism becomes a kind of 
existential apophaticism. The unknowable “One” becomes the principle-beyond-principle of a 
lived whylessness, an errancy in the trajectory of existence that dislodges the self from the 
pursuit of determinate identities and goals. Eckhart calls this “becoming nothing” and living 
“without why.” Kierkegaard’s authorship repeats this gesture. The unknowable “One” becomes, 
for him, the source of an exigent call to live apophatically, in unknowing and risk, a call that is 
lived out in “that one” [hiin Enkelte], the single individual. Kierkegaard, too, calls this 
                                                     
17 Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, 206. 
18 Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, 206. 
19 See Barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism, and Holiness (Ashgate, 2013). 
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“becoming nothing,” an “absurd” movement that has “no ‘Why’ at all.”20 On the religious stage, 
the unknowable oneness or singularity that is God “repeats” itself in the lived singularities of 
single individuals, rendering all of existence a field of apophatic elusiveness, split open beyond 
any determinable totality.  
It is difficult to say what of Eckhart Kierkegaard might have read or encountered. 
Eckhart’s thought underwent a revival in the early nineteenth century through the Romantic 
movement, and it is somewhat curious that Kierkegaard, who comments on such a wide array of 
figures and topics, nowhere mentions him in his published works or his journals, even though 
Eckhartian tropes and even some quotes are splattered across his writings.21 What is clear is that 
Kierkegaard was influenced by a number of texts and authors that fall within a broad Eckhartian 
tradition. On the philosophical side, Eckhart was a formative influence on German idealism, 
Fichte and Hegel in particular, both central influences on Kierkegaard. In addition, 
Kierkegaard’s teacher—and nemesis—Hans Martensen, produced a study on Eckhart that 
Kierkegaard was most likely familiar with.22 On the religious side, the Eckhartian influence 
comes through Kierkegaard’s exposure to various pietist texts, texts “whose metaphysical 
horizon is entirely derived from the thought of Meister Eckhart,”23 as David Kangas puts it. Such 
texts include the Theologia Germanica, Die Nachfolung des armen Leben Jesu Christi by 
pseudo-Tauler, Johann Arndt’s Von warhem Christentum, and Jacob Boehme’s Der Weg zur 
                                                     
20 JP, 4901. 
21 See EUD, 98. Kierkegaard here quotes Eckhart unacknowledged. It is in the silence surrounding Eckhart that one 
can perhaps hear something of the complicated and ambivalent nature of Kierkegaard’s relationship to idealism, 
which itself has a complicated and ambivalent relationship to mystical theology. As I will explore in a moment, 
those areas in idealism that appropriate mystical theology are the sites of Kierkegaard’s overlap with and critique of 
idealism. Eckhart stands at the heart of these junctures. For now, I simply want to hazard the claim that Eckhart’s 
influence on Kierkegaard (directly or indirectly) is as important as it is silent. 
22 Martensen, Hans. “Meister Eckhart: A Study in Speculative Theology,” trans. Curtis L. Thompson and David 
Kangas in Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen’s Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997).  
23 Kangas, David. Kierkegaard’s Instant: On Beginnings (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 9. 
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Christo, among others.24 My aim in what follows is not to try to sort out the details of this 
influence. My aim is rather to show that Kierkegaard’s theology can be read as a creative 
repetition of Eckhartian apophaticism. With Kierkegaard, I want to venture, mysticism becomes 
modern with the effect of breaking modernity open. What I offer in this dissertation can be read 
as a few explorations of this territory.25  
iii 
I also want to contest Law’s claim that Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel constitutes a “vigorous 
attack”26 on Neoplatonic theology. This opens a complex set of issues that I cannot deal with 
fully here. But a few things can be said, specifically concerning the relations between 
Kierkegaard, idealism, and Neoplatonic apophaticism. 
Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel is not a lobbing of bombs from an external standpoint, 
even if at times his rhetoric gives that impression. His critique does not stand in any kind of 
simple opposition or externality in relation to idealism. If it has any power, I would claim, it is 
because it is a gesture of what would come to be called “deconstruction”—a breaking open from 
the inside. The core of Kierkegaard’s conceptual vocabulary is derived from idealism: spirit, 
moment, the absolute, immediacy, subjectivity, self-consciousness, reduplication, reflection, 
                                                     
24 See Kangas, Kierkegaard’s Instant, 9, as well as Barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism, and Holiness, ch. 3. 
25 For an account of Kierkegaard’s exposure to Eckhart through the teaching and writing of Hans Martensen, see 
Curtis T. Thompson, Following the Cultured Public’s Chosen One: Why Martensen Mattered to Kierkegaard 
(Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 2008), especially ch. 3. For a reading of Kierkegaardian faith as 
Eckhartian releasement, see David Kangas, Kierkegaard’s Instant: On Beginnings. Kangas is the only Kierkegaard 
scholar I know of who has given sustained attention to the apophatic, Eckhartian logic of “infinite reduplication.” 
His work is a central inspiration and guide for this dissertation. See Kangas, “Absolute Subjectivity: Kierkegaard 
and the Question of Onto-Theo-Egology,” Philosophy Today; Winter 2003; 47, 4; pp. 378-91. See also Kangas, 
“Kierkegaard, the Apophatic Theologian,” Enrahonar 29, 1998, pp. 119-23. For a read of Kierkegaard as an 
apophatic theologian in relation to the problem of theodicy that also draws on Kangas, see Claudia Welz, Love’s 
Transcendence and the Problem of Theodicy (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). For a read of Eckhart and 
deconstruction that makes reference to Kierkegaard, see Mary-Jane Rubenstein, “Unknow Thyself: Apophaticism, 
Deconstruction, and Theology After Ontotheology,” Modern Theology 19:3 July 2003. 
26 Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, 206. 
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paradox, idea, becoming, etc.27 His critical or deconstructive gesture is not to inhabit an external 
position outside of the metaphysics of idealism—which would simply allow it to stand—but to 
traverse its territory otherwise, redeploying its concepts in such a way so as to open within them 
an excess, an excess that is perhaps already present in idealism but is in various ways suppressed 
or under erasure. 
For instance, Kierkegaard takes over from Fichte the idea that the truth that constitutes 
subjectivity is an infinite ethical striving. Johannes Climacus’ slogan, “truth is subjectivity,” 
which affirms that truth is found in an infinite willing that exceeds thinking, is essentially a 
Fichtean slogan. Fichte writes, “what I ought to become, and what I will be, exceeds all my 
thought.”28 For Fichte, however, this excess of striving is wholly within the bounds of a 
transcendental subjectivity that posits itself, indeed creates itself: “I will then be absolutely 
independent…the innermost spirit of my spirit is not an alien spirit but is simply produced by 
myself in the truest sense of the word. I am thoroughly my own creation.”29 Kierkegaard adopts 
Fichte’s ethical apophaticism, but he in turn radicalizes it by locating its excess not within a 
priori transcendental subjectivity but within the relation to a transcendent absolute whose 
ethical-religious call, which is equally gift and task, strikes absolutely prior to any self-positing 
or self-choosing, simultaneously disrupting and founding the ethical subject, founding it as 
disrupted. This is the problematic at the heart of Fear and Trembling, the “teleological 
suspension of the ethical.” Significantly, Fichte’s notion of self-creation is itself a transformative 
appropriation of Eckhart’s notion of self-birth, the birth of God in the soul, turning it from a 
                                                     
27 See Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
28 Quoted in David W. Wood, “Fichte’s Conception of Infinity in the Bestimmung des Menshcen,” in Fichte’s 
Vocation of Man: New Interpretive and Critical Essays. eds. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 2014).  
29 Fichte, Johann. Vocation of Man (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 73. 
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transcendent, paradoxical event into a transcendental structure.30 Kierkegaard will turn the notion 
of self-willing back into a transcendent, paradoxical event, that is, back to its Eckhartian 
meaning.  
Likewise, there is an excess within the Hegelian “movement” of reason. Reason, for 
Hegel, enacts a unity beyond the oppositional bifurcations that constitute “the understanding.” 
Hegel’s absolute is the speculative movement of reason that holds together oppositions in a unity 
that exceeds binaries, a unity that, for him, finds implicit affirmation in theologies of mystical 
union, such as Eckhart’s.31 The Hegelian movement toward unity, however, takes place on the 
level of “the concept,” a location that, for Kierkegaard, abstracts from lived existence and its 
excess of movement or becoming and the unity toward which it strives which is located on the 
level of ethical-religious willing. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard does take over the Hegelian (and 
Kantian)32 idea that the movement of subjectivity exceeds “the understanding” [Forstand]. The 
passion of thought enacts the “downfall” of the understanding.33 “Downfall” covers the same 
territory as “sublation,” but differently. Both name a movement of negation, a negation of the 
binaries that structure the understanding, which are themselves negations of absolute unity. The 
critical difference is that Kierkegaard locates the overcoming of understanding’s binaries in an 
“absolute paradox,” an unmediated coincidence of opposites that incites ethical-religious willing, 
rather than in a new, synthesized concept that opens further avenues for speculative thought. The 
former upholds the apophatic meaning of negation; the later erases it.  
                                                     
30 See Ernst Von Bracken, Meister Eckhart und Fichte (Wurzburg: Konrad Triltsch, 1943). See also Katharina 
Cemig, Mystic und Ethik bei Meister Eckhart und Johann Gottlieb Fichte (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999).  
31 Hegel, G.F.W.  Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Lectures of 1827. ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 193. 
32 Already in Kant, the movement of reason drives past “the understanding” toward “the unconditioned.” 
33 PF, 37. 
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 Kierkegaard’s critical gesture vis-à-vis idealism, critique through re-appropriation, is the 
negative image of a gesture that idealism itself makes in relation to various theological 
conceptualities. This is what makes the Hegel-Kierkegaard standoff so interesting, and 
complicated. Both are trying to beat the other at the other’s own game, Kierkegaard breaking 
philosophy open to religion, Hegel sublating religion into philosophy. Hegel, like Kant, Fichte, 
and Schelling, traverses theological territory and critically redeploys its concepts for his own 
purpose, finding in them an implicit affirmation of a reconciled or non-alienated relation between 
the finite and the infinite, i.e., the absolute. To carry through this reconciliation, Hegel negates 
any abstract or indeterminate infinite that would lie beyond or external to the determining 
movement of reason. It is here where Kierkegaard’s protest will take place. He will reassert, in a 
repetition of Eckhartian apophaticism, the non-negatable indeterminability of the divine, the 
infinite as “nothing” rather than “something.” Hegel begins with nothing and ends with 
determinate concepts produced by speculative reflection. Kierkegaard strives to end with 
nothing; he strives to break open the realm of the conceptual through a willing of or a becoming 
nothing that exceeds reflection: “The system begins with ‘nothing’; the mystic always ends with 
‘nothing.’ The latter is the divine nothing.”34 
This is not, however, a simple or direct affirmation of an “outside” or a transcendence 
that establishes itself through its opposition to an “inside.” For Kierkegaard, relation to the 
infinite, or the “divine nothing,” takes place as an abyssal inwardness whose enactment does not 
take the metaphysical form of positing transcendence “out there.” The outside, transcendence, 
happens, is an opening that happens, right here on the most intimate levels and folds of lived 
existence. Inwardness is where transcendence happens, where the outside is birthed into 
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existence. Inwardness is a letting-in, a letting-happen, a making room, a throwing open, an 
abandon—in which “nothing” happens. “The one who loves discovers nothing,”35 writes 
Kierkegaard. Love, the highest enactment of inwardness, inwardness as transcendence, is a 
movement that lets-in nothing for the sake of the other so that there might be room for the 
beloved, infinite room. 
Such inwardness or interiority opens prior to subject-object duality, prior to any 
intentionality that consciousness could make in relation to reality, prior to the understanding and 
to reason, exposing consciousness to a negativity it cannot recuperate. Inwardness is where the 
self is nothing, knowing nothing, having nothing, being nothing. It is where the self touches and 
is touched by the absolute absolutely prior to any mediation by consciousness. Kierkegaard calls 
this absolute touching Øieblikket, the moment or instant. The irrecuperability of this eternal 
instant or moment, its falling always prior to consciousness as the event that opens consciousness 
to an absolute incommensurability at and as its heart, is the “nothing” that cannot be turned into 
something.   
 For Hegel, by contrast, reason can find its way to and occupy the position of an absolute 
beginning for which there is nothing prior. In this position lies the possibility of “the system,” a 
point of view that can speculatively recuperate all negativity into the movement of the concept 
and so articulate the essential unity within all difference. Kierkegaard, against Hegel, asserts 
Øieblikket as a beginning prior to any beginning consciousness can make, a beginning that 
subjectivity does not occupy and undertake but rather one that subjectivity must undergo or 
suffer as its constitutive moment. To allow all one’s own beginnings, including the beginning of 
thought, to become transparent to a beginning prior to all beginning is the movement of 
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“repetition”: “Oh, what a difficult beginning to existing or for coming to exist: to exist, then to 
come into existence in order first to exist.”36 Consciousness is constitutively burdened by a 
perpetual, non-surpassable instant of beginning, a being given, a coming into existence, a being 
born, that it cannot be done with and that it cannot master. This ungrounding of the subject in its 
self-relation is the “transcendence” that Kierkegaard affirms against the immanence of Hegelian 
mediation.  
iv 
To speak of beginning is to speak of temporality. I want here to unpack a bit of Kierkegaard’s 
sense of temporality. It might not be immediately apparent how temporality relates to apophasis, 
but in Kierkegaard’s world they are intimately related. To sink into temporality, specifically into 
its openness before the eternal, is to undergo a being given, a gifting, that exceeds knowledge 
and representation.  
At the heart of Kierkegaard’s break with Hegel, and idealism in general, is an un-
mastering of temporality, an un-learning of time as grasped and represented in consciousness. 
Consciousness in some measure will always have eclipsed time as openness, as unknowable and 
non-calculable, in favor of time as represented, as recollected and anticipated. This is its 
originary “guilt.”37 For Kierkegaard, temporality is timed not by transcendental subjectivity, as 
in Kant and Fichte, which becomes the unity of recollection and anticipation in Hegel, but by the 
                                                     
36 CD, 39. This is the argument of Kierkegaard’s [Johannes Climacus’] text Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus 
Dubitandum Est. The reason that doubt, which is a form of unknowing, is impossible to overcome on the level of 
reflection is because consciousness is always too late or too early in relation to reality. Consciousness will always 
already have eclipsed reality in order to represent it to itself. It is the site of a “collision” between reality and 
representation, meaning that consciousness is structurally constituted by the possibility of doubt, by the gap between 
the real and its “repetition” in consciousness. Because consciousness arrives with the advent of language, the 
possibility of pure self-presence is impossible. Language founds consciousness as split from itself within itself.  
37 Which is why in Repetition when Job comes to face to face with God he repents, even though he has nothing to 
repent of. Simply to take up a position vis-à-vis God, to bring God into the orbit of consciousness, is to become 
guilty, however subtly, of eclipsing God’s non-calculable otherness.  
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eternal, by the divine nothing, which is to say, by an immemorial past and an unanticipatable 
future. Temporality is an undergoing, the suffering of coming into existence, again and again, out 
of nowhere, toward nowhere—each day, each moment, each instant returning to a departure. 
Existential subjectivity is essentially vulnerable, exposed to the uncertainty of temporality, given 
to and infinitely tasked with itself beyond the possibility of forming itself as a determinate 
whole, always undone by the nothing of an instant by which it is given into existence. As soon as 
the self turns around to apprehend itself (faith will have unlearned this gesture) it will always 
have vanished from sight, given again into the future behind its own back. Every instant of 
existence, each of which is an “atom of eternity”38 in time, is a re-launching of this being given 
in which eternity opens time forward, forming time’s limit or edge as a gaping opening. 
Religious subjectivity, which situates the self “at the edge of existence,”39 in the tension or 
passion between time and eternity, consents absolutely to this opening, to the passion of being 
given ever again without knowledge.     
Existence—the gaping open of time before the eternal—therefore makes self-identity, the 
possession of oneself in knowledge, impossible. Existence just is the interruption of totality, the 
slicing open, division, or “spacing” of subjectivity that “holds apart”40 living and knowing. 
Eternity is this spacing, the limit of time that re-launches time off itself, like the beating or 
pulsing of rhythm in which every downbeat is simultaneously an interruption and re-launching of 
a song (or poem or dance) abandoned to its movement: “eternity is the true repetition.”41 The 
movement of repetition lets the outside of time into time, forming time’s own difference from 
itself, opening an infinite distancing within time that is traversable only with faith, hope, and 
                                                     
38 CA, 88. 
39 CUP, 572. 
40 CUP, 118. 
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love, rather than knowledge. Eternity is this: that the present is exposed to its own 
groundlessness, that the present opens, that the future comes, not as an outgrowth of the past that 
one could anticipate, but with the suddenness of a surprise “which makes all things new.”42 The 
future is the outside of time opening within time: “the eternal first signifies the future…the future 
is the incognito in which the eternal, even though it is incommensurable with time, nevertheless 
preserves its association with time.”43 Eternity re-launches time forwards: “repetition, by which 
eternity is entered forwards.”44  
For Kierkegaard, eternity is not a metaphysical concept that makes possible an account of 
what time “is.” Eternity is not the ideal meaning of time that is to be apprehended through 
recollection. Eternity is the “earnestness of existence.”45 It (it is not an “it”) is that by virtue of 
which spirit or subjectivity beats and pulses forward, absolutely, obeying not any telos or 
immanent thrust but only the abandon of its being given, which is “the wonder,”46 “the one and 
only marvel,”47 the gift that will not become a possession. Eternity is the throwing open of time 
in which even the past will not have been simply what it was. One cannot apprehend the eternal 
under any conceptual determination, nor use the eternal as a principle of ideal meaning. The 
eternal is the loosening of all determinations, the beyond of time into which time must empty 
itself of its determinations. One can only glimpse the eternal as one undergoes the movement of 
time opening forward, glance at it as it departs from one’s sight, as it spaces the present out from 
itself, forming the present as an opening beyond closure or “conclusiveness.”48  
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This is the sense of Øieblikket, which literally means “the glance of the eye.” One might 
say that in Øieblikket, the eternal winks in time, “with the suddenness of the enigmatic,”49 
relating to and within time under the form of hiddenness or withdrawal, like a wink, releasing in 
time a spacing, an incommensurability, to which it is not a matter of being “bound”—one cannot 
be bound to nothing—but of being open. The instant constitutes time as a spacing, opening, and 
departure toward the absolute. Øieblikket: an absolute spacing, opening, and departure, charged 
with an infinite passion, a tension without intention, a repetition, a beating, a pulsing, a releasing, 
a flying forward, without goal. 
This is why in The Concept of Anxiety Vigilius Haufniensis (literally, “watchman of the 
harbor,” one who glimpses or glances at the opening onto the sea) depicts the timing of 
temporality by the eternal through the image of a lover watching, glimpsing, her beloved depart 
in his ship over the horizon.50 Through this departure or withdrawal, the present opens for the 
lover as the impossibility of possession, an interruption of direct immediacy and continuity that 
re-launches subjectivity as an infinite longing charged with a tension and spacing stretched out 
by the open sea, traversable only with a patience that waits upon the unknowable future, for an 
unanticipatable return or repetition. Exposure to the instant interrupts and empties time as a 
medium of knowing, being, and having. This is also why Johannes de Silentio, when straining to 
catch a glimpse of Abraham as he departs over the horizon toward Mt. Moriah, where he 
undergoes the interruption and re-launching of his relation to Isaac, experiences the suspension 
of consciousness and the blanking out of vision: “My brain reels…I almost faint,”51 “everything 
goes black before my eyes.”52  
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Within the opening of inwardness, the event of being given into time by eternity, which is 
the movement of religiousness, the self does not relate to the “divine nothing” as an object that it 
could apprehend or as a principle that it could put to speculative use. The self rather becomes 
nothing through a repetition or reduplication, what Kierkegaard will also call an “appropriation,” 
of the divine nothing, of the self’s abyssal origin, which is also its absolute future. Suspended 
between an abyssal origin and an absolute future in the instant of its coming into existence, the 
self is nothing, nothing in itself, nothing that is not already ungrounded off itself, continually 
interrupted and re-launched. It has nowhere to stand still—“in the life of spirit there is no 
standing still”53—no ground beneath its feet, no place to be something. This being-always-in-
between, being-on-the-way, is the self’s exposure to existence, the exposure that is existence. 
Existence, for Kierkegaard, is an exit, an ecstasy, an exit from self-identity and self-possession 
by way of the instant of being given. Existence is passage, movement, becoming, departure, 
birth, not as represented in consciousness, however, which would be a reduction to immanence, 
but as lived, with an openness beyond knowing, which is “the earnestness of existence.”  
For this reason, where a transcendental production of temporality might be spoken of, as 
in Kant, Kierkegaard speaks instead of an apophatic and kenotic breaking open of temporality, 
namely, patience.54 Patience abides in a beginning that does not anticipate its own end. It lets 
time be beyond representation, lets it gape open without concept or conclusion by virtue of the 
eternal. Patience suffers the openness of time that opens the self beyond itself. It undergoes time 
beyond calculation, waiting upon the timing or repetition of the eternal, the divine nothing, 
whose moment strikes always in an instant, eluding anticipation and recollection.    
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This perpetual, repeated beginning or being given places God or the infinite infinitely 
close to the self, but also infinitely beyond mastery, neither inside nor outside, displaced from 
any determinate place. This is a kind of transcendent immanence, or immanent transcendence. It 
is again a repetition of Eckhart, of what Ernst von Bracken calls Eckhart’s “transcendentizing 
inwardness,” a letting-in and so giving birth to what cannot be mastered—existence in its 
openness, or what is the same, existence as a gift that will never become a possession. To be 
ceaselessly given a gift that one will never come to possess, one’s life in time, is for both Eckhart 
and Kierkegaard, an irremediable suffering, a passion, that coincides with, that is, a bottomless 
joy.  
v 
Gathering these threads, let me articulate differently than Law an account of Kierkegaard’s 
relation to Neoplatonism as it pertains to his critique of Hegel. One could trace the movement of 
his critique in the following way: Hegel “sublates” Neoplatonic mystical theology into his 
system, but he does so only by putting its apophaticism under “erasure,” as Cyril O’Reagan puts 
it.55 Hegel declared his full agreement with Eckhart’s famous line: “The eye with which I see 
God is the same eye with which God sees himself. My eye and God’s eye are one eye, one 
seeing, one knowing, one love.”56 But whereas, for Eckhart, this is a profoundly apophatic 
affirmation of the oneness of God and the soul in the hidden ground of the self in which the soul 
gazes at the divine withdrawal or wink, for Hegel, this is an affirmation of absolute seeing or 
knowing, of the possibility of glimpsing reality from the standpoint of an absolute beginning that 
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anticipates its absolute end. The oneness of God’s eye and the mind’s eye is, for Hegel, the 
ability of reason to enact the absolute, to arrive at the unity of identity and difference as the all-
embracing totality of spirit. It signals the fundamental determinability and thus knowability of 
reality, including God, and therefore an immanence in relation to which there is no outside. 
Hegel empties out the silence and indetermination of the One, making it speak as the dialectical 
history of spirit. He “mediates” identity and difference, the One and the many, arriving at the 
identity of identity and difference. The One is the many as such, the many in-and-for-itself, 
unfolding as an all-embracing whole that holds together and articulates all difference within 
itself.  
Kierkegaard, as I’ve said, stands not outside of but within this nexus. He adopts the 
idealism of Hegel’s turn from apprehending the real as substance to apprehending it as subject or 
spirit, a turn that has its precedents in Eckhart, Böhme, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Spirit or 
subjectivity, in distinction from substance, is the act of relating itself to itself. Kierkegaard, 
therefore, also affirms the identity of identity and difference. Spirit or subjectivity, for him, is the 
active relating of itself to itself, opening difference (i.e. negation) as that across which any 
identity is enacted. Moreover, with Hegel and the idealists (and Eckhart), Kierkegaard affirms 
that human subjectivity is where the absolute occurs, where it “comes into existence,” where the 
finite is synthesized with and so “sees” the infinite in the glance of the eye.  
The crucial difference is that Kierkegaard conceives of this act of synthesis as a 
movement of “repetition” or “reduplication” rather than “mediation,” a wink rather than a steady 
gaze, a non-recuperable instant rather than an achieved concept. This produces a different 
account of the relation between identity and difference, one in which their identity cannot be 
represented, externalized, or articulated—synthesized—because the difference to be traversed 
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between the self and itself is not an immanent difference within being. It is the absolute or non-
determinable difference that is God, a difference that is seen or glimpsed only in its withdrawal 
from all determinable difference, a difference that is nothing and so, objectively, no difference at 
all. This withdrawal of the divine from objectivity is not a “going away” but an absolute coming 
near, a coming near beyond the binary of presence/absence, a coming alongside, a being “with-” 
that “-draws” the self into an intimacy with itself as nothing, an intimacy that spaces the self out 
from itself, infinitely. Between the self and its repetition is an absolute negation, an absolute 
expenditure without return, or an expenditure that returns to and “repeats” its own expenditure.  
For Kierkegaard, this is the structure of “freedom,” the capacity to let go of and give 
oneself, absolutely, which is the capacity to wait, to be patient, to abide in a beginning without 
anticipatable or determinable end. To dispossess oneself in this way, which simultaneously to 
gain oneself infinitely, is to let the eternal interrupt and halt all of one’s projects, re-launching 
one beyond the realm of projects and projections. Such freedom is a “dying to the world,”57 a 
dying to the anxious need to be or accomplish something in the world, a becoming nothing. This 
negation leaves identity always gaping open, never closed or accomplished, and therefore never 
identity. The self becoming or reduplicating itself across time cannot, therefore, be represented 
directly in thought or in speech. It can only be lived as inwardness, as an inwardness more 
inward than self-presence, so inward that it cannot come to speech: “Abraham cannot speak.”58 
Identity becomes singularity in Kierkegaard, the self split off from totality by being split open by 
the absolute, unspeakable difference that is God.  
This opening of the self onto absolute difference erases Hegel’s erasure, reopening the 
apophatic motifs that Hegel sought to overcome, in particular the apophatic economy of the 
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inward relation between the soul and God that is prior to any subject-object relation. Kierkegaard 
both adopts and reverses the Hegelian problematic of spirit, which itself adopts and reverses 
Neoplatonic mysticism. By reversing a reversal, or negating a negation, he turns the problematic 
of spirit into a negatively theological dialectic, repeating the negativity of Hegelian dialectic 
against itself in order to break it open to absolute difference, to abyssal inwardness.  
It is crucial to register that inwardness or interiority, so very central for Kierkegaard, is 
not self-presence, self-possession, or the site of identity. Interiority is the sight of an exposure to 
what cannot be possessed or brought to presence. With Kierkegaard, one has to think the 
exteriority of interiority, that is, interiority as an exposure to an abyss, an exposure that goes “all 
the way down,” as it were, and all the way in. Interiority is where the self wraps itself around an 
infinite opening, a movement that is simultaneously the self’s undoing and its birth, its birth as 
nothing, an absolute splitting open. As David Kangas puts it, “The most interior is what is not 
possessed, but rather what dispossesses. Interiority, then, is not a foundation for the constitution 
of the real, but non-foundation, groundlessness. The preeminent—most originary and singular—
tasks of the subject arise in the relation to its own groundlessness.”59 Inwardness is the site of a 
“breakthrough”60 into groundlessness through which the self is dispossessed from itself and, one 
might say, its onto-theological will, its will to render reality calculable through the positing of 
grounds. The ground of the self is the groundlessness of the “divine nothing,” which Kierkegaard 
evokes with his metaphor of the self treading water out over “70,000 fathoms.” This does not 
place Kierkegaard outside of Neoplatonic mystical theology but within something like an 
Eckhartian version of it.  
vi 
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The central conceptual nexus to clarify in Kierkegaard’s repetition of Eckhartian apophaticism is 
“reduplication.” I will devote chapter three to its exposition. What I want to clarify here initially 
is how reduplication is a principle of indetermination, one that is not, however, simply opposed 
to determination in any kind of static sense. Indetermination understood as reduplication is an 
un-determin-ing. It is an opening of determination that releases a dispossession within 
determination—a freedom—that does not allow it ever to arrive at any final sense or security of 
meaning, or at any final sense or security of un-meaning, a nihil-ism.  
In Eckhart’s theology, this dialectic between determination and indetermination is found 
in the way he dialectically relates God’s tri-unity and unity, or God and the Godhead. The 
Godhead is sheer, indeterminate unity or oneness that is radically “beyond” the determinate life 
of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. At times, Eckhart’s rhetoric can even give the impression that 
God’s oneness is severed from God’s threeness.61 I follow Bernard McGinn, however, in finding 
a thoroughly paradoxical relation between God’s oneness and threeness in Eckhart. What the 
Trinity reveals is what remains unrevealable, the absolute oneness of God that cannot be named 
or conceptualized. It is not a matter of choosing between oneness and threeness, or between 
revelation and hiddenness, or determination and indetermination. These poles are paradoxically 
simultaneous and amplified in relation to each other. Eckhart writes, “Distinction comes from the 
Absolute Unity, that is, the distinction in the Trinity. Absolute Unity is the distinction and 
distinction is the Unity. The greater the distinction, the greater the Unity, for that is the 
distinction without distinction.”62 This means that the trinitarian determination of God is also an 
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indetermination, one in which all determinations are kept open and fluid, without closure or 
fixity, flowing from and toward a oneness without name or concept. The Trinity determines God 
as indeterminate. It reveals God as hidden. It opens an empty center, a nothingness, an absolute 
“with-” that “–draws,” that sketches with abandon, creating “without why.” Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit together enact an apophatic excess within which the soul (and God) is given birth. 
The indeterminate oneness of God, then, precisely as the source and excess of God’s tri-
unity, is not without relation or movement, even as it is cannot be identified with any determinate 
relation or movement. It is limitless relation and movement. It is here where the principle of 
reduplication becomes central. The Godhead, for Eckhart, is not a static or rigid unity, making 
even “one” an improper name or concept, but a dynamic uniting that occurs as a reduplication or 
reflection of itself into itself. He writes: 
Note that the repetition (reduplicatio) [of the divine name] (namely that it says ‘I am who 
I am’) points to the purity of affirmation excluding all negation from God. It also 
indicates a reflexive turning back of its existence into and upon itself and its dwelling and 
remaining fixed in itself. It further indicates a ‘boiling’ or giving birth to itself—glowing 
in itself, and melting and boiling in and into itself…everywhere turned back and reflected 
upon itself.63 
 
As the movement that constitutes the Godhead, reduplication is a movement of self-affirmation 
that excludes all negation, that is, all determination that falls outside of—is not—the purity of 
self-affirmation that inheres in and reverts into itself. It is a negation of negation (but not in the 
Hegelian sense of a “sublating” of negation). Such indeterminate purity of self-affirmation, an 
affirmation that doesn’t affirm anything determinate, an affirmation of no-thing, an affirmation 
of affirmation, like water (an indeterminate medium) boiling into itself, is the unity of God’s tri-
unity. This means, as I’ve said, that God’s determinate, revelatory movement as Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit is fluid or excessive. It is ordered not toward a fixing of objective revelatory content 
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but toward the purely reduplicated and therefore indeterminate divine self-affirmation from 
which and toward which all determination flows. The inward “boiling” (bullitio) of the Godhead 
is the principle of God’s trinitarian relations, of their “melting” into each other, as well as of their 
“overflow” or “birth” (ebullitio) into creation. God boils and births creation within the divine 
life, the divine life that, in creating, with-draws. Creatures are given to themselves within the 
divine with-drawal, not in order to reach an entelechy, a finished form, but in order to desire 
themselves, one might say, as sketches, as transparencies drawn open to nothing but the instant 
of their birth. This opens an open-ended, unfinishable economy of relation between creator and 
creature, a movement of life and affirmation absent of or free in relation to determinate ends or 
goals. In God, the creature undergoes its own (and God’s) reduplication or reversion into itself as 
nothing, which is a becoming open to nothing but birth, a being born—Gottesburt. 
Accordingly, the existential thrust of Eckhart’s theology drives toward whylessness. 
God’s life has no immanent use, either speculatively or existentially. That is its transcendence. 
This is why giving birth to God in one’s soul, breaking through into the Godhead, which is 
simultaneously a letting oneself be born, is a breaking open to a life “without why.” Such a life 
wills the good in a reduplicated way, in and for itself, withdrawn from and so unsettling any 
economy of determinate results, speculative projects, projected futures, or calculated moralities. 
It wills the good sheerly in the moment as a movement of joyful wandering. Eckhart writes: 
But if someone asks a good man: ‘Why do you love God?’—‘I do not know, because of 
God.’—‘Why do you love the truth?’—‘Because of the truth.’—‘Why do you love 
justice?’—‘Because of justice.’—‘Why do you love goodness?’—‘Because of 
goodness.’—‘Why are you living?’—‘My word, I do not know! But I am happy to be 
alive.’64  
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A person who breaks through into the Godhead, as Reiner Shurmann puts it, “no longer has a 
place to establish himself. He has settled on the road, and for those who have learned how to 
listen, his existence becomes a call. This errant one dwells in joy. Through his wanderings the 
origin beckons.”65 In Eckhart, the Neoplatonic One becomes a call to an existential apophasis, a 
wandering. The One: that the origin with-draws, releasing forward, sketching, an open road.  
 My claim is that when Kierkegaard speaks of God as “infinite reduplication” a similar 
apophatic open-endedness or whylessness is being affirmed. Kierkegaard also speaks of God as 
“unconditioned, being in and for itself,” which I will also unpack in chapter three. This is another 
way of naming the pure—unconditioned—self-reversion or repetition that constitutes the divine 
or absolute as “nothing,” nothing determinate, nothing but an infinite intimacy with and longing 
for its own nothingness that in the instant of creation becomes an infinite roominess for and 
intimacy with creatures. Kierkegaard here brings himself into structural similarity with Eckhart’s 
Neoplatonic apophaticism of the One, the unity-in-reduplication that constitutes the Godhead. 
Accordingly, the existential thrust of Kierkegaard’s theology also drives toward whylessness, a 
whylessness that is an “offense” to the understanding that seeks reasons and grounds. Why 
should a person venture or let go of everything for the sake of the absolute, that is, die to the 
world, the world structured by projects and calculations? Kierkegaard answers, “Well, there is no 
‘why’; so it is indeed lunacy, says the understanding. There is no ‘why,’ because there is an 
infinite ‘why.’ But where the understanding comes to a standstill in this way, there is the 
possibility of offense. If there is to be any triumphant breakthrough, there must be faith.”66  
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Moreover, Kierkegaard, like Eckhart, construes the “breakthrough” of faith as a breaking 
through into joy, the whyless joy of the moment of birth, “the blissful security of the moment,”67 
the joy of the lilies and the birds who live only for today, rather than the calculated joy of a 
project that has the care and worry of tomorrow. Willing the latter, “perhaps one becomes 
something great in the world, scores extraordinary success, is honored and praised by one’s 
contemporaries as the greatest man of the age, etc.”68 Whyless willing, by contrast, dislodges one 
from the movement of becoming something, the movement toward identity, and therefore it 
incites the offense of the world. “The infinite loftiness of living for the absolute is expressed by 
becoming scum in the world, an object of mockery and disdain…in whom the world sees a 
criminal,”69 that is, an “errant one,” in Shurmann’s language. For Kierkegaard and Eckhart, a 
whyless, offensive joy that abides even in suffering, even through the loss of outward 
recognition, place, and identity, is the lunacy of apophatic faith.  
 In Kierkegaard, too, I am claiming, the Neoplatonic One becomes a lived whylessness, an 
existential apophasis, a joyful excess at the heart of willing. Purity of heart is to will “one” thing, 
namely, the good reduplicated into itself and so withdrawn from external reasons or 
justifications, from result-oriented willing that Kierkegaard calls “double-mindedness.” The 
good has no “why,” no telos beyond itself. The good is the good only in relation to itself. To will 
the good for fear of punishment, out of desire for reward or success, to be seen as a good person, 
to enforce a morality, to protect an institution, etc., is precisely not to will the good. This is to 
will the good and some determinate end, which is to negate the good. The good is beyond good 
and evil, beyond the determinate distinctions through which the understanding represents the 
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good to itself.70 The good excludes or negates all such negations, for Kierkegaard. The good is 
pure, limitless affirmation, an apophatic, utterly free Yes! uttered in inwardness.71 
I want to claim, therefore, that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the single individual alone 
before God, which is not, it should be emphasized, an asocial individualism, is a reinscription of 
an unspeakable, unknowable “One,” “that one” [hiin Enkelte], withdrawn from objective 
attachment and determination, in Kierkegaard’s case from “the system” and “the crowd.” 
Kierkegaard does, like Hegel (and both are dependent here on Christian transformations of 
Neoplatonism), affirm the One only through an affirmation of multiplicity or difference. Each 
self, as that one, is a singular (non-identical) repetition of the One. But unlike Hegel, 
Kierkegaard does not sublate this multiplicity into an articulable unity or totality, the unity of the 
concept or the totality of the system or a determinate ethical community. The unity that unities 
all multiplicity, all singularities, cannot be said. In Works of Love, this is the unity of absolute 
equality, the absoluteness of equality, of being-with the neighbor. As absolute, this equality, 
which is our sharing and loving our absolute spacing from each other, is unsayable. Absolute 
equality—and Kierkegaard is clear in Works of Love that God simply is the principle of absolute 
equality, of “like for like”—is neither enforceable nor identifiable with anything objective. Its 
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trace is written in the command to love: you shall love the neighbor, whoever, whatever, 
however, whenever, wherever they are.  
Kierkegaard therefore lets “that one,” each one, be. He does not demand that the neighbor 
speak and articulate its identity within any determinate social idiom, such as politics, or even the 
church. He hears a different demand or duty with regard to the neighbor, the demand to let them 
be, to let them remain the secret, the singularity, the ever-renewed becoming that they are, and in 
that letting be, that hospitality, to love, which is to will the good. The gift of the singular 
neighbor, “that one,” each one, every one, is prior to any subject-object framework into which 
they might be translated, prior to any identity, prior to any determinate social belonging. Prior to 
any determinate belonging is a belonging to nothing, the divine nothing, which is why the 
highest willing of oneself (and the neighbor) is not the will to belong to “the crowd” but the 
longing for one’s (and the neighbor’s) being-given, for the instant of birth that precedes and 
exceeds identity. All translation of the self into an articulable identity must therefore fall 
backward, or forward, into silence. If there is recognition in love, it is an apophatic recognition. 
To love is to let the neighbor live without telling them who they are or where they belong. It is to 
let oneself live without being told who one is by “the others.” The good, the gift: to let the self be 
its silent, never finished movement, its longing, to let love become the love of secrets, to unhand 
the self before God where it may rest joyfully and freely in its becoming.  
vii    
Let me say a bit more about what I mean by an “existential apophasis” or apophatic willing, 
which will be fleshed out in the chapters on faith, hope, and love. Two things are central here, 
both of which come to Kierkegaard from the Eckhartian tradition: 1) An affirmation of the real 
not as being or presence but as the gift or birth of presence, an affirmation made in Eckhart’s 
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Gottesburt, the birth of God in the soul, and repeated in Kierkegaard’s Øieblikket, the instant. 
This is an affirmation of reality in terms of event, a coming into existence by virtue of an instant 
prior to all presence, an instant that on the horizon of presence is “nothing.” 2) Undergoing or 
“appropriating” this instant, this birth or being-given, which is always only appropriated as in-
appropriable, is the movement of releasement or letting-go: Gelassenheit, in Eckhartian terms, 
“faith,” in Kierkegaardian terms.  
By conceiving of God as pure subjectivity and infinite reduplication, an infinite 
reduplication of subjectivity, Kierkegaard repeats a central move of Neoplatonic apophatic 
theologies that I have already begun to trace: he removes the cause or principle of existence from 
the order of determinate being leaving existence “ungrounded” before what can only be 
described and related to as “nothing,” “the nothing that interlaces existence.”72 This move goes 
back to Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius and extends through Eckhart and Nicholas Cusanus and 
beyond.73 Eckhart speaks of God as pure intellect that is absolutely absolved of determinate 
being, a pure openness, attention, and intimacy without determination. The birth of God in the 
soul, therefore, which is the enactment of inwardness, is the event of Gelassenheit, the letting go 
of being and the will to determine and a sinking into nothing. “Releasement” is apophatic 
willing.  
Kierkegaard repeats this gesture when he speaks of God as pure subjectivity that “has 
nothing of objective being.”74 This leads him to speak of faith as an “absolute sinking”75 and a  
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“letting go”76 through which “the existence of God…emerges.”77 God comes into existence, is 
birthed, only through and for faith, but not as some-thing that the intellect grasps, neither this nor 
that. God comes into existence as nothing, nothing objective, as pure subjectivity, as the longing 
of and for birth. God is the very event of releasement, a letting go that releases the opening, the 
beginning, the instant of coming into existence. In the instant of faith, which corresponds to the 
Neoplatonic and Eckhartian instant of “breakthrough,” divine subjectivity is not mediated 
through any objective positivity. The instant of faith reduplicates or repeats divine subjectivity as 
“an infinite negative resolution, [a letting go of all objective being], which is the individuality’s 
infinite form of God’s being within him.”78 Becoming a self before God means becoming a 
releasement from being, a nothing, a nothin-ing, an apophatic becoming, alive only on the pure 
freedom and longing that is the breath of God. To live into this freedom is to “sink into one’s 
own nothingness,”79 which is to sink into the moment of birth that is prior to presence, the 
moment that births presence. In the bewilderment of this moment one is nothing but a 
reduplicated instant of birth. One is set in motion absolutely, apophatically, withdrawn and 
withdrawing from objective identity, place, and position. “The more pure a person is, the more 
he approaches inability to be an object to others persons.”80 The self before God flies and leaps 
and dances into existence.  
This freedom that is God comes into existence not through positive exertion or forceful 
intrusion, but only through a letting go, through a letting-in of an inappropriable opening that is a 
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dislodging of the knowing, willing subject. God and self are always mutually implicated events 
in Kierkegaard, as they are in Eckhart, meaning that neither God nor the self ever objectively 
“is.” God does not exist as an immanent object or ground for the knowing subject: “God does not 
exist, he is eternal.”81 Neither does the self exist as an immanent being that as such is 
analogically related to transcendent Being: “There is no immanental underlying kinship between 
the temporal and the eternal.”82 God and self come into existence together as an ethical-religious 
event that is “let be” by the self that becomes nothing. This is why Abraham, for Johannes de 
Silentio, “conquered God by his powerlessness.”83  
One can give this paradoxical statement an Eckhartian reading.84 God beyond any 
objective “God” of human willing and conception is, as it were, “let be” by powerlessness, 
repeated into existence through the movement of releasement. Kierkegaard writes, “It is self-
renunciation which discovers that God is.”85 Such renunciation lets go of the “self” that holds 
“God” calculatively (ontologically) in place and is itself held in place by “God.” The instant one 
lets go of this “self” and its will to ground itself and the “God” that is the result of this will, 
“God” is conquered and one is free of “God,” and God beyond “God,” God as God, is given 
birth, as the very joy and power of the self’s releasement. “The one who will work,” writes 
Johannes de Silentio, “gives birth to his own father.”86 Faith is the work of giving oneself one’s 
own divine origin as a work of letting go of oneself as origin, releasing oneself into an absolute 
origin or beginning that is one’s eternal being given into time and existence. Faith gives the self 
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its being given. Faith is a repetition of the self’s being given, a letting-be of God’s letting-be. 
This is a precise Eckhartian paradox. Eckhart writes, “Out of the purity he everlastingly bore me, 
his only-born Son, into that same image of his eternal Fatherhood, that I may be Father and give 
birth to him of who I am born…God acts like that: He gives birth to his Only-Begotten 
Son…into me, so I give him birth again into the Father.”87  
This is an articulation of the self as an event of origination, a coming into existence, a 
birth to presence that is its own condition of possibility—a “miracle.”88 In the working of faith, 
the self sinks into its nothingness where it abides in the instant of its birth out of nothing. 
“Work,” here, because it is the work of sinking into one’s giftedness, becomes “play,”89 a letting 
go into existence as gift. This transforms all of life into a “joyful surprise” full of “wonder”90 
rather than a calculated advance or despairing resignation. Faith relates to existence neither as 
grounded in an eternal presence that one “recollects” nor as set adrift on “a vast, never appeased 
emptiness,”91 but as the gift or letting be of presence that one “repeats” by letting oneself be 
given into time as an event of freedom that leaves one “astonished,”92 in awe that one is here, 
alive, living, breathing, even though one is nothing. Faith, then, lets go even of letting go, which 
could become a subtle gesture of mastery, a resignation or flight from existence. Letting go 
absolutely is a “double movement” or repetition through which one lets oneself be given into 
time and existence passionately as a “boundless reality.”93 The “only possible hindrance” to this 
boundless joy “is a person when he himself wants to be something” rather than “nothing”94: “If, 
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however, a person knew how to make himself truly what he truly is—nothing—knew how to set 
the seal of patience on what he had understood—ah, then his life, whether he is the greatest or 
the lowliest, would even today be a joyful surprise.”95  
viii 
I would locate the difference between Kierkegaard’s apophaticism and certain Neoplatonic 
apophaticisms in the different locations and trajectories of apophatic ecstasy or breakthrough into 
what is beyond knowledge. The breakthrough into the One, for Plotinus, is an ecstasy that 
launches one out of time and out of the body. The breakthrough into “that one,” for Kierkegaard, 
is a breakthrough into one-self as an ecstatic movement into time and therefore into and through 
the body. This is why Kierkegaard prefers dancing metaphors: leaps, movements, and positions. 
It is why thought, for him, is not motionless contemplation, but “walking”96—quite literally 
walking, Kierkegaard loved to walk!97 Becoming nothing is not the cessation of worldly passion 
and engagement, but, as I‘ve said, the condition for an infinite engagement beyond posited, 
teleological grounds: “to become nothing before God, and nevertheless infinitely, 
unconditionally engaged.”98    
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The distinctiveness of Kierkegaard’s apophaticism lies in his treatment of God’s non-
objectivity as an ethical-religious exigency rather than as an isolated epistemological or 
ontological problematic. Apophasis is an existential, spiritual task, an education into “the silent 
and voracious eloquence of action.”99 Forerunners to Kierkegaard in this regard, besides Eckhart, 
are various figures from mystical and pietist traditions, such as Marguerite Porete, Teresa of 
Avilla, John of the Cross, and Jakob Böhme, among others. Kierkegaard adopts the tropes of 
“becoming nothing” and “inner annihilation” that operate centrally in these authors as apophatic, 
ethical-religious orientations to life. And although Kierkegaard does not explicitly adopt the 
theme of mystical union, something like mystical union is operative in his thought, especially 
when the language of “becoming nothing” emerges. Human subjectivity and divine subjectivity 
sink into each other at the point where both are nothing. Kierkegaard writes:  
Whom should the struggler desire to resemble other than God? But if he himself is 
something or wants to be something, this something is sufficient to hinder the 
resemblance. Only when he himself becomes nothing, only then can God illuminate him 
so that he resembles God. However great he is, he cannot manifest God’s likeness; God 
can imprint himself in him only when he himself has become nothing. When the ocean is 
exerting all its power, that is precisely the time when it cannot reflect the image of 
heaven, and even the slightest motion blurs the image; but when it becomes still and 
deep, then the image of heaven sinks into its nothingness.100 
 
Particularly striking in this regard are the resonances between Porete’s “sea of joy” and 
Kierkegaard’s “70,000 fathoms of water.” Both are metaphors for an abyss of indetermination 
that opens an insane, dangerous joy: “Where is the right place [to be joyful]?” asks Kierkegaard. 
“It is—in danger. To be joyful out on 70,000 fathoms of water, many, many miles from all 
human help—yes, that is something great!”101 For Porete and Kierkegaard, to live before God as 
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nothing, which is to live “in”102 God, is to undergo the joyful liquidation of objective identity and 
purpose and become the joy of coming into existence upon an open sea of possibility. Porete 
says “farewell” to ecclesial virtues insofar as they are positive, determinate pathways to identity 
and recognition. The nothingness of her liquid joy is better to her than who she could become if 
she submitted to ecclesial authority and regimen, an authority and regimen that ended up putting 
her to death for refusing to recant her farewell.103 Echoing Porete, Kierkegaard also dethrones 
virtue: “this is one of the most decisive definitions for all Christianity—that the opposite of sin is 
not virtue but faith.”104 Those who cling to their own capability “swim in the shallows in the 
company of waders.” This “is not the religious.”105 Faith swims out in the deep where even 
virtues are liquidated. 
One of my intentions in the following chapters is to explore how, in Kierkegaard’s hands, 
the traditional theological virtues—faith, hope, and love—break from the discourses of habit, 
capability, and recognition, which are all discourses of determination, of the self as something. 
Faith, hope, and love, for Kierkegaard, are not immanent teleological orientations toward a 
socially mediated good, nor does the willing subject acquire them as self-possessed capabilities. 
Decision for the good always takes place in some measure “alone” without the determination of 
“the others,” and moral and ethical capability are always in some measure too late with regard to 
the difficulty of existence, which puts one “out on the ‘70,000 fathoms deep,’ before one learns 
to be able.”106 Learning faith, hope, and love is a matter of abiding before God in “the continual 
understanding that I am able to do nothing at all.”107 This is a consent to a disability, a 
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nothingness, that is a constitutive, and not merely contingent, feature of being a self: “And it is 
difficult to understand this, [that I am able to do nothing at all], to understand it not at the 
moment when one actually is unable to do anything, when one is sick, in low spirits, but to 
understand it at the moment when one seemingly is capable of doing everything.”108 To will 
one’s own nothingness in all one’s willing, willing even the nothingness of one’s own willing, is 
to release oneself into God in whom one is “able to do everything.”109 Here complete disability 
and complete ability coincide, which is a “contradiction in blessedness and terror.”110 Willing 
nothing is a lived coincidence of opposites that unities “strenuousness” with something “quite 
easy.”111 There is nothing harder, and nothing easier, than letting go. “The difficulty, therefore, is 
just that I am to work together with God, if not in any other way, then through the continual 
understanding that I am able to do nothing at all.”112   
Also particularly striking with regard to the letting go of capability are the resonances 
between John of the Cross’ “dark night of the spirit” and Kierkegaard’s meditations on despair, 
spiritual trial, and God as unconditioned darkness.113 Consider the following passage from 
Kierkegaard: 
By nature human beings dread walking in the dark—no wonder, then, that they by nature 
dread the unconditioned, getting involved with the unconditioned, of which it holds true 
that no night and 'no darkness is half so black' as this darkness and this night in which all 
relative goals...in which all considerations (the lights we generally use to help ourselves), 
in which even the most sensitive and warmest feelings of devotion—are extinguished, for 
otherwise it is not unconditionally the unconditioned…Only when every ‘Why’ vanishes 
in the night of the unconditioned and becomes silent in the silence of the unconditioned, 
                                                     
108 WL, 363. 
109 WL, 362. 
110 WL, 362. 
111 WL, 362-3. 
112 WL, 363. 
113 See Simon D. Podmore’s books, Kierkegaard and the Self Before God: Anatomy of the Abyss (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2011), and Struggling with God: Kierkegaard and the Temptation of Spiritual Trial (James 
Clarke & Co., 2013). 
  38 
only then can a person venture everything…In the unconditioned all teleology 
vanishes…114 
 
As with John of the Cross and other mystics, the journey into God involves the dispossession and 
frustration of plans, expectations, representations, and even the warmest of religious feelings. 
One must let go of anything and everything one might be tempted to hang on to, including one’s 
virtue. This is not, however, a plunge into nihilism or a hatred of life. It is, as I’ve already 
mentioned, the opening of a relation to life beyond posited, teleological grounds. The “non-
experience” of relating to God as darkness is the pathway out of our “natural” expectations, 
ideas, and ideological positionings of God, ourselves, and each other, and so the beginning of a 
freedom and transformation of desire that “turns everything upside down”115 in a limitless 
affirmation that endures all things, hopes all things, believes all things, and is never put to shame. 
The darkness, negativity, and non-objectivity of God does not take one out of the world or put 
one in an apathetic or stoic relationship to life. It opens a different way of being in and with the 
world, dead to the world insofar as it is dead to itself in self-consuming despair, but supremely 
alive to God’s action in the world and so alive to the world as an arena of gift, mercy, and 
novelty. God’s action and presence is undergone as a kind of darkness, a “wound of negativity” 
that cannot be conscripted into any human project, plan, or aspiration, and this is exactly why it 
is freeing. The movements of faith, hope, and love are, for Kierkegaard, “appropriations” of this 
negativity, an appropriation of what always remains inappropriable, rendering human existence 
an expropriation unto God, a releasement or letting go that provocatively trusts that with God all 
things are possible, that nothing is finished, that God is the negation of every closure and the 
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giver of infinite beginnings. The apophatic in Kierkegaard is located here, where existence is 
held open before the supreme difficulty of learning this trust, which is a learning of silence. 
ix 
Kierkegaard’s christology, which is an affirmation of “absolute paradox,” an unmediated 
coincidence of opposites, gathers and intensifies all of these threads. I will offering a reading of a 
few of his christological texts in the following chapters, showing that his christology is 
apophatic. Divine revelation in Christ does not supply determinate knowledge. God’s 
unknowability is not negatable. Unknowability is not primarily a function of the internal limits of 
the knowing subject but a function of God’s absoluteness. Revelation, rather than overcoming 
hiddenness through the giving of knowledge, is the revelation of hiddenness: “God manifests 
himself; this is known by the fact that God hides himself.”116 “In Christ everything is revealed—
and everything is hidden.”117 Revelation occasions the release of knowledge through which one 
unknows both God and oneself and so relates to God as God and to the self as self, to both as 
nothing. Christ is the opening in history of God’s absoluteness, an opening that occasions not 
determinate knowing but an ever-deepening passion or longing that expresses itself in unhanded 
action not identifiable with any determinate project, outcome, or success. Kierkegaard’s 
emphasis on “imitation” and the “contemporaneity” of Christ, rather than on knowledge of 
Christ, configures christology in an apophatic key. Before Christ, one is given to act in ways that 
release knowledge and embrace risk and uncertainty. Christology is the site of an apophasis of 
action, where action, as absolute action, action as abandon, has “no ‘Why’ at all.”118   
x       
                                                     
116 Pap. X3 A 626. 
117 JP, 2397. 
118 JP, 4901. 
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Before going on to explore in more detail the logic (or beyond logic) of infinite reduplication and 
pure subjectivity, and the virtues (or beyond virtues) of faith, hope, and love, I want in chapter 
two to turn my attention to Kierkegaard as a writer, specifically to his authorship as a 
performance of “indirect communication.” My aim is to draw out the apophatic logic of 
indirection as one that is intimately related to the apophatic logic of reduplication. Kierkegaard’s 
writing is reduplicated discourse. Its “what,” its content, is reduplicated or reflected through its 
“how,” its form. There is, therefore, never any finalized or objective “what.” Form is content. Or 
Kierkegaard’s forms open discourse beyond the production of scientific content, beyond results, 
conclusions, or any objectivity on which it could find support. The stylistic passion and 
elusiveness with which Kierkegaard writes is not adventitious fancy. Nor is it subordinate to a 
more measured and manageable objectivity. The style of the authorship has everything to do 
with how one communicates what cannot be said, which is its burning passion.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
INDIRECT COMMUNICATION: WRITING NOTHING 
 
 
 
This plurality of voices, pens, positions, and literary jokers—which are also present in the most 
philosophical parts of the work (the Fragments and Postscript)—necessitates a never resting attentiveness 
on the part of the reader. The reader must have a dual view, which not only grasps what Kierkegaard 
writes, but also how he writes what he writes. And if one could wish for a future reading of Kierkegaard, I 
would wish for a less reverent, more flippant reading than in earlier generations. A reading that delivers a 
type of restrained affection or a 'sympathetic antipathy'—to say it along with Vigilius Haufniensis. A 
reading that makes use of the rhetorical discipline and irony that the authorship itself prefers, but at the 
same time turns irony upon itself in order to counteract itself. A reading that does not fall for a 
reductionistic theory of stages, and is not blind to the existential progression and conceptual development 
throughout the authorship. A reading that does not naively lead the work back to the author behind it, but 
that is aware of the complex and dramatic connection between life and writing. A reading that mixes blood 
and ink with a science of cheerfulness, and thus, in praxis, shows that cheerfulness can be a part of science, 
and that seriousness is never necessarily found where it seems most obvious. A reading with a sense for 
rhetoric—a sense that rhetoric is not merely decoration and exterior ornamentation, but is essentially 
written into the discourse and is thus inextricable from both epistemology and edification. And finally, a 
reading that bears witness to the fact that the seemingly most useless parts of the Kierkegaardian corpus—
everything in the margins and all the fragmentary material—is in reality the most indispensable, since it 
opposes every attempt to instrumentalize the texts and thereby be done with them. And if one asks why 
such a sense is important, the answer is simple: the indispensability of the useless corresponds to—in fact, 
is repeated in—the most fundamental existential phenomena that the authorship captures and illuminates 
both negatively and positively: phenomena like anxiety, despair, trust, devotion, faith, and forgiveness—
which also are just as useless and indispensable. 
May a sense for the indispensability of the useless therefore be an edifying pulse in every 
deconstructive reading of Kierkegaard. — Joakim Garff1  
 
 
i 
One could write endlessly about the hermeneutical challenges that Kierkegaard’s authorship 
poses, itself an indicator of the authorship’s apophatic elusiveness. What I intend in this chapter 
is to open a few of these challenges, not in order to resolve them but simply to enter them, to 
mark or trace some of winding curves of Kierkegaard’s writing through which it withdraws from 
                                                     
1 Joakim Garff, “The Esthetic is Above All My Element,” in The New Kierkegaard. ed. Elsebet Jegstrup 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 69-70. 
  42 
direct appropriation and understanding. The relation between form and content will emerge as 
my central preoccupation. Mark Jordan notes that, “The theological reception of Kierkegaard has 
been a long denial of his experimentation with forms…Kierkegaard’s most striking experiments 
with form are set aside, with palpable relief, as super-subtle and superfluous ironies, raucous 
excesses unrelated to his pedagogical purposes.”2 Jordan locates the denial of Kierkegaard’s 
experimentation with forms in the desire to find in him a “reassuring orthodoxy” in which his 
“extraordinary range of voices and genres, of histrionic gestures and fantastic scenes, 
is…dismissed as so much adolescent rebellion now happily surpassed.”3 With Jordan, I regard 
attention to form to be essential to reading Kierkegaard well, to reading him well theologically. 
An inattention to genre, style, mood, and the pervasively theatrical character of Kierkegaard’s 
writing diminishes its interpretation significantly. Specifically, it disallows full recognition of 
how pervasive its apophaticism is, an apophaticism that constitutes its theological core. 
Attending to the apophatic in Kierkegaard is not simply a matter of pointing out the passages that 
mention silence or infinite qualitative difference. More is required of the interpreter, namely, an 
attention to how the forms of Kierkegaard’s writing aim to open the reader out toward what they 
cannot say directly. As Heidegger puts it: “The point is not to listen to a series of propositions, 
but rather to follow the movement of showing.”4 What follows in this chapter is an attempt at a 
kind of “attunement” to how the apophatic shows itself in Kierkegaard’s texts, a showing that is 
always at the same time a hiding.   
 The movement of this chapter, therefore, will not strictly conform to what is typically 
taken to be proper academic style: a logical sequence of steps that produce the form of an 
                                                     
2 Mark Jordan, “The Modernity of Christian Theology or Writing Kierkegaard Again for the First Time,” Modern 
Theology 27:3 July 2011, 449. 
3 Jordan, “Writing Kierkegaard Again,” 449. 
4 Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being (New York: Harper Collins, 1977), 2. 
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argument. Kierkegaard does not write this way. He does not argue in scientific sequences. He 
persuades by performing otherwise, in artistic sequences. His aim is not to secure the legitimacy 
or finality of propositions but to open theaters of communication in which readers can roam and 
respond freely. (There is an ethics of writing here). Kierkegaard’s texts seek to form the heart, 
and therefore their forms seek to disrupt the result-oriented scientific mind and the forms of truth 
it presupposes. Kierkegaardian truth is art rather than science: “The subjective thinker is not a 
scientist-scholar; he is an artist. To exist is an art.”5 My aim in this chapter is to let some of this 
artistry show itself, to let it speak toward the silence it seeks to communicate.  
ii 
I want to begin by highlighting the difficulty of finding a position or point of view from which to 
comment on Kierkegaard’s texts in such a way that does not betray them, block their flow, or 
overwhelm their elusiveness. The difficulty is that the aim of Kierkegaard’s writing is not the 
production of objects of scientific analysis, even if scientific analysis of his writings is entirely 
possible. The aim of Kierkegaard’s writing is the enacted life of hiin Enkelte, “that single 
individual,” whose life as enacted withdraws from objective analysis. How does one comment on 
a writer who writes toward that which continually withdraws from and resists objective analysis? 
How does this withdrawal, and the failure to represent that which withdraws, show up in the 
commentary? That is the difficulty.  
There are no simple or straightforward solutions to this difficulty. It is the difficulty of 
commenting on apophatic discourse generally, which, as Michael Sells emphasizes, should be 
distinguished from apophatic “theory.”6 Apophatic discourse, rather than directly theorizing what 
cannot be said as an object of thought, continually reverts upon and moves against itself, 
                                                     
5 CUP, 351. 
6 Sells, Michael. Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
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performatively unsaying itself. To comment on apophatic discourse as if its subject matter were 
something simply present and available to be commented on is to betray that discourse deeply. It 
is to attempt to force out into the open what desires to remain in secret.  
Apophatic discourses themselves are of course caught in the same dilemma. To speak of 
what cannot be said, even to speak of it as “unsayable,” is a betrayal of what cannot be said. 
What marks apophatic discourses as apophatic is not so much their taking up “the unsayable” as 
an object of thought. It is more their refusal to stay put or occupy a determinate discursive 
position, their willingness to take back and negate everything that is given in speech, even 
negations, or to take back as the manner of giving, destabilizing both affirmation and negation. It 
is this elusiveness and unceasing movement, often quite subtle, that the commentator must 
become attuned to, with a patience, humility, and artistic ear that work against the scientific 
desire to “master” texts. 
The simultaneity of giving and taking back, a way of writing that weds itself neither 
simply to affirmation nor simply to negation, and therefore maintains itself above all as a way or 
path or movement rather than a series of achieved propositions or conclusions, is what 
Kierkegaard practices as “indirect communication” and “double-reflection.”7 Indirection and 
double-reflection form discourse as a movement of unceasing de-flection in which the movement 
of thought and articulation does not simply return to itself as re-flection, as achieved concepts or 
conclusions. To “double” reflection is to in-direct it, to deflect thought off itself, to un-master it. 
Such deflection, which requires that one write at a slant or with a swerve, with an artistic touch 
and flare, is how Kierkegaard lets discourse remain restless, beyond any determinate position or 
self-possessed meaning. Indirect communication, which seeks to communicate what cannot be 
                                                     
7 CUP, 73ff. 
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said, to speak and not speak at the same time, is the opening of an apophatic hermeneutical space 
between text and reader in which meaning or truth is never directly or objectively present. The 
meaning or truth that Kierkegaard’s texts perform is always one that is to be opened and enacted 
silently, secretly, and singularly by hiin Enkelte. Truth occurs only as it is deflected into the 
reader’s own lived existence rather than reflected in an abstract consciousness.  
It is crucial to recognize here that indirection is not an adventitious feature of 
Kierkegaard’s writing, as if behind its literary elusiveness lies a body of objective content that is 
the abstractable “point” of the authorship. The inability to communicate truth objectively goes, 
as it were, all the way down. Indirection responds to the essential elusiveness of truth, its 
essential withdrawnness and uncertainty, which is only heightened and intensified as one moves 
from the aesthetic through the ethical to the religious. The paradoxical simultaneity of giving and 
taking back that indirection enacts is not simply a clever literary method. It finds its deepest 
justification and impetus, indeed its necessity, in the weightiest of Kierkegaard’s philosophical 
and theological categories, above all in the paradoxical simultaneity of time and eternity that 
religiousness enacts in which time is thrown open, off itself, into an infinite beginning by 
eternity coming into existence in time. Kierkegaard’s writing unfolds at this intersection, in the 
passion between time and eternity in which they touch, elusively. He writes, one might say, with 
one eye looking into time, the other looking into eternity, with a sort of crossed-eyed double-
vision. The eye facing eternity faces a nothingness, a blank, a blinding and therefore 
Kierkegaard, if you will, winks at his reader as he writes, disrupting and deflecting his own 
discourse even as he writes it, “writing in order to erase,”8 the way a wink disrupts and deflects 
the gaze even as it performs it. This is exactly the sense of Øieblikket, the glance of the eye, in 
                                                     
8 EUD, 67. 
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which eternity approaches and withdraws in the same instant, opening time forward. An 
approach that withdraws as it approaches, deflecting its own approach, is one that makes room. 
Kierkegaard writing, I am claiming, moves to the rhythm of such an opening. He writes in order 
to make room for his reader, to release the reader forward into the roominess that eternity opens 
in time, rather than to suffocate her or him with a smothering, tightly determined discourse.    
Through multiple gestures (irony, humor, playfulness, hyperbole, a plurality of genres 
and moods, pseudonymity, etc.), Kierkegaard inscribes an indetermination into the heart of his 
authorship, an excess or roominess that should be let be. The goal for the commentator, I would 
suggest, ought to be to avoid translating the movement of indirection and deflection into 
something masterable or finalizable by scientific thought, as if it were simply a method for 
delivering certain definable results, or something to be tidied up into useable conclusions or 
concepts. Kierkegaard writes beyond the concept, beyond even his own concepts, or he allows a 
beyond, a rupture, a fragmenting, a winking into the writing of concepts. He writes not in order 
to secure for himself or for his reader objective conclusions but in order to release and revitalize 
subjectivity: an energy, a passion, a sense, an anger, a tenderness, a sorrow, a joy, a laughter that 
concepts as such cannot allow to burst forth.  
Hiin Enkelte, “that single individual,” is the limit concept of Kierkegaard’s writing, the 
limit of the concept, the stumbling block on which every concept trips and falls, or else learns to 
dance, to get off itself. Hiin—“that”—pushes Enkelte beyond the concept, beyond the abstraction 
of “the” individual to that one, right here. Hiin indicates the movement of an address—“My dear 
reader!”—an address that is already a response to what opens, to what is given, prior to thought 
and prior to speech, the sheer thatness of that other, the shock of relation and responsibility that 
elicits a joy (and suffering) that arrives before language and outlasts it. One might think of the 
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joy of babies (in-fants, non-speakies), little balls of beginning and birth, who learn to smile in the 
presence of the other before they learn to speak, who burst with the joy (and suffering) of 
existence before learning the “ambiguous art”9 of language. Kierkegaard writes in order to return 
his reader to, to repeat forward, this smile older (and newer) than speech: 
Thus the upbuilding address is fighting in many ways for the eternal to be victorious in a 
person, but in the appropriate place and with the aid of the lily and the bird, it does not 
forget first and foremost to relax into a smile. Relax, you struggling one! One can forget 
how to laugh, but God keep a person from ever forgetting how to smile!10         
 
Kierkegaard’s wink always comes with a smile, an apophatic smile, with the joy of relating and 
communicating outside of, beyond, prior to, along the edge of, or simply without the concept. 
Academics, as a rule, are trained to forget how to smile, especially in their writing. To read 
Kierkegaard well, however, one must be able to see him smiling and winking and dancing, 
letting the outside in. 
___  
None of this requires the abandonment of critical thought or academic precision, only that they 
must be allowed to founder upon “the illusiveness of the infinite”11 which withdraws from any 
direct communication or understanding. Apophatic, indirect communication “invests everything 
in the process of becoming and omits the result.”12 Johannes Climacus calls this “having style.”13 
The writer who has style “is never finished with something but ‘stirs the waters of language’ 
whenever he begins, so that to him the most ordinary expression comes into existence with 
newborn originality.”14 Style expresses itself as a perpetual beginning, a coming into existence 
                                                     
9 EUD, 231. 
10 CD, 12. 
11 CUP, 86. 
12 CUP, 73. 
13 CUP, 86. 
14 CUP, 86. 
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that has no objective telos. One might say it is a saying that omits any finalized said, or a saying 
that is itself the to-be-said, a saying which lets speech abide in its birth rather than in its closure. 
The author who writes with apophatic style desires not to win the reader to a cause or agenda but 
is concerned above all, as Climacus puts it, with “setting the other free.”15 Commentary alive to 
such a concern for the reader’s freedom, commentary that comments with style, might learn to 
write apophatically about apophasis, or indirectly about indirection, winking back at 
Kierkegaard’s wink.  
The real difficulty of reading Kierkegaard lies not in synthesizing a massive and complex 
body of writing, although this is difficulty enough. Kierkegaard would call this “worldly” 
difficulty, the kind of difficulty that concerns “assistant professors.” The existential, spiritual 
difficulty of reading Kierkegaard, especially since “Kierkegaard” is an academic industry, lies in 
learning how to resist turning his writing into something directly appropriable, whether in the 
form of careerist academic commentary or literal spiritual protocols. Kierkegaard desires to 
withdraw from the scene of his writing as an authority. His aim is to incite thinking and spiritual 
searching but never to give anybody direct answers. Attending to this withdrawal is the central 
difficulty.  
In a draft of a preface to a collection of upbuilding discourses, Kierkegaard writes of his 
desire to withdraw: 
Dear Reader, please accept this dedication. It is offered, as it were, blindly, but therefore 
in all honesty, untroubled by any other consideration. I do not know who you are; I do 
not know where you are; I do not know your name—I do not even know if you exist or if 
you perhaps did exist and are no more, or whether your time is still coming. Yet you are 
my hope, my joy, my pride, in the uncertainty of you, my honor—because if I knew you 
personally with a worldly certainty, this would be my shame, my guilt—and my honor 
would be lost. It comforts me, dear reader, that you have this opportunity, the opportunity 
for which I know I have honestly worked. If it were feasible that reading what I write 
came to be common practice, or at least pretending to have read it in hopes of getting 
                                                     
15 CUP, 74. 
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ahead in the world, this would not be the opportune time for my reader, because then the 
misunderstanding would have triumphed…No, if reading what I write becomes a dubious 
good…or still better, if it becomes foolish and ludicrous to read my writings, or even 
better, if it becomes a contemptible matter so that no one dares to acknowledge it, that is 
the opportune time for my reader; then he does not read for my sake or for the world’s 
sake—but for his own sake, then he reads in such a way that he does not seek my 
acquaintance but avoids it—and then he is my reader.16  
 
To be an academic reader of Kierkegaard is perhaps de facto to cease to be his reader, the reader 
he longed for, who reads in secret. To read Kierkegaard “objectively,” I might even venture, is to 
misread him. Those seeking the authorial intention behind Kierkegaard’s texts will find a 
Gelassenheit, a letting go of the text, a letting be of the reader, a withdrawal that opens the space 
of edification.  
I say all of this not to disparage the genre of academic commentary—here I am after 
all!—but I do want to signal the limitations of this genre, limitations that become particularly 
acute when commenting on a figure like Kierkegaard. His authorship sits awkwardly within 
academic discourse. I do not take his mockery of “assistant professors” as an isolated critique of 
19th century Hegelians. I take it as a perpetual challenge to the academic mind and vocation as 
such. It is not that Kierkegaard does not give the academic mind an abundance of important 
material to think about. His writing, however, is rooted in and invites participation in an 
apophatic impulse and energy that cannot be tamed by scientific or professional frames. It 
unleashes what William Franke calls “the unruly energy of the unsayable.”17 Attending to such 
energy, as Franke writes, “calls for rethinking some of the elementary automatisms of our 
reading, which is continually at risk of degenerating into mere consumption of standardized 
intellectual commodities.”18 Kierkegaard’s texts find their home in silent appropriation and the 
                                                     
16 JP, 5948. 
17 Franke, A Philosophy of the Unsayable, 6. 
18 Franke, A Philosophy of the Unsayable, 6. 
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personal witness of an enacted life. Reading them well therefore requires intuiting something 
beyond their positive, scientifically transcribable sense. As Craig Keen puts it:  
To read Kierkegaard well is alternately to feel the warm breeze of a bright autumn 
evening, the biting gust of a blizzard in the dead of winter, the cool rain-scented rush at 
the forward edge of a fast moving hot summer storm; or alternately to hear the first gasp 
and cry of a newborn baby, the faint rattle in the throat of a dying parent, the rapid 
breathing of lovers, the sob and sigh of an abandoned child, the near breathless spasms at 
the end of a prolonged bout of laughter. Kierkegaard is the wind.19  
 
Academic framing ought, therefore, to keep its edges wild. Perhaps then it might make room for 
what exceeds and unsettles them.20 
iii  
To communicate with style is to enter and suffer the “passion of thought.”21 To think and write 
along with Kierkegaard’s texts is to follow a movement of “reduplication” [Fordoblelse]22 in 
which “what” is thought is not separable from “how” it is thought, “which is ‘the earnestness.’”23 
Content reduplicates as form in Kierkegaard, specifically as forms that perform their own 
incompleteness: “This again is the dialectical movement…or it is the dialectical method: 
                                                     
19 Craig Keen, “Prayer: Standing Up to the Coming of God,” Unpublished paper, 2013.  
20 Kierkegaard’s own academic dissertation, The Concept of Irony, pushes on the borders of academic framing. Not 
only did he write in Danish instead of the more academically proper Latin, he experimented with a free-flowing 
style that he anticipated would receive pushback from his examiners: “I have worked on this dissertation with fear 
and trembling lest my dialectic swallow too much. The ease of style will be censured. One or another half-educated 
Hegelian robber will say that the subjective is too prominent. First of all, I will ask him not to plague me with a 
rehash of this new wisdom that I must already regard as old, also not to place such great claims upon me: [let it be 
recognized] that the idea’s own movements should take place through me, that the idea should break out in me (for 
most young people burst forth, like the woman in Ludlams Hule, with a rustic region behind them), and, finally, 
[recognize] that one cannot write about a negative concept except in this way; and I ask him, instead of continually 
giving assurances that doubt is overcome, irony conquered, to permit it to speak for once. Moreover, whether I may 
have been too effusive at times, and since Hegel says with authority that the mind is the best epitomizer…let me be 
judged modestly and without any demands, but I will not be judged by boys…and if it should seem to one or another 
that this is madness, I will reply with Soc. (Phaedrus, 244 a): ‘[That would be right if it were an invariable truth that 
madness is an evil, but in reality, the greatest blessings come by way of madness, indeed of madness that is heaven-
sent].’And if something should be found, particularly in the first part of the dissertation, that one is generally not 
accustomed to come across in scholarly writings, the reader must forgive my jocundity, also that I, in order to 
lighten the burden, sometimes sing at my work.” CI, 440-1. 
21 PF, 37. 
22 PV, 9n. 
23 PV, 9n. 
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in working also to work against oneself, which is reduplication [Fordoblelse].”24 His authors aim 
to write ironically about irony, doubtingly about doubt, lovingly about love, passionately about 
passion. This means that content is never directly given and that the form or feel of the writing 
“says” just as much, if not more, than any positive content of the writing. The mood, attunement, 
or tone of a text is absolutely essential, perhaps most essential.25 This is not a mere stylistic or 
rhetorical preference for interesting and elusive writing. It has everything to do with the nature of 
thought itself, of the inseparability and mutual destabilization of thought, affect, and writing.  
Thought is thoroughly dialectical, for Kierkegaard’s Climacus: that which incites and 
enables thinking also ruptures and “torments”26 thinking at its most intimate and inceptual point. 
The passion of thought, “which is fundamentally present everywhere in thought,”27 is its 
impulsion towards “paradox.”28 Without paradox, thought is like a “lover without passion: a 
mediocre fellow.”29 Thought desires above all to be drawn beyond itself before a paradox; it 
wants “to discover something that thought itself cannot think.”30 Crucially, it is not just that 
thought wishes to acknowledge paradoxes at a comfortable distance, assigning them a place 
within the larger scope of reason—as is the case, perhaps, with Kant’s “antinomies.” Paradox is 
                                                     
24 PV, 9n. Continuing: “To endeavor or to work directly is to work or to endeavor directly in immediate connection 
with a factually given state of things. The dialectical method is the reverse: in working also to work against oneself, 
a reduplication [Fordoblelse], which is ‘the earnestness,’ like the pressure on the plow that determines the depth of 
the furrow, whereas the direct endeavor is a glossing-over, which is finished more rapidly and also is much, much 
more rewarding—that is, it is worldliness and homogeneity.” 
25 JP, 6032: “I have finished ‘Works of Love,’ final copy and all. While working on No. VIII I felt a little tired and 
thought of traveling to Berlin. I did not dare allow myself that for fear of getting too far away from the decisive 
mood. I stuck it out. God be praised, it went all right. Oh, while people deride and ridicule all the work I do, I thank 
God who grants success to it. Yes, take everything else I have had, the best is still an original and, God be praised, 
indestructible blessed conception that God is love. No matter how hopeless things have seemed to me many times, I 
scrape together all the best thoughts I can muster of what a loving person is and say to myself: This is what God is 
every moment.” 
26 PF, 44. 
27 PF, 37.  
28 PF, 37.  
29 PF, 37. 
30 PF, 37. 
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not just the content or “what” of thought, but also its “how,” its style. Paradox reduplicates itself 
into the very movement of thinking. Thought is itself a “paradoxical passion,”31 simultaneously 
willing and un-willing itself, at once elicited and undone by what it cannot think—elicited as 
undone. In willing itself before a paradox, thought “wills its own downfall.”32 Thought is akin to 
the movement of walking understood as “continuous falling,” which is different from the 
“progress” and “mediation” of one “who unswervingly follows his nose.”33 Before what it cannot 
think, thought is pushed, or falls, beyond itself, beyond all reasons and concepts toward what is 
absolutely ungraspable. Thought fulfills its vocation by “letting go.”34  
The most appropriate metaphor for thought, then, is “erotic love.”35 Before a lover, the 
self is elicited as undone: “self-love has foundered.”36 To make love to a lover is to be elicited 
into oneself, yet without possessing oneself, because one becomes nothing but one’s exposure to 
the other. Lovers will themselves as ecstatic openings, continuously undoing enclosure and 
putting themselves at the mercy and desire of the other. Likewise, when released into itself 
before what it cannot think, the self-enclosure of thought founders and thought is launched 
toward an infinite opening. Thought becomes erotically open, even orgasmic: “language breaks 
down, and thought is bewildered.”37  
Erotic vulnerability and passion are the syntax of thought, its rhythm and pulse. Lovers 
allow their bodies to come to themselves as skin, as limit, as exposure, exposed to another skin, 
another limit, another exposure. Likewise, thought coming to itself arrives at its limit, its 
exposure before what it cannot think. The passion of thought is thought thinking along its own 
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35 PF, 48. 
36 PF, 48. 
37 EO 1, 230. 
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exposure before what it can perhaps touch but never grasp, undone by the limit, the skin of a 
lover.   
Another name for this “paradoxical passion” is writing, by which I don’t simply mean the 
physical act of making marks on a surface, but the unsuturable cut or difference that separates 
thought from itself, its being given to and tasked with itself along with the impossibility of ever 
arriving at or forming itself as a whole. Writing is the name for thought undergoing its exposure 
to time, which is a movement of “repetition” rather than “recollection,” thought walking, 
tumbling, or dancing forward into the unknown rather than sneaking out of life backward into 
what it already knows. To write is to skim along the edge or surface of thought, inhabiting 
thought as a movement of exposure to what infinitely exceeds it.  
Repetition and its erotic passion is found everywhere in Kierkegaard’s writing. For 
instance, Nicolaus Notebene’s book Prefaces reduplicates writing-as-repetition into the very 
form of a (quasi) book, anticipating, by performing it, Derrida’s claim, “the preface is 
everywhere; it is bigger than the book.”38 Prefaces is a collection of prefaces, with a preface. It is 
a repetition of beginnings, of beginnings to books that never get written, showing, perhaps, the 
perennial situation of writing. One can only ever write within the infinite deflection of “the 
book.” All writing is a preface to what doesn’t get written, to what cannot be said. Writing can 
only ever repeat its own beginning, without end.  
The narrative frame of Prefaces is the tragi-comic situation of one Nicolaus Notebene 
who longs with erotic passion to be a writer. He is married, however, and his marriage does not 
allow for such erotic pursuits. The day he got married he chose, officially at least, devotion to the 
task of marriage, which, as his wife repeatedly reminds him, means that he must forsake any 
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devotion to writing. Nicolaus’ ingenious solution to this dilemma is to write without really 
becoming a writer. He will be a writer of mere prefaces! He will write only lead-ups to books. 
He will only flirt with the possibility of the book and perhaps engage in a bit of foreplay, but 
never fully consummate a relation to writing that would lead to the birth of a book. This will 
allow him, officially at least, not to forsake devotion to his ethical duties. His wife begrudgingly 
accepts this solution, although this does not stop her on one occasion from trying to burn 
Nicolaus’ manuscripts with impunity.  
Writing along the limit of the preface, however, turns out to be an ambiguous solution. It 
seems to redouble Nicolaus’ erotic passion for writing rather than safely confine it. Flirting with 
the book incites passion, causing language to erupt, to disseminate wildly. Let me quote a long 
passage from the preface to Prefaces that puts Nicolaus’ erotic passion on display. One can feel 
in this passage the pleasure of writing, the pleasure of repetition, the pleasure of beginning again 
and again and again. Form and content here are inseparable, reduplicated into each other with 
erotic intensity. Nicolaus writes: 
A preface is a mood. Writing a preface is like sharpening a scythe; like tuning a guitar; 
like chatting with a child; liking spitting out of the window. One does not know how it 
happens; the desire comes upon one, the desire fabulously to tremble in the mood of 
productivity, the desire to write a preface, the desire for these leves sub noctem susurri 
[quiet whisperings when night falls]. Writing a preface is like ringing at a man’s door to 
bamboozle him; like walking past a young girl’s window and looking at the cobblestones; 
it is like lashing with one’s stick in the air at the wind; like tipping one’s hat though one 
greets no one. Writing a preface is like having done something that entitles one to a 
certain amount of attention; like having something on one’s conscience that tempts one to 
confide; like bowing in invitation to dance, then not moving; like pressing the left leg in, 
tightening the reins to the right, and hearing the steed say, ‘Prrf,’ and oneself not caring a 
fig for the whole world; it is like joining in without suffering the least inconvenience 
from joining in; like standing on Valby hill and staring after the wild geese. Writing a 
preface is like having arrived with the stagecoach at the first posthouse, waiting in the 
dark shed, sensing what is going to appear, seeing the gate and with that heaven opened, 
beholding before one the country highway which constantly has more before it, 
glimpsing the forest’s expectant secret, the footpath’s seductive disappearing, hearing the 
sound of the post horn and Echo’s beckoning invitation, hearing the coachman’s mighty 
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whip crack and the forest’s confused repetition, and the traveler’s cheerful conversation. 
Writing a preface is like having arrived, standing in the cozy room, greeting the character 
desired by nostalgia, sitting in an armchair, filling one’s pipe, lighting it—and having so 
infinitely much to talk about with each other. Writing a preface is like bending aside a 
branch in the jasmine hut and seeing her who sits in secret: my beloved. Thus, oh thus, it 
is to write prefaces. And what is the one who writes them like? He goes in and out among 
people like a jester in winter and a fool in summer; he is hello and goodbye in one 
person, always happy and carefree, pleased with himself, a really frivolous good-for-
nothing, indeed an immoral person, for he does not go to the Stock Exchange to scrape 
money together but only strolls through it. He does not talk about annual general 
meetings, because the air is too stuffy; he does not propose toasts in any Society because 
one has to give notice several days in advance; he does not run errands for the System; he 
pays no installments on the national debt; indeed he does not even take it seriously. He 
goes through life in the way a cobbler’s apprentice goes whistling down the street, even if 
the one who is to use the boots is standing waiting—he has to wait as long as there is a 
single stride left or the least sight worth seeing. Thus, yes thus, is the one who writes 
prefaces.39 
 
After citing such a passage, I find myself compelled to break off my own writing and simply 
smile for a while with no need to worry about extracting the passage’s meaning. There is a kind 
of reduplicating revelry here that is simply to be enjoyed. And then after sitting with this 
pleasurable nothingness opened through Nicoclaus’ effusive outpouring, I can begin again with 
my own writing, perhaps differently, less acquisitively.  
The effect of this writing is to disarm and disrupt the relentlessly teleological drive of the 
mind. A writer of prefaces is someone who never gets past the pleasure of beginning, the joy of 
the inceptual moment of thought. Such a writer reverts or reduplicates writing into itself, away 
from the ethical respectability and wholeness of “the book.” Such writing does not participate in 
the stuffy air of polite society and its result-driven money economy. It has no desire to find itself 
giving speeches to any official society. One has to plan for such things, after all. Prefaces, 
however, live only for the repetition of today, the opening, like the lilies and the birds, creation’s 
wonderful little prefaces who run no errands for the System and care nothing about the national 
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debt or the long term success of scientific scholarship. Writing that writes for today pleasures 
itself rather than seeking the pleasure of official recognition. Its desire is not to announce and 
establish itself in an identity, but to hold an “expectant secret,” to become a “seductive 
disappearing.” This is writing that trembles with immoral, fabulous desire, wanting only to keep 
itself trembling in secret. 
 Fear and Trembling is shot through with the same passion for the repeated beginning. 
Abraham is a preface-like figure that haunts the pages of the book, the Bible, trembling in a 
beginning outside of ethics, prior to the giving of the law, outside of any calculative economy of 
thought, desire, or time. Abraham is a figure of the absurd promise, a wildly uncertain beginning 
that holds desire open in the face of impossibility, the impossibility of producing, securing, or 
anticipating its own fulfillment, a fulfillment made impossible by the call to journey to Moriah. 
Abraham desires and hopes in the face of the unthinkable, in the face of what cannot be thought, 
absurdly so. His wish is not for a direct conclusion, satisfaction, or fulfillment. He desires and 
hopes that he will be returned, he knows not how, to the beginning, without end, that he will 
begin again with Isaac, in joy, even though the cut that differentiates every moment of time from 
the next, the cut of the eternal, never ceases to disrupt and make uncertain his best laid plans, his 
possession of himself and his others.  
To hope like this, to hope in the face of the impossible, by virtue of the impossible, the 
impossibility of closure, is to tremble with fabulous desire. “It is great to give up one’s desire, 
but it is greater to hold fast to it after having given it up”40—like Nicolaus holding fast to, 
“repeating,” his desire to write even though he gives up the desire to be an official writer of 
“books.” This repetition of writing by virtue of the impossibility of the book imbues his writing 
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with a kind of madness, a “really frivolous good-for-nothing” passion for the never-surpassed 
beginning that looks absurd and immoral from the point of view of ethical, scholarly, 
economically conscientious desire. 
 Likewise, Abraham’s consent to the divine call to love Isaac “absurdly,” that is, to love 
Isaac only by loving him anew on the other side of the death of official, ethically readable 
identity, is also a kind of madness. Abraham knows how wonderful it would be to let his love be 
a readable, respectable book: “He knows that it is beautiful and beneficial to be the single 
individual who translates himself into the universal, the one who, so to speak, personally 
produces a trim, clean, and, as far as possible, faultless edition of himself, readable by all.”41 But 
Abraham is called to a higher love, a love not writable in any book, a love that does not write its 
own conclusion by translating itself into the security and relief of ethical recognition, but a love 
that writes only its beginning in order to wait upon the other with utter vulnerability, patience, 
and unknowing, letting desire become love’s desire, the yearning to let the other remain other, a 
gift one will never possess. Abraham’s exit from the ethical is not a destruction of the ethical. It 
is nothing but his re-entrance into it otherwise, a repetition of the ethical that re-launches it off 
itself, opening within it a love that receives the other only by letting go, absolutely. To abide in 
this repetition, in this trembling beginning without guarantee, is to love madly: “Humanly 
speaking, he is mad and cannot make himself understandable to anyone. And yet ‘to be mad’ is 
the mildest expression.”42 
 This preface-like desire for the repeated beginning is reduplicated in the very form of 
Fear and Trembling. Johannes de Silentio cannot write Abraham into a coherent narrative or 
logical sequence that gets further than the gesture of beginning. Every time he tries he gets 
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derailed into admiration, bewilderment, or silence and he has to begin again. Fear and 
Trembling, on my count, begins itself nine different times. It is not a “book” with a clean 
sequence of beginning, middle, and end. It is a series of stuttering departures that circle around 
an impossibility, the impossibility of understanding or thinking or writing the movement of faith.  
The ending of Fear and Trembling, its epilogue, is not a closing of the book, a gesture of 
finality, summation, or arrival, but a repetition of the beginning of the book, a gesture of opening 
or departure. Johannes returns in the epilogue to where he began in the preface, namely, the 
exhaustion of the modern age and its abandonment of absolute tasks. An absolute task is one that 
remains eternally “young and beautiful,”43 always only beginning. The only absolute task 
Johannes names directly is “love.”44 The task of faith is to learn love’s absoluteness, its infinite 
beginning. Fear and Trembling aims itself at this infinite beginning, and so, it might be said, it 
never gets anywhere. Its epilogue gets no further than its preface, making the whole book a kind 
of preface. Beginning and ending, departure and arrival become paradoxically simultaneous in 
the very form of the book, echoing and putting into play its content. Faith is an absolute 
beginning, an infinite opening or departure. “But what did Abraham do?...He mounted the ass, he 
rode slowly down the rode.”45 
Nicolaus and Johannes, like Socrates, don’t know how to write books. They are full of 
too much erotic passion for what cannot be said. They are poets of the impossibility of the book. 
As Kierkegaard writes of Socrates: 
He certainly was an eroticist of the highest order; he had an extraordinary enthusiasm for 
knowledge—in short, had all of spirit’s seductive gifts; but inform, fill up, enrich he 
could not do. In this sense, one would dare perhaps to call him a seducer. He infatuated 
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the youths, awoke longings in them, but did not satisfy them, let them flare up in the 
thrilling enjoyment of contact, but never gave them strong and nourishing food.46 
 
To write by virtue of the impossibility of the book, by virtue of the passion of thought, is to let 
thought flare up in the thrilling enjoyment of contact with the skin, the edge of thought, exposed 
to its own opening with an infinite desire that knows no satisfaction. To write is to keep desire 
going, to keep thought in motion non-possessively, “continually having one’s pen poised for 
what comes next,”47 eternally called out of one’s homeland forward into the unknown, where 
there “winds a lonesome trail, steep and narrow…outside of the universal.”48 One can think and 
write along this trail only if one is willing to tremble in secret with fabulous, apophatic desire, 
with unspeakable sorrow, hope, longing, and joy. 
iv 
Kierkegaard’s authorship, like Hegel’s, is a thinking of the absolute, a movement toward the 
synthesis of the infinite and the finite through writing. And like Hegel’s, Kierkegaard’s 
authorship undertakes this movement by uniting form and content: the content of thought 
emerges only within the very movement of thinking as it forms itself. Moreover, for both 
Kierkegaard and Hegel, thought forms itself around its own negativity, its own difference from 
itself. Thought moves by exceeding itself, by driving toward its own negation, which is to say, 
by writing, by letting the difference time makes time the rhythm of thought.  
This is why Derrida can say that Hegel is not simply the champion of the achieved 
concept and the return to the same: “Hegel is also the thinker of irreducible difference…the last 
philosopher of the book and the first thinker of writing.”49 Hegel’s dialectic is necessarily a 
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written movement, a movement of “mediation,” which names the impossibility of pure presence. 
Content must undergo form, the form-ation of writing, in order to be truth. And therefore truth, 
the absolute, is never undialectically self-identical but always shot through with “difference.” 
The absolute is splayed out across the differencing movement that is writing.50 
 What is not often appreciated is how close Kierkegaard and Hegel are on this point. For 
both, thought never has direct objects. What is thought is always a certain how, the movement of 
thinking relating itself to itself across difference and in that self-relating opening an indirect or 
dialectical relation to what it thinks, one that never achieves the pure presence of what is thought. 
Both Kierkegaard and Hegel write truth as process, truth as becoming, as a movement that 
traverses difference. Both understand deeply the intimate co-implication of thinking and what is 
thought, of the “how” and the “what,” and both display this co-implication by letting thought do 
its work through writing. Both seek through writing to let the movement that is truth show itself. 
 And yet, for all of their similarity, for all of Hegel’s deep and profound influence on 
Kierkegaard on this point, there is, of course, a point where the two authors, precisely in their 
writing, diverge sharply from one another. As I said, both authors are writers of the absolute, of 
the synthesis of the infinite and the finite, which is to say that both write in order to bring the 
absolute into consciousness. Kierkegaard, however, through multiple strategies of writing, will 
relentlessly evoke and perform the impossibility of the absolute’s mediation into consciousness. 
Performing this impossibility through writing is precisely how Kierkegaard brings the absolute 
into consciousness. To be conscious of the absolute is to be conscious of the impossibility of 
mediating the absolute within consciousness, which is to be conscious of consciousness’ own 
limit as an exposure to its outside, to “nothing.”  
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This nothing, as I’ve emphasized, is not an elsewhere, some “beyond” just on the other 
side of the limits of reason that does not intrude on reason’s domain.51 This nothing is the very 
opening of consciousness right here, at and as its heart, an opening more intimate to 
consciousness than it is to itself the way, as Derrida emphasizes, the gaps and fissures between 
words and letters, which time language, are an opening closer to writing than it is to itself. What 
transcends consciousness is not “out there” over against it. Transcendence, the outside, is 
radically interior, so interior so as to be anterior to consciousness, the nothing of an instant that 
births the present, the gift of time.52 Kierkegaard writes, impossibly, toward this anteriority, 
toward the blank page, the beginning prior to all beginning.  
This impossibility of writing the absolute is a repetition of the impossibility that 
constitutes selfhood most basically. The self that writes is a displaced self, set adrift over 70,000 
fathoms. Existential subjectivity, for Kierkegaard, because it cannot recuperate its own origin, 
the instant of its being given, its birth to presence, is constitutively burdened with the task of 
synthesizing itself with (“appropriating”) an impossibility, the impossibility of the origin, the 
origin’s withdrawal. This takes the form of “paradox,” the self synthesizing elements that cannot 
be synthesized, the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, freedom and necessity.53 
These elements cannot be synthesized because there is “no third factor”54 in which synthesis 
becomes possible. The self must always be synthesizing itself with its origin in the absence of 
any principle of synthesis, synthesizing by virtue of the impossibility of synthesis. An 
unsuturable difference cuts through the self, the cut of its being given, opening a difference more 
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intimate to the self than it is to itself. Inwardness or interiority is this difference, the place where 
the self is dis-placed, where it gapes open before the infinite. 
 The absence of a third factor that would synthesize dialectic opposites—the finite and 
the infinite, time and eternity, freedom and necessity, the self and God, etc.—does not mean that 
dialectical opposites remain alienated from each other, cut off from reconciliation. It means that 
their reconciliation is not an achievable concept but the living play of their encounter, the play of 
their difference, the spark55 ignited between two edges that touch, a happening in a lived 
existence. Life, rather than the concept, is the arena of reconciliation, meaning that reconciliation 
happens only in “the instant,” like a spark, vanishing as soon as it arrives, arriving as a 
vanishing. This makes reconciliation a living work, a “repetition,” vulnerable, uncertain, exposed 
at every turn to surprise, unpredictability, failure, unknowing, and the necessity of beginning 
again. The writing of reconciliation will therefore be a writing that moves with the uncertain 
rhythms of living rather than the rhythms of the concept, which means a writing that has the feel 
of art rather than science, or of science becoming art. It will be a writing concerned above all 
with edification.      
For Hegel, however, the absolute simply is the principle of synthesis, of “absolute 
knowing” in which the concept is the arena of reconciliation. The absolute is the impossibility of 
any outside to consciousness. It is the principle through which all wounds of negativity heal: “the 
wounds of Spirit heal and leave no scars behind.”56 Consciousness is absolute. The movement of 
Spirit is the mediated movement of consciousness proceeding from itself as its own origin back 
into itself as its own goal. Hegel’s system, whatever its possibilities for an affirmation of endless 
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negativity,57 intends an apprehension of the real as intelligible, i.e., determined by self-
consciousness, all the way to its core. It aims itself at “that goal where it can lay aside the name 
of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge.”58 Armed with the principle of anticipated 
synthesis, the absolute, Hegel’s writing proceeds systematically and scientifically toward 
absolute knowing, toward the concept.  
Kierkegaard’s writing is not so armed. Bereft of any principle of anticipated synthesis, 
exposed to the absolute, it cannot aim at the scientific unfolding of knowledge. Exposed to the 
cut of existence, it must proceed unscientifically, which for Kierkegaard means poetically and 
artistically, with yearning, broken forms sent off as so many vanishing sparks that light up the 
night of thought with momentary fragments, glimpsed but not possessed, scattered again into the 
dark.  
The rhythm or timing of Hegel’s thought, its feel, its tone, its mood, is something like a 
heavy march toward a goal, the entire armory of history’s thought in tow. The rhythm or timing 
of Kierkegaard’s thought, its feel, its tone, its mood, is something like an ebullient dance, which 
is its own goal, spinning against the way Hegel drives: “I have trained myself and am training 
myself always to be able to dance lightly in the service of thought, as far as possible to the honor 
of the god and for my own enjoyment, renouncing domestic bliss and civic esteem, the 
communio bonorum [community of goods] and the concordance of joys that go with having an 
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opinion.”59 Rather than catalogue a series of opinions or achieved concepts, Kierkegaard’s 
authorship traces, as it performs, a series dance steps.    
One way to locate the difference between Kierkegaard and Hegel is to ask what each 
author seeks to move through writing. One way to answer this question is that Hegel seeks to 
move the concept whereas Kierkegaard seeks to move the heart. And this makes all the 
difference. Hegel’s love for the concept moves him in the direction of scientific objectivity, the 
mediation of truth into an external movement. Kierkegaard’s love for matters of the heart moves 
him in the direction of artistic upbuilding or edification, which holds open only the possibility of 
truth as a hidden, inward movement to be enacted by hiin Enkelte. Hegel uses an organic 
metaphor to evoke the movement truth: a seed unfolding into the externality of a plant, its hidden 
inwardness giving way to the mature display of its leaves and flowers.60 Kierkegaard uses a 
different organic metaphor for the movement of truth. He speaks of lettuce that forms “the tender 
delicacy of the heart and its lovely coil”61 only after it has formed its external leaves. Lettuce 
matures as it uses its external leaves to hide and protect the formation of its tender and lovely 
heart. The point of writing and reading, and living, is not to mediate truth externally, allowing all 
that is implicitly inner to become explicitly outer. “The main point,” Kierkegaard writes, “is 
rather to speak quite softly with oneself,”62 allowing truth to become inwardness, hidden in the 
coil of one’s heart.  
The truth toward which Kierkegaard writes is nothing he can secure or enforce or 
determine as necessary. That is, he cannot mediate or guarantee its intelligibility for the reader. 
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He can only present its difficulty, its objective uncertainty, its undecidability, and abide whatever 
comes. Truth, the truth of living, which is the only truth that finally matters, can only come 
freely, by virtue of he absurd, like the surprise of falling in love, or like an unexpected, 
uncoerced grief before an enemy’s grave. Its spirit is the intimate tilt of the heart, not the 
grinding necessity of the system’s dialectic. Kierkegaard writes: 
Everything, indeed everything, ought to serve for upbuilding...The kind of scholarliness 
and scienticity that ultimately does not build up is precisely thereby unchristian….It is 
precisely Christianity’s relation to life (in contrast to scholarly distance from life) or the 
ethical aspect of Christianity that is upbuilding, and the mode of presentation, however 
rigorous it may be otherwise, is completely different, qualitatively different, from the 
kind of scienticity and scholarliness that is ‘indifferent,’ whose lofty heroism is…a kind 
of inhuman curiosity. It is Christian heroism—a rarity, to be sure—to venture wholly to 
become oneself, an individual human being, alone before God, alone in this prodigious 
strenuousness and this prodigious responsibility; but it is not Christian heroism to be 
taken in by the idea of man in the abstract or to play the wonder game with world 
history.63  
 
For Kierkegaard, the heart is everywhere; it is bigger, deeper, and wider than the concept. 
More primary than intellection is affect, the sheer shock of existing which gives rise to wonder, 
anxiety, and joy—all dispossessive attunements, attunements that dispossess the subject from 
itself. These apophatic attunements are what carry and give life to the movement of thought, not 
the other way around, which is simply to say that living gives life to thought.  
v 
At stake here is the place and role of passion and affect in thinking and writing—and living. 
Hegel follows in and consummates the Greek tradition of subordinating the passions to the logos, 
the concept. The passions are not eradicated in this tradition, but they are to be disciplined into 
determinate judgments that give teleology to affective life. Stoicism is the clearest example of 
this tendency in Greek thought. The ethical task of living is to order one’s thinking rightly, to 
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conform one’s thinking to the logos, the intelligibility of the world. From this will follow a 
properly ordered emotional or affective life. One will be attuned to the world rightly in a way 
that leads to right action, to virtue. 
Kierkegaard effects something of a reversal or rupturing of this tradition which identifies 
the real with the intelligible and therefore regards passion as a dangerous waywardness that 
needs to be reigned into the bounds of the logos. Rather than seek to determine affect according 
to the intelligible structure of the logos, Kierkegaard lets thought think out of indeterminate 
affects, attunements, and moods that precede and exceed the determining movement of the 
concept. He turns the attention of thought to certain dispositions—irony, humor, doubt, boredom, 
anxiety, despair, devotion, trust, forgiveness, patience, joy—that are disclosive of an excess in 
reality, an excess that cannot be mediated or speculatively reinscribed. 
Kierkegaard’s authors, however, resist directly theorizing this excess as an object of 
thought. This would inevitably reduce it to the bounds of the concept. His authors most often 
perform this excess by reduplicating its exceeding movement into the very forms and movements 
of their writing. The literary forms and movements of Kierkegaard’s authorship rupture, 
fragment, ironize, elude, restrain, mock, and exceed themselves in multiple ways as various 
strategies of indirectly indicating and reaching out toward what they cannot contain. To think 
and write in this way, which is to let thought become nothing but a way or movement, rather than 
a series of achieved conclusions, is to become a “subjective existing thinker,”64 a thinker who 
thinks while existing, while undergoing the “earthquakes of existence”65 that cause the ground of 
thought to tremble.  
                                                     
64 CUP, 72. 
65 FTR, 63. 
  67 
I’d like to trace how the movement of subjective thinking shows itself in the first book of 
Kierkegaard’s authorship: Either/Or: A Fragment of Life. This will allow me to move through 
the “stages” of existence, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious, and how each per-forms 
content. 
___ 
Part 1 of Either/Or, which gives voice to “the aesthetic,” thinks out of a range of indeterminate 
affects. Perhaps the most important and telling of these is boredom, which Kierkegaard lets 
become a site of thought in A’s essay “Rotation of the Crops.” It is in and through boredom that 
thought is exposed to “the nothing that interlaces existence,”66 to the excess of time, or to time as 
an excess that surpasses the ability of consciousness to contain it in its representations. Letting 
thought become bored, letting nothing determinate hold its interest, is how one becomes exposed 
to what is excessive to thought, namely, time as an infinite opening that cannot be filled up with 
projects. Projects at some point always become boring. They become exposed to the excess of 
time they cannot contain. Boredom is therefore an opening toward thinking something other than 
the project, toward thinking otherwise than as a project. In the face of boredom, thought is 
pressed to unlearn itself as teleological. It might learn instead to play, to sink into, rather than 
determine, the excess of time offered.   
In “Rotation of the Crops,” A uses the excess of time to play with, i.e. “rotate,” an 
endless stream of distractions and diversions that allow him to avoid decision and commitment, 
which he knows will always end in boredom. For example, instead of listening to his boring 
philosophy professor’s boring lecture, A becomes enamored with a bead of sweat that forms and 
trickles down the professor’s nose. The bead of sweat is actually moving, whereas the professor 
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rambles on in a decidedly unmoving way about the supposed “movement” of Hegel’s logic. This 
desire for real rather the represented movement—Hegel’s system can only represent 
movement—is repeated in the play of seduction in “The Seducer’s Diary” in which an endless 
series of erotic objects are seduced, enjoyed once, and then immediately cast aside in order to 
keep desire moving without succumbing to the boredom and monotony of commitment.  
A, however, no more than Hegel’s logic, never really moves, although both appear to 
move, both give a seductive, aesthetic show of movement that is nevertheless not actual 
movement. This is the irony of A’s irony. “I feel as a chessman must feel when the opponent 
says of it: That piece cannot be moved.”67 “How sterile my soul and my mind are, and yet 
constantly tormented by empty voluptuous and excruciating labor pains!”68 A never gives birth 
to actual movement. He only suffers its labor pains, like Hegel’s labor of the negative that 
produces only an abstract system of labor pains. The movement he produces remains within the 
womb of self-consciousness and its attempts to master and ground itself. A, one could say, 
attempts to ground himself in failure, in the failure of becoming a self, the failure to be born. 
This is a desperate bid at preserving himself otherwise than through the boring project of gaining 
an identity. It is nevertheless still a gesture of grounding that halts actual movement. It is the 
movement of a self-enclosed consciousness which closes itself off from the will to actual 
movement, the movement of being born, which is the movement or exposure of consciousness to 
its outside. 
What the aesthetic essays of Either/Or dramatize, rather than merely theorize, is the crisis 
of subjectivity, subjectivity as crisis. This crisis is the subject’s being given always more than it 
can synthesize within itself, the “always more” that is the movement of time, making synthesis, 
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the consolidation of oneself into an achieved identity, impossible. This impossibility makes the 
very attempt at a consolidated self undesirable because the attempt will always leave one bored 
or in despair, burdened by time’s excess. A’s desire for endless diversion and distraction is a 
neurotic defense against becoming a self, to be sure. But his desire also shows something 
fundamental and enduring about selfhood or subjectivity. By abandoning the project of 
subjectivity, by letting subjectivity-as-project fail (subjectivity will absolutely fail only in the 
religious, however), A’s essays indirectly display or perform the constitutive crisis of 
subjectivity, its impossibility. To be in existence is to be faced with the impossibility of a 
consolidated, achieved self. Time is always slicing or tearing the self open, exposing it to an 
abyssal origin and an undetermined future. A perceives this acutely. He therefore perceives the 
lie in all bids at identity. This perception is at the heart of his polemics against marriage, 
friendship, and any institution or project that pretends it can gather and master the excess of time. 
Time makes life (as project) and the self (as identity) impossible: 
What is going to happen? What will the future bring? I do not know, I have no 
presentiment. When a spider flings itself from a fixed point down into its consequences, it 
continually sees before it an empty space in which it can find no foothold, however much 
it stretches. So it is with me; before me is continually an empty space, and I am propelled 
by a consequence that lies behind me. This life is turned around and dreadful, not to be 
endured.69    
 
“I am propelled by a consequence that lies behind me”—this is the double-bind of existence in 
time. To be in time is always to have to choose, to decide, to “fling” oneself in some direction. 
And yet to choose in time is always also to choose what cannot be chosen. To choose in time is 
to choose, to open oneself to, consequences one cannot calculate, that lie outside of one’s 
anticipative vision, “behind one.” These unanticipatable consequences, the non-calculable excess 
that haunts all decision making, is what propels existence as an opening, making it move and 
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twist beyond anyone’s control. This makes life dreadful. The self must move through life with its 
back toward the future. The future opens always behind one, in an instant, prior to the 
consolidating reach or phenomenological intentionality of consciousness, and therefore without 
knowledge. “Before I knew it…” one says of undergoing a surprise, a break, the sudden opening 
of time. The self is always hurtling blindly it knows not where, toward and within a gaping 
opening, within “empty space.” 
 Judge Wilhem’s response to A in Part II of Either/Or, the response of “the ethical,” is to 
appeal to and argue for a certain kind of consolidation of the self that is both possible and 
desirable. The Judge knows, however, that a naïvely affirmed or simply assumed self is an 
impossibility, and therefore the ethical does not simply negate the lessons of the aesthetic. It 
“sublates” the aesthetic by working with the impossibility of the self differently. Rather than 
defend against the self’s impossibility as A does through distraction and diversion, the Judge 
aims to face the impossibility of the self as an infinite task, a task whose form is “repetition,” a 
ceaseless renewal of the will to move toward the infinite telos that the self is. The Judge knows 
that time does indeed space the self out from itself, infinitely. But unlike A, the Judge takes up 
the ethical call to traverse this spacing and in that traversing to become present to oneself, not as 
a stable or quantifiable “thing,” but as a patterned and disciplined movement across time that has 
its own “aesthetic” appeal. This disciplined, patterned movement across time—“actuality,” 
actual movement—is paradigmatically enacted in marriage, which is the earnest decision of two 
people to unite together across time in pursuit of an infinite telos.        
 For the Judge, the self becomes a patterned movement by virtue of “duty” or law, the 
very law he represents as a judge. Duty is a mediation into time of “the eternal,” the eternal value 
of one’s decisions in time. It is by virtue of duty or law that the crisis of subjectivity becomes 
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livable, its impossibility made possible as a task or striving. Duty allows a consolidation of the 
self. By grounding oneself in duty the impossible gulf between the present moment and the next, 
the impossibility of facing the future on which A is wrecked, is bridged. The way across the gulf 
is opened. By way of duty one can anticipate one’s next move, the future can come into view, 
possibility can become actuality, and the self can receive historical concretion. The agony of 
decision is relieved, and the ghosts of undecidability are banished. One can translate oneself into 
social readability and recognizability and so become a grounded human being with a respectable 
name, identity, pattern of desire, and ethical telos, like Judge Wilhelm, rather than remain a 
nameless spider floating in empty space, like A.  
The ethical marks a “higher” form of subjectivity than the aesthetic insofar as it is 
capable of actual movement. It is not the highest, however. The ethical subject still faces the 
impossibility of the self with a “why,” with the purpose of discovering its own infinite capacity 
as a willing, ethical agent. For Judge Wilhelm, as for Kant, the impossible ethical ideal 
appropriated within the self effects a grounding of the subject in itself by enabling the endless 
striving of duty. The infinite is translated into a posit of the ethically grounded subject.  
The brief ending of Either/Or, which speaks on behalf of neither the Either nor the Or, 
explodes this grounding of the subject, and the whole book along with it. It gathers all preceding 
800 pages into a tightly packed stick of sermonic dynamite, lights the fuse, and walks away. 
Either/Or ends by unsaying itself in an apophatic gesture, one performed without being directly 
announced, the gesture of speaking in praise of love as an indeterminate affect, an infinite 
roominess that desires never to be in the right, never to be the Judge. 
 After Judge Wilhem’s appeal to A, Either/Or ends with an “Ultimatum,” with a written 
yet unpreached sermon by a nameless pastor titled, “The Upbuilding That Lies in the Thought 
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That In Relation To God We Are Always in the Wrong.” This sermon is a brief but decisive turn 
to “the religious.” Its theme is the “upbuilding,” the “joy,” of being always in the wrong. What is 
crucial to grasp about this sermon is how being “in the wrong” has nothing to do with morality, 
with a failure to conform to a determinate moral or ethical code. Wrongness, for the pastor, 
signifies the self’s “perfection”70 rather than some lack. It is a quasi-ontological category. And 
yet, to speak the language of ontology here is also “wrong.” The message of the sermon is how 
joyful it is that existence cannot be determined, i.e., put in the right, by any principle 
whatsoever—ethical, moral, or ontological. Existence before God is “more superabundant than 
any measure,”71 it “tears up the accounting”72 that would seek to calculate life as a pursuit of 
finite end-goals, like being “in the right.” The sermon writes existence into an excess, the excess 
of love that is God. 
What exceeds any determination is the movement of infinite desire, the movement of 
stretching out toward the excess of love that is God. At its heart, the sermon is about the “how” 
of loving God, “the longing with which one seeks God,”73 a seeking which makes the “spirit 
glow”74 with “the deep inner motion…the heart’s indescribable emotion.”75 To elucidate this 
longing, the sermon unfolds a paradoxical phenomenology of love’s desire. It traces the 
movement whereby love exceeds its own movement toward finite objects, opening itself toward 
the divine, by way of the desire always to find itself in the wrong. The sermon rests on the 
counter-intuitive insight that love delights in and draws strength from being in the wrong, that 
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only in being in the wrong is love free and uncoerced. And only before God is one infinitely in 
the wrong and therefore “infinitely free.”76  
The core phenomenological observation is that the position of being “in the right” in 
relation to one’s beloved is an impoverished and anxious position, bereft of love’s joy and 
confidence. Love desires never to gain the upper hand or be in the right over against the beloved. 
This would introduce a kind of measure or calculation into the movement of love. And 
calculation signals love’s death, its reduction to something finite. The moment one finds oneself 
in the right over against one’s beloved, perhaps because of some sort of injury they have caused 
or wrong they have done, or because one wills oneself into the right out of arrogance or perhaps 
fear, love becomes an external relation ruled by calculation and law rather than an inward 
relation of desire. To be in the right, either by choice or by necessity, is to occupy a determinate 
position outside of the inward freedom of love’s longing, which has no measure, no law, no 
condition. Love never wants to find itself in a determinate, fixed position, which would be a kind 
of closure. To love, therefore, is to desire never to be in the right, never to be hemmed into a 
position, no matter how right, over against one’s beloved. Love transgresses the integrity that in 
the name of rightness keeps one from the beloved.77 Love desires itself as infinite rather than as 
finite, as an “empty space” (to use A’s language) that never ceases to open for the other. “Love 
takes everything,”78 it opens itself to the beloved with an infinite embrace. 
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In an “infinite relationship”79 there is never a moment when the gift of the beloved has 
been fully received, and this “never,” this excess of the other, is one’s unrightable “wrongness,” 
which is equally one’s “perfection,” one’s calling to open oneself to the infinite gift of the other. 
To respond endlessly to the infinite gift of the other, always “wrongly” because there is always 
more to receive, always more room to be made, is to be upbuilt by love’s excess.   
Why did you wish to be in the wrong in relation to a person? Because you loved. Why 
did you find it upbuilding? Because you loved. The more you loved, the less time you 
had to deliberate upon whether or not you were in the right; your love had only one 
desire, that you might continually be in the wrong.80 
 
Of course, in relation to another finite human being, there will always come moments in which 
one finds oneself or the beloved in the right, in which circumstance—time—intervenes and 
ruptures the inward freedom of love’s longing only to be in the wrong. This is the frailty of 
human love in time, its fallibility, uncertainty, and instability. In the face of this uncertainty, this 
lack of guarantee that haunts love’s freedom, one could turn either to despairing self-enclosure, 
which is what A does, or to the grounding and stability provided by duty, which was is what 
Judge Wilhelm does.  
The nameless pastor, however, in the face of the uncertainty of existence opts for neither 
the Either nor the Or. He writes himself instead into the nameless excess of God’s love that 
ungrounds the position of the self-grounding subject, which both A and Judge Wilhelm 
represent. This excess relativizes even duty and the pleasures of identity it offers. It opens onto a 
source of bottomless joy that explodes the consolidated and finite joy of recognition, a joy that is 
inherently anxious because it can always be lost in the vicissitudes of time. The pastor writes:    
If your wish were what others and you yourself in a certain sense must call your duty, if 
you not only had to deny your wish but in a way betray your duty, if you lost not only 
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your joy but even your honor, you are still happy—in relation to God, you say: I am 
always in the wrong.81 
 
The real either/or of Either/Or is the difference between a grounded subject and an ungrounded 
one. Either you hold onto yourself and strive to be in the right in the face of time’s uncertainty, 
which will only produce endless anxiety, or you let go. 
 God is the “how” of this letting go, its event, its happening, its gift. God, for the pastor, is 
not some metaphysical “rightness” “out there” that objectively puts one in the wrong. If such 
were the case there would be nothing upbuilding in being in the wrong because one would “be 
forced to acknowledge that God is always in the right,”82 and being forced to do anything is the 
opposite of being upbuilt. Only freedom is upbuilding, only that which comes “from the love 
within you”83 builds up. “There is nothing upbuilding in acknowledging that God is always in the 
right, and consequently there is nothing upbuilding in any thought that necessarily follows from 
it. When you acknowledge that God is always in the right, you stand outside God, and likewise 
when, as a conclusion from that, you acknowledge that you are always in the wrong.”84  
What the pastor is describing here, one could say, is the despair of onto-theology. There 
is nothing upbuilding, nothing freeing, about God as the grounding posit of metaphysical or 
ethical reason that proceeds from the axiom of God’s inviolable rightness. This places God 
“outside,” out there, as a highest being, despairingly distant. Infinite love that desires only to be 
in the wrong relates to God otherwise. It does not relate to God as a grounding ground, or as any 
kind of separate entity: “But when you do not claim and are not convinced by virtue of any 
previous acknowledgement that you are always in the wrong, then you are hidden in God.”85 
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God is not an external standard over against which one is in the wrong. One is in the wrong by 
being in God. God is this: that one is always in the wrong: 
You did not arrive at the certainty that you were in the wrong from the acknowledgement 
that God was in the right, but from love’s sole and supreme wish, that you might always 
be in the wrong, you arrived at the acknowledgement that God is always in the right. But 
this wish is love’s wish and consequently a matter of freedom, and you were by no means 
forced to acknowledged that you were always in the wrong. Thus it was not through 
deliberation that you become certain that you were always in the wrong, but the certainty 
was due to your being built up by it.86 
 
To sink into God as a sinking into one’s wrongness is to receive the gift of one’s freedom, a 
receiving that the pastor calls “adoration.”87 In God, existence opens as an astonishing event of 
freedom, the freedom to love without the anxiety of striving to be in the right. 
 There is a sense in which God “is always in the right,” of course. But the radical, 
paradoxical point to grasp is that one’s wrongness precedes God’s rightness. God’s rightness is 
the rightness, the joy, the blessedness, of one’s wrongness: “from love’s sole and supreme wish, 
that you might always be in the wrong, you arrived at the acknowledgement that God is always 
in the right.”88 God’s rightness is not a metaphysical “thing in itself.” God’s rightness, rather, is 
an originary affirmation of the self in its relation to an absolute incommensurability that keeps 
the self limitlessly open, an open-ing. God’s love, the love that God is, which loves nothings and 
nobodies, is this incommensurability, this absolute: “And then should not the thought that in 
relation to God we are always in the wrong be inspiring, for what else does it express but that 
God’s love is always greater than our love?”89 “And was it not your bliss that you could never 
love as you were loved?”90  God’s rightness is nothing but the self’s being so excessively loved 
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prior to any achieved rightness so as to be placed forever in the wrong, outside any economy of 
calculated rightness. What ungrounds the self is that in God it is infinitely, unconditionally 
loved, adored, and held and therefore it is free to let go of the project of grounding itself. It is 
free to be in the wrong and in that freedom the self can turn and open itself to the other.   
God, one could say, is the love through which one loves oneself as an infinite opening 
capable of welcoming the other, absolutely. The eye with which I see God is the same eye with 
which God sees me, as Eckhart puts it. It is only by loving oneself infinitely, which means loving 
oneself absolutely prior to anything one might achieve or become, loving oneself as nothing, as 
sheerly given, which is to love oneself in God, that one is freed to love the other as other and not 
as a tool in the project of grounding the self. To love oneself as nothing rather than as something 
is to absolve oneself from the anxiety of calculation and identity, of the calculated pursuit of an 
identity. It is to place oneself infinitely “in the wrong,” beyond even the possibility of being “in 
the right.”  
This is freedom, a freedom that redoubles into boundless joy and bold self-confidence in 
loving, the confidence that comes only when there is nothing left to lose because there is nothing 
but the nothing of God’s love: “In relation to God we are always in the wrong—this thought puts 
an end to doubt and calms the cares; it animates and inspires to action.”91 Loved absolutely, prior 
to any rightness, the self is freed to love absolutely, in the joyful roominess of wrongness. To be 
animated with a love that moves without doubt, without care, without the anxiety of being in the 
right, is to play. In God, one is free to play with the excess of time, with the timing, the rhythm, 
of love. This is to remain a child rather than become a judge, “always ready to keep eternally 
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young the love with which one loves God—eternally young as God is eternal, in the first tension 
of passion, but more and more inwardly.”92 
___ 
My reading of the stages here breaks from teleological readings, that is, from readings that 
regard the movement from the aesthetic, through the ethical, to the religious as a movement of 
self-realization in which the self progressively gathers itself into itself as a movement of 
determination. Mark C. Taylor is a representative of these readings when he writes, “At the 
Christian stage of existence Kierkegaard argues that the self achieves the balance within itself 
that has been the goal of the entire quest of self.”93 On my reading, religiousness is rather a 
dispossession or breaking open of the self, a movement out into its groundlessness, a becoming 
nothing, in which “achievement,” “balance,” “goal,” “quest,” and even “self” are undone. 
Kangas puts it like this: 
If the religious acquires a priority in Kierkegaard’s texts—and no doubt it does—this is 
not because the subject realizes therein the implicit telos of its existence. On the contrary, 
it is because the subject finally discovers the representational or egological status of 
every telos. A telos is something inevitably posited or mediated by consciousness; it has 
the ontological status of a representation. Yet the religious is the name for the referral of 
the subject to, and its holding itself open for, the infinite beginning, the instant of 
coming-into-existence, which it can neither posit nor recollect. It coincides with the 
subject’s impossibility to take itself as origin, ground, absolute beginning (as still 
happens in both the aesthetic and the ethical). This is exactly why the texts…link the 
religious to the ‘impossible,’ to ‘the ordeal,’ and refuse to regard it as the outcome of a 
process for which the subject constitutes the origin. If one insists upon teleology, then 
one could say that the telos of human existence, the point at which it becomes religious, 
is the abandonment of every telos. The abandonment of every telos is the absolute telos. 
One possesses only in agreeing not to posses.94 
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It is because of this ungrounding of the subject that the religious bends back around to resonate 
and rhyme with the aesthetic. What the aesthetic and the religious share is non-teleological 
passion, a tension without intension, “the first tension of passion”95 that redoubles back into itself 
as a nameless excess that refuses identity, which is why both A and the pastor have no names, no 
identity. The difference of the religious is that it refuses identity absolutely. This is an abandon in 
which the gift of selfhood (as opposed to identity) is infinitely received, whereas the aesthetic 
refuses identity only within an attempted self-grounding. The latter is despair. The former is 
bottomless joy.  
vi 
Any account of Kierkegaard as an author has to come to terms with the issue of pseudonymity, 
one of the more elusive, and therefore apophatic, aspects of the authorship. All that I have said 
thus far touches on this issue, but let me turn my attention to it directly.  
Kierkegaard’s authorial voice is dispersed across seventeen pseudonymous personas: 
Victor Eremita, A, Judge William, A.F., Hilarious Bookbinder, William Afham, Johannes de 
Silentio, Constantine Constantius, Vigilius Haufniensis, Nicholas Notabene, A.B.C.D.E.F 
Godthaab (Rosenbald), Inter et Inter, Procul, Frater Taciturnus, Johannes Climacus, H.H., and 
Anti-Climacus. With regard to these pseudonyms, often there is a desire in commentators to 
locate the “real” and authoritative voice of Søren Kierkegaard, to isolate and pin down what the 
author behind all the masks really thought about things. I regard this approach as unfruitful. It 
does not, it seems to me, ask the most important questions about pseudonymity. I read the 
authorship with all of its pseudonyms as staging an apophatic problematic. The authorship is a 
multi-voiced discourse in which there is no authoritative voice anywhere, not even when the man 
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we call “Kierkegaard” signs that name to texts, because all the voices in the authorship arise of 
out an exposure to what none of them can capture or authoritatively mediate. This is not simply 
the post-structuralist claim that there is nothing behind the dispersal of the grammatical subject 
or that language endlessly refers only to itself. This is at heart a negatively theological claim 
about the nature of writing before the unnamable God whose name, like Kierkegaard’s authorial 
voice, is endlessly determinable. 
I regard the principal function of the pseudonyms as a way to signal indirection, that is, to 
signal the scene of writing as a communication of subjectivity. Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms are 
subjectivities in the movement of communication, and what they are communicating is 
subjectivity, the possibility of subjectivity for the reader.96 This constitutes the whole authorship 
as apophatic insofar as subjectivity as such cannot be said, cannot be communicated directly or 
authoritatively. “All its essential content is a secret, because it cannot be communicated 
directly.”97 Subjectivity is the lived or spirited synthesis of finitude and infinitude, time and 
eternity, in the existing individual that eludes any direct representation, any final synthesis. Any 
objective content of the authorship that can be apprehended directly is therefore not itself the 
point. Objective content is set in motion, off itself, across the chasm of silence between the 
author and the single individual who reads, who in reading is not present as an objective telos but 
“continually desires only to be as one absent on a journey.”98 In this passing, objective content 
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disappears and unsays its objectivity. Writing that respects this chasm of silence and 
difference—the very space of relation—and the absent reader who journeys, as all of 
Kierkegaard’s writing does, is “doubly reflected,” already letting go of itself as it becomes itself, 
becoming itself by letting go of itself.  
This requires that one not set up an absolute distinction between the pseudonymous and 
the signed texts. Pseudonyms signal indirection, but the lack of a pseudonym does not mean a 
lack of indirection.99 Kierkegaard does not come out of hiding in the edifying, upbuilding, and 
deliberative discourses that he signs with his own name. Just the opposite: his writing, as he says 
in a preface to a collection of such discourses, enters a “hiding place in the great forest.”100 It 
“remains in secret.”101 He does not produce in these works summarizable content meant to 
reassure us of his orthodoxy, or of anything else. He produces writing that even before a “shut 
door”102 cannot be contained or forced to explain itself directly. The writing “slips through, since 
it shifts for itself and goes its way and tends to its errand and discerns its own enigmatic path.”103 
Considered directly, it is but “mute letters” that are “unable to express”104 what they long for. 
The letters are “captive thoughts that long for release” with “stammering and stuttering.”105 Only 
the single individual who “reads aloud to himself”106 can release what is held captive in the 
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writing. Such a reader “breaks the spell on the letters, with his voice summons forth what the 
mute letters have on their lips.”107 
Absent a reader for whom it comes alive subjectively, Kierkegaard’s signed writings are 
a collection of mute letters that only stutter and stammer. Meaning breaks through only in the 
inwardness of the single individual, never externally for “the crowd.” Meaning, or truth, is 
therefore always elusive, never objective, always a gift, never a possession. The reader 
Kierkegaard longs for is “that favorably disposed person who receives the book and gives it a 
good home, that favorably disposed person who in receiving it does for it by himself and by his 
acceptance what the temple box by itself did for the widow’s mite: sanctifies the gift, gives it 
meaning, and transforms it into much.”108  
The signed writings, therefore, withhold direct and finalized content no less than 
pseudonymous writings. Kierkegaard in fact acknowledges that his own name is a pseudonym: 
“This is my limitation—I am a pseudonym.”109 His signed discourses also wink at his reader, 
approaching only by withdrawing, looking only by turning away. They aim not at a scientific or 
descriptive “result” but at an “overturning of thought and speech.”110 Writing about the 
“deliberations” [Overveielse] that make up Works of Love, Kierkegaard writes that his aim is to 
paint a world governed by the logic of paradox that will “awaken and provoke people and 
sharpen thought.”111 A deliberation is a “gadfly.”112 It is “impatient, high-spirited in mood.”113 It 
aims to startle the mind and heart. Therefore: “irony is necessary here and the even more 
significant ingredient of the comic. One may very well even laugh once in a while, if only to 
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make the thought clearer and more striking.”114 A deliberation desires to “fetch [readers] up out 
of the cellar, call to them, turn their comfortable way of thinking topsy-turvey with the dialectic 
of truth.”115  
 Simply registering that the pseudonyms signal indirection does not exhaust the issue of 
pseudonymity. How any given pseudonym signals indirection must be determined locally in each 
text. Different pseudonyms signal indirection differently, depending on what point of view 
toward existence they are opening. Let me take three examples: Kierkegaard, Johannes 
Climacus, and Constantine Constantius. 
Kierkegaard enacts indirection by writing for “that single individual” [hiin Enkelte] and 
by prefacing his discourses with prayers. This forms his discourse as address, as sent beyond 
itself, emptying itself of claims to possess its own meaning and truth. Kierkegaard’s writing has 
meaning only for another, not in itself. It is “nothing for itself and by itself, but all that it is, it is 
only for [the reader] and by [the reader].”116 Writing before God and for hiin Enkelte, 
Kierkegaard’s language could be described as an act of what Jean-Luc Nancy calls 
“adoration,”117 speaking (-oration) toward (ad-) the other, the other who exists for God and not 
for Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard adores his reader, whom he continually refers to as “my reader” 
and “my lover.”118 He offers his writing to hiin Enkelte as a self-emptying gift that desires to set 
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the reader free. Writing toward the reader’s opening before God, Kierkegaard’s discourses aim to 
release the reader from dependence upon the author into “the infinite remoteness of 
separation”119 where, before God, the author as authority is “infinitely forgotten.”120 
Kierkegaard’s writing longs to set its reader free, free for her or his own life before God that no 
objectivity could capture. “It adores this letting be.”121 
An edifying or upbuilding discourse is therefore an outgoing that seeks no safe return, 
and this is why it is edifying. It “goes out like a messenger, but not like a messenger who comes 
back again.”122 Its “trail always leads ahead to my reader, not back, and…the messenger never 
returns home.”123 Kierkegaard never knows what his writing will have meant. He leaves its 
meaning in the hands of the unknown reader. This self-emptying, unknowing writing toward the 
other is not a resignation to a lack of meaning. It is the “joy” of writing before the elusiveness of 
God with “fantastic hope”124: 
Although the one who sends [the messenger] never discovers anything about his fate, the 
next messenger nevertheless goes intrepidly through death to life, cheerfully goes its way 
in order to disappear, happy never to return home again—and this is precisely the joy of 
him who sends it, who continually comes to his reader only to bid him farewell.125 
   
Kierkegaard’s writing is sent out “in order to disappear,” in order to go “through death,” the 
death of any objective, closed meaning. The writing comes “to life” only in the existence of hiin 
Enkelte, whose life’s meaning will never be fully known or accounted for, even to itself, always 
eluding capture and finality before the hope-giving elusiveness of God.126  
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Kierkegaard’s writing is in this sense a work of love. It “stretches out its arms”127 to its 
reader “because one goes to the person one loves, makes one’s home with him, and remains with 
him if this is allowed.”128 This is “the book’s joyous giving of itself.”129 Adoring its reader 
through God, Kierkegaard’s writing prays, it prays that it will fall on listening ears and be met 
with “appropriation, and the appropriation is the reader’s even greater, is his triumphant giving 
of himself.”130 To appropriate or become attentive to the truth toward which Kierkegaard writes 
is not to close down on or possess some definite content. It is to become expropriated unto God, 
given over to a movement of communicating in which joy, gratitude, and adoration before the 
other exceeds all articulable meaning. 
Philosophical pseudonyms, who are not as pious as Kierkegaard, tend to enact indirection 
by mocking their own efforts. Johannes Climacus does this sublimely. He takes Shakespeare’s 
line, “Better well hanged than ill wed,” as his authorial slogan. Better to have one’s book 
“unnoticed…not…reviewed, not mentioned, anywhere; no literary clangor…no scholarly 
outcry…no shouting about it” that would bring “the citizenry of the reading world to their 
feet.”131 To be ignored is much better than to have one’s book greeted with “cannons mounted 
and fuses lit, with fireworks and illuminated banner in readiness; some with the town hall 
festively decorated, the reception committee all dressed up, speeches ready; some with the 
dipped pen of systematic urgency and the dictation notebook wide open in anticipation of the 
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arrival of the promised one.”132 Rather than respond to doting admirers and annoyingly earnest 
readers who are “disturbing interventions”133 into his “personal freedom,”134 Climacus prefers to 
“lounge undisturbed in his living room, smoke his cigar, busy himself with his thoughts, jest with 
his beloved, make himself comfortable in his robe, sleep soundly.”135 Perhaps then he can write 
another book in peace and quiet. One is reminded of “The Dude” in the Cohen brother’s film The 
Big Lebowski—“takin’ ‘er easy for all us sinners.” Climacus prefers “the negative” to “the 
positive,” because “the negative is not an intervention, but only the positive.”136 Positive speech, 
such as admiration, suffocates and obligates and negates freedom. Negative speech, speech that 
negates and therefore doesn’t wed itself to objective content and “hip-hip-hurrah”137 success, 
grants freedom. 
How, then, is the reader to read Concluding Unscientific Postscript? What kind of book is 
this? In the subtitle, we are told that it is a Mimical-Pathetical-Dialectical Compilation: An 
Existential Contribution. It is a big, dense book that covers vast dialectical territory. But it 
doesn’t do so systematically or with tight-lipped discursivity that knows exactly where it is 
going. It takes its time. It plays with time’s excess. “We do have plenty of time,” Climacus 
writes, “because what I write is not the awaited final paragraph that will complete the system.”138 
The Postscript saunters and swags across 600 pages, not bothering to take off its robe and don 
more respectable clothes. It is content to wander and ponder slowly while it puffs a cigar and 
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recounts fantastic, sobering, and hilarious scenes. Its aim is not to problem-solve or make 
anything easier. It wants only “to make difficulties everywhere.”139   
The Postscript signals over and over in both subtle and not so subtle ways that its 
objective content is not itself the point. Most bluntly, Climacus revokes the whole book as its 
concluding gesture. He writes that “everything is to be understood in such a way that it is 
revoked, that the book has not only an end but has a revocation to boot.”140 How does one “go 
on” from a book that completely unsays itself? What sort of response or answer does it invite? 
By revoking his book, Climacus leaves the way forward objectively uncertain. There is no 
necessary or obvious way to “go on.” Climacus has no interest in winning readers to an 
intellectual or religious cause or in setting up a tightly bounded and policed field of discourse. 
He only wishes to make clear the difficulty of going on toward Christian religiousness. And the 
worst possible thing, for Climacus, would be to force this difficulty upon someone or tell them 
how to face it. Each reader must decide for themselves how to go on, how life is to become 
difficult for them. The possibilities for the meanings and effects of Climacus’ book are therefore 
unspeakably numerous and untameably diverse, as numerous and diverse as the single 
individuals who read it. By revoking his book, he makes way for the meanings and effects that 
the book might produce but that the book itself cannot say. The Postscript does not police its 
own meaning. 
Perhaps Kierkegaard’s most wildly un-policed text is Repetition: A Venture In 
Experimenting Psychology, the companion piece to Fear and Trembling. It was written by 
Constantine Constantius “without any philosophical pretension, a droll little book, dashed off as 
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an oddity.”141 The book seeks to communicate “repetition” as a category that is at once aesthetic, 
ethical, and religious. Repetition, however, is not a concept, or it is a concept that negates itself 
as a concept. It is a “task,” specifically, “a task for freedom”—“it signifies freedom itself…upon 
which metaphysics comes to grief.”142 Constantine therefore writes not “in a scientific-scholarly 
way, still less in scientific-scholarly way in the sense that every teller in our philosophical bank 
could count 1, 2, 3.”143 He aims to let the untameability of life interrupt the smooth accrual of 
intellectual capital: 
Just as on the street one hears the minutest portions of a solitary flute player’s 
performance, and almost instantly the rattle of the carriages and the noise of traffic make 
it necessary even for the Amager hawker to shout loudly so that the madame standing 
there can hear the price of her kale, and then for a brief instant it is quiet and one again 
hears the flute player, just so…[Repetition] is continually interrupted by the noise of 
life.144  
 
“Repetition” [Gjentagelse] is intended as a critical undoing of Hegelian “mediation.” It 
names the movement of life that exceeds than the movement of the concept.145 Gjentagelse 
therefore does not get determined with any kind of stability or finality in this text, just as life 
itself can never be determined with any kind of stability or finality. This indetermination of the 
text’s central category, this freedom, is at the heart of its critical gesture vis-à-vis mediation, a 
gesture that critiques indirectly through performance. One cannot simply assert indetermination 
or freedom as a direct position over against determination. This would be to determine the 
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freedom of indetermination. Indetermination must be “performed” indirectly as the very open-
endedness of determination.  
Repetition is such a performance. It refuses to mediate Gjentagelse, to determine it 
scientifically across a dialectical unfolding that arrives at the finalization of a concept. Rather, 
Gjentagelse is non-identically repeated across a range of unsystematically related performances 
that sprout throughout the book like “wild trees.”146 Constantine’s return trip to Berlin, at the 
heart of which is his return to the theater, at the heart of which is a performance of farce, which 
is a performance of indetermination; additionally, a certain young man’s poetic re-discovery of 
himself, his exchange of letters with Constantine, and even the repeated blowing of a stagecoach 
horn with its “infinite possibilities”147—each of these is an instance of Gjentagelse. Gjentagelse 
is disseminated into multiple guises that “constantly run around in the book and create 
confusion.”148  
And yet none of these repetitions is truly Gjentagelse because none of them is religious 
repetition, which is repetition in the “pregnant sense.”149 This is the fundamental indetermination 
of the text, its farce. It progressively moves through multiple determinations of “repetition” 
toward the possibility of religious repetition, parodying the Hegelian movement of the concept. 
But Constantine’s text leaves off the decisive, absolute moment, the moment in which the 
concept becomes fully determined and articulable. Repetition does not happen in the text. It goes 
unsaid. One can only wait for repetition. This is the book’s decisive, if also elusive, gesture of 
critique. Religious repetition cannot happen within the frames of discourse. Like mediation, 
repetition names a movement, but not a movement into speech. It is a lived movement that takes 
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place in an inwardness where thought and language cannot go. Repetition, through the 
indetermination and dispersal, one could say failure, of its central category, says this inwardness 
by unsaying, writes it by unwriting.   
vii  
 
I want to conclude this chapter by asking the following: what kind of apophasis have I been 
tracing throughout Kierkegaard’s writing? William Franke identifies two main streams of 
apophasis in Western discourse, one “extralinguistic” the other “intralinguistic.”150 Franke 
writes, “they are based, respectively, on the unsayability inherent in being and on the 
unsayability inherent in language.”151 The first finds its origin in the Greeks: “it developed in 
Neoplatonic discourses revolving around the One that Logos cannot comprehend. This One is the 
supreme source of Being as such and therewith also of all beings throughout the universe. Yet it 
remains inaccessible to every effort of knowledge by means of the Logos: it is the ineffable par 
excellence.”152 The second finds its origin “in the problematic of the unnameability of God as it 
devolves from Jewish interpretations of the Torah and, following them, from Christian and 
Muslim meditations on the revelation of the divine Names.”153 In this second stream, “language 
itself is the starting point, and the divine Name stands as the ineffable instance at the source and 
core of language.”154 The Greek approach finds the unsayable lying beyond language, whereas 
the Jewish approach finds the unsayable right in the midst of language, at its very origin.  
These two streams, however, do not remain separate. Throughout Western history they 
are found “intersecting and interpenetrating.”155 Franke writes:  
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Greek Neoplatonic speculation on the ineffable One-Nothing and Jewish, Kabbalistic 
theology of the unutterable divine Name have been tangled together all through Western 
intellectual tradition. Just as being and language are mutually relative terms, so also the 
absolute of what cannot be said in the register of either being or language emerges in 
complementary fashion from the parallel reading of these two apophatic oeuvres.156 
 
Kierkegaard’s writing, I want to claim, is a potent mix of both Greek and Jewish modes of 
apophasis. If one abstracts the metaphysical and ontological presuppositions of his discourse one 
finds, as I argued in the introduction, a relocation of the Neoplatonic problematic of the One, 
now identified by Kierkegaard as “that one” [hiin Enkelte], the single individual. Hiin Enkelte is 
ineffable in its utter concreteness and absolute singularity. The single individual is where 
existence redoubles itself into singularities that withdraw from and elude the frames of language, 
which inevitably generalize and abstract. The unsayable One, for Kierkegaard, is met in every 
face. Yet if one approaches Kierkegaard’s discourse with a view to the performative force and 
elusiveness of its forms, as I have tried to do in this chapter, one finds the unsayable “beyond” 
happening right in the midst of language as it endlessly and hyperbolically opens itself, straining 
to respond to a silent, originary Name or Word, the call to become a self, to become “that one.”  
These two aspects of Kierkegaard’s discourse are both instances of “reduplication.” What 
singularizes the self is its being-before-God. God, however, is not an object or a substance 
straightforwardly “beyond” language. God is a movement of infinite reduplication that is neither 
beyond language nor within language. God is prior to the binaries of presence and absence, 
outside and inside, dis-placed from any determinate place. God is absolute, an elusive absolution 
from—and of—any fixed position, the solvent that dissolves the closure of both being and 
language, opening a beyond right in the midst of being and language that keeps both in constant 
motion. As the self “repeats” this absolution, which in Christian language is the event of 
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“forgiveness,” a repetition of being given-for, the self is reduplicated into and through itself such 
that its very existence is lived as an echo of the singular, reduplicated, apophatic divine Name: I 
am who I am, I will be who I will be. It is only before God that the self can become itself, that is, 
a reduplicating self that lives elusively (i.e. freely) through faith, hope, and love. A discourse that 
seeks not simply to write about this movement but to undergo its constant motion will be 
reduplicating discourse, a discourse that doubles back on itself, expressing its “what” through an 
elusive “how,” keeping itself always unsettled, eluding closure by writing…
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
INFINITE REDUPLICATION: KIERKEGAARD’S NEGATIVE CONCEPT OF GOD 
 
 
 
To become involved with God in any way other than being wounded is impossible, for God himself is this: 
how one involves himself with him…In respect to God, the how is the what. –Kierkegaard1 
 
God is infinite reduplication. – Kierkegaard2 
 
 
i 
 
My goal in this chapter is to attempt to trace some of the more conceptual contours of 
Kierkegaard’s apophaticism. It is, however, impossible to exhaustively trace these contours. It is 
a mark of their apophatic power that they are inexhaustible, able to be redetermined and re-
launched endlessly and unpredictably. Fordoblelse, for instance, “reduplication” or 
“redoubling,” which is intimately related to Gjentagelse, “repetition,” is a concept that 
Kierkegaard deploys unsystematically across an extraordinary range of problematics: God, the 
self, Christ, writing, communication, suffering, joy, patience, faith, hope, love, inwardness, 
hiddenness—each of these has Fordoblelse at its heart. What exactly Fordoblelse is, therefore, 
cannot be definitely said or stabilized. It is a “how” not a “what.” It sets thought and existence in 
motion, not as a principle that produces delimited or articulable identities, the identity of thought 
and being, for instance, which is the goal of mediation, but as a principle of movement that 
ruptures identity, that allows an excess into identity. Kierkegaard’s concepts are wounded by an 
open-endedness and an indetermination, a transcendence, a “nothing,” that cannot be reinscribed 
speculatively.  
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The history of Kierkegaard interpretation is sparse when it comes to interpretations of his 
concept of God.3 This is undoubtedly owing in part to the fact that the quantitative weight of 
Kierkegaard’s pages leans heavily in the direction of ethical, existential, and spiritual exposition. 
There are only a handful of passages in which Kierkegaard discusses directly his concept of God. 
Nevertheless, quantitative weight does not decide on qualitative importance. A negatively 
theological (non)apprehension of God underwrites the movements of his ethical, existential, and 
spiritual expositions. It is precisely because Kierkegaard’s concept of God is apophatic that it 
hides itself in these expositions, that it gets off itself, ex-positions itself within lived ex-istence.     
This chapter will follow this (x)-positioning of the concept of God. I will move through 
three of the theological coordinates that frame Kierkegaard’s concept of God: “infinite 
qualitative difference,” “unconditioned, being-in-and-for-itself,” and “infinite reduplication.” Of 
these three, infinite reduplication expresses the apophatic core of Kierkegaard’s thought and 
connects him, as I’ve already explored, to Eckhartian apophaticism. Along the way, I will show 
how these coordinates underwrite a theological economy of gift, generosity, freedom, and 
abandon. At the heart of this economy is an apophasis of divine intentionality. Kierkegaard is 
explicit that in relation to creation God has no intentions, no determinate plan, no why, only an 
infinite attention, intimacy, generosity, longing and joy. God is nothing but an absolute “with,” 
the “with” of love without why.  
ii 
 
Infinite qualitative difference.  
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The notion of God as infinite or absolute difference runs through Kierkegaard’s authorship. In 
Philosophical Fragments, God is described as “absolutely different.”4 Absolute difference is an 
entirely dialectical or paradoxical idea, one found also at the heart of Eckhart’s theology. 
Absolute difference is difference absolved not only of sameness but even of difference, meaning 
that one cannot articulate or grasp the absolute in its difference. It is neither identical nor 
different. The absolute cannot be placed in the oppositional frames that structure knowledge—
not this but that. The absolute is infinitely dis-placed—neither this nor that. It escapes all 
opposition, all duality through which it could be reduced to something knowable, even 
negatively. This is why Eckhart names God as “distinction without distinction,” or difference 
without difference. It is why Kierkegaard says that God has “no distinguishing mark,”5 nothing 
that would mark off God’s difference. God is without determination, even negative 
determination. God is the absolute limit to thought, its “torment”6 that leaves it without rest and 
conclusion, dis-placed and undone. God is beyond all speech, beyond all silence, too. Neither 
the“via eminentiae” nor the “via negationis”7 puts thought on a path toward God. God is never 
found as the conclusion of any method. Neither this nor that, God is this: that every method fails. 
God is no more the infinite perfection of creaturely being than its infinite negation. God escapes, 
slips beyond, all determinable difference. 
 When Kierkegaard writes, “God himself is this: how one involves himself with him,”8 
and, “God is this—that everything is possible,”9 and, “In respect to God, the how is the what,”10 
he is letting God slip beyond determination. He is refusing the metaphysical gesture, the 
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supplying of predicates to a divine being. God is, for Kierkegaard, “predicatless,”11 without 
ontological substance, a subjectivity to which no predicates can be attached, or a subjectivity that 
reduplicates itself as its own predicate—“pure subjectivity,” I am who I am. What is he is doing 
with these statements, one might say, is laying down a certain grammatical rule, or better, a style, 
an apophatic style.  
It might go something like this: when speaking of God, do not speak as if you were 
supplying predicates to a divine being. Speak, rather, an event, a happening, one that names the 
happening of the divine as nothing, a nothin-ing. God is this—that…that everything is possible, 
that closure is impossible, that metaphysics comes to grief and is tormented by a fever it cannot 
break, that there is hope, that an abased Jewish peasant’s flesh is hallowed, hollowed, thrown 
open, made empty, roomy enough for each one, for every one, that I, in shocked response, in 
repentance, may love that one, that person, that friend, that lover, that neighbor, that enemy with 
a love that releases, that does not grasp at the knowledge of good and evil.  
This is to release into language an apophatic elusiveness and aliveness. It is to free 
language from the temptation of speaking about God. God cannot be spoken about. “God cannot 
be an object.”12 God moves elusively in the saying of an event, in a saying that does not congeal 
into a said, or even into a silence, but in a saying that keeps itself alive, trembling, slipping, 
exclaiming, whispering, moving at a slant, with a swerve, like a dance.    
 That God escapes and slips beyond all determinable difference is what Kierkegaard 
means by “infinite qualitative difference.”13 What is crucial to clarify here is the meaning of 
“quality.” A qualitative difference, I am claiming, is not an ontological difference. It is not the 
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difference between Being and beings, nor is it the difference between two beings or entities—
one infinite, the other finite, for instance. Qualitative difference moves the discourse of 
difference off of ontology, off of any direct accounting of what “is.” This is not to say that 
Kierkegaard’s discourse simply avoids ontology in favor of, say, psychology, or some other 
“practical” or “existential” discourse. Kierkegaard’s discourse does have ontological stakes (I 
will return to this at the end of chapter six). He does not so much avoid ontology and 
metaphysics as void them, empty them, shatter them, by way of a kind of apophatic, poetic, 
religious fervor, “the passion of the infinite.”14 The religious thrust of his discourse is too 
restless, too attuned to the exigency of lived existence in its openness before the absolute, too 
insistent that discourse on the self not have the feel of an autopsy15 to be confined to an ontology. 
For Kierkegaard, knowledge of being is never as such edifying. Edification exceeds ontology.          
The difference between God and the self cannot be formulated as a concept, that is, 
within a discourse that stabilizes their difference in an abstract accounting. The difference 
between God and the self is their enacted relation, which is too slippery, alive, and rich to be 
transposed into metaphysical discourse. This relation cannot be thought, it can only be lived as a 
differenc-ing of inwardness, a spacing opened and traversed within lived existence. Qualitative 
difference is “expressed through action in the transformation of existence.”16 Thinking this 
difference requires a discourse that breaks with or exceeds ontology in the direction of ethical-
religious responsibility, a discourse that ruptures ontology by calling the reader to a task, a work, 
an upbuilding. “Qualitative difference” names the breaking open of the ontological by the ethical 
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and the religious. It names an infinite responsibility, one that Kierkegaard calls “repentance,” a 
turning toward the outside. 
 Kierkegaard links quality to singularity: “There is really only one quality—singularity. 
Everything revolves around this, and this is also why everyone understands qualitatively with 
regard to himself what he understands quantitatively with regard to others.”17 A difference in 
quality is a difference that inheres in itself. It is a mode of self-relation, a reduplication of self, 
that establishes its difference not through a quantitative, relative difference on a shared horizon 
such a “being,” as if God were the “highest,” or “most perfect” being, but as a difference that is 
its own genus, and therefore maintains heterogeneity—secrecy—toward everything outside of 
itself. (There is no analogy of being between God and the creature, on Kierkegaard’s terms). A 
quality is a difference than cannot announce its difference, which is why the difference or 
transformation God makes in existence is expressed not in external, quantifiable changes but in 
“hidden inwardness.”18 God is this: that I tremble in secret, given again, to the wonder. 
Kierkegaard also links quality to that which comes into existence only through a “leap,” a 
transcendent movement, rather than through an immanent modulation or movement within 
being. In The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard’s author critiques Hegel for claiming that an 
increase in quantity can bring forth a new quality: “It is therefore a superstition when it is 
maintained in logic that through a continued quantification a new quality is brought forth.”19 He 
also critiques Hegel for bringing “the negative” into logic as a principle of movement, thus 
turning movement, becoming, and qualitative transition into logical movements.20 Both moves 
amount to a reduction of all movement, transition, and coming into existence to immanent 
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modulations of being, “which in a profound sense is no movement at all.”21 Hegel erases from 
his system the possibility of surprise and the in-coming of the singular other that would disrupt 
immanent continuity and let existence gape open with qualitative newness and movement, with a 
leap, with birth. All difference, all quality, for Hegel, is an immanent outworking and unfolding 
of being in which all negativity, transition, and movement is folded back into the production of 
immanent, self-same being, a “self-moving selfsameness”22 as Hegel puts it. For Kierkegaard, 
this is a flattening out and closing up of existence in which “the qualitative distinction between 
God and man,” the difference that opens existence off itself, “is pantheistically abolished.”23    
Kierkegaard, by contrast, thinks God as the birth of non-being (nothing) into existence. 
This is the coming into existence of a qualitative difference, an infinite negativity, that is not 
dialectically recuperable to being, to the concept. God is a leap, a letting, a break, that births 
existence anew, that moves existence off itself, forward, not toward any objective goal, but 
toward the abandon of beginning again, the instant of being given anew, an endless re-launching, 
an infinite rhythm, repetition, redoubling—a repentance. The difference between God and the 
self is therefore expressed by Kierkegaard not in general ontological terms but in terms of an 
existential-spiritual break, a disruption of immanent continuity, an undetermining of time, a 
throwing open of the past and the present from the future, the break of forgiveness. God is this: 
that forgiveness breaks and therefore breaks open despair, that one is given time again, that the 
world is repeated anew, that joy comes to birth. In The Sickness Unto Death, Anti-Climacus 
writes: 
As sinner, man is separated from God by the most chasmic qualitative abyss. In turn, of 
course, God is separated from man by the same chasmic qualitative abyss when he 
forgives sins. If by some kind of reverse adjustment the divine could be shifted over to 
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the human, there is one way in which man could never in all eternity come to be like 
God: in forgiving sins.24 
 
Forgiveness, which is the gift of non-being, a letting-in of the divine nothing, the birth of 
the spacing between the self as sinner and the self as new creation, is the coming into existence 
of God and the self in their infinite qualitative difference. God is the difference, the transition, 
between the sinful self and the forgiven self, between the self in despair and the self in joy. This 
difference is not an immanent, logical change, but a transcendent, absurd leap, an abandon. 
Forgiveness is the in-coming of a singular quality that could not be produced through immanent, 
quantitative movement or change. Forgiveness is absolute movement and birth, a movement that 
puts into motion not the speculative movement of the concept but the movement of the heart in 
wonder: “Yes, let us from the bottom of our hearts wonder at this! If there is anything we in 
these times have forgotten, it is to wonder, and therefore also to believe and to hope and to 
love.”25 In the movement and moment of forgiveness, it is the approach and touch of the 
impossible that occasions wonder. “Oh, blessed refreshment, that the one who was brought close 
to despair because [forgiveness] was impossible now believes it, blessedly believes it, but in his 
soul’s wonder continues to say, ‘It is impossible!’”26 Forgiveness carries and liberates the power 
of the impossible. God is this: that the impossible touch of forgiveness, impossibly, happens, 
delivering the self from any horizon of closure.       
Again, difference here is not being construed in terms of ontology but in terms of ethical-
religious relation, a relation to the impossible. A quality is nothing but a mode of self-relation 
that includes its relation to the other, a self-relat-ing not determined by any prior substance or 
being, a relating that is its own presupposition. This is, to be sure, exactly how Hegel thinks 
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ontological movement or becoming, as a self-positing or self-othering that is its own 
presupposition. Again, Kierkegaard does in any simple way exit ontology or metaphysics. He 
does not stand outside of their discourses but within them, otherwise. He appropriates the 
Hegelian structure of ontology, being as self-posited self-relation, but he appropriates it only by 
exposing it, by placing it within an ethical-religious economy marked by an excess, one not 
reducible to ontological thought, to the concept. What exceeds the movement of the concept in 
Kierkegaard’s writing, again, is edification, which always concerns itself with lived beginnings 
or breakthroughs thrown open by a negativity, an impossibility, not recuperable to being.     
The quality of self-relating singular to the human, its originary beginning and 
breakthrough into existence, is sinfulness, which, for Kierkegaard, does not name any 
determinate moral transgression but what comes prior to any determinate sinful act as its very 
possibility: the free self-relating of the human in its willful autonomy or separation from God, its 
closure to the other, to the other-ing of existence, which Kierkegaard also calls “offense.”27 
Sinfulness names the originary, transcendent leap of the individual into existence, the self as it 
wills or grabs hold of itself in order to stave off the dizziness and anxiety of its creaturliness, its 
freedom. This freedom is the self’s abandonment or thrownness into nothing, into the divine 
withdrawal, the space of genuine creaturely alterity vis-à-vis the divine. In creating, God 
withdraws in order to let the self be in freedom, in order to let it become. In the face of this 
withdrawal, this wholly other-ing, this spacing at the heart of existence, bereft of a principle that 
structures existence, exposed to its own freedom, to “the nothing that interlaces existence,” the 
self leaps into existence as an anxious self-positing, attempting to take itself as its own principle, 
which results in an inextricable entanglement and closure of the self within itself. This is the 
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coming into existence of sinfulness as a quality wholly other to the divine. What is wholly other 
to the divine is enclosure, the self curved in on itself.28 Sinfulness: that in its freedom the self 
comes to transcend God, harnessing the space of its freedom, the divine withdrawal, into various 
species of closure and despair, the highest of which is a nihilistic, demonic rage.29   
 The quality singular to the divine, on the other hand, is forgiveness, which is a dis-
enclosure. In relation to God, “one cannot be inclosed.”30 Forgiveness, like sinfulness, names a 
self-relating, a reduplication, a relation of the divine life to itself that includes its relation to the 
creature, in this case a re-opening or repetition of the creature. What is striking about how 
Kierkegaard construes divine forgiveness, which confirms and puts into play his apophatic 
concept of God, is that, for him, forgiveness is not the outcome, payoff, or result of an economic 
act structured by reciprocity and exchange, as in certain penal, sacrificial, and ransom theories of 
the atonement. Forgiveness, for Kierkegaard, is a sheer, presuppositionless event, a pure, 
unconditioned gift. It happens in an instant (Øieblikket), out of nothing, as the gift of nothing. It 
is, Kierkegaard says, a divine forgetting, a divine unknowing, a divine release of knowledge, a 
divine Gelassenheit. Forgiveness names the self-relation or reduplication of the divine that 
relates itself to itself not as a field of knowledge, accounting, surveillance, reciprocity, or 
exchange, that is, as anything determinate, but as nothing, as a nothin-ing: an open, 
unconditional, infinite embracing of the creature that embraces precisely by releasing, by 
granting the birth of a new day, an open future, one that is not an outgrowth of yesterday. God 
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gives (reduplicates) the divine life not as a knowing but as an unknowing, an abandon, a prodigal 
embrace. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard writes: 
Forgetting, when God does it in relation to sin, is the opposite of creating, since to create 
is to bring forth from nothing, and to forget is to take back to nothing. What is hidden 
from my eyes, that I have never seen; but what is hidden behind my back, that I have 
seen. The one who loves forgives in this way: he forgives, he forgets, he blots out the sin, 
in love he turns toward the one he forgives; but when he turns toward him, he of course 
cannot see what is lying behind his back.31  
 
The loving turn of forgiveness turns simultaneously toward and away, turning toward the sinner 
by turning out a-way, a way out of despair, an open road. Forgiveness is the hinge of the self on 
which it is flung open again to the divine withdrawal, to freedom.32 It is a with-, an embrace, that 
-draws the self away from itself as a closed determination, (re)turning the self to itself as an 
opening. Forgiveness is a repetition of the instant of creation that un-creates in order to create 
anew, returning the self to its nothingness in order to give the self to itself again, repeated, 
redoubled, re-launched. Kierkegaard elsewhere construes this act of divine forgetting at the heart 
of forgiveness as an act of divine omnipotence: “just as God is almighty in creating out of 
nothing, so he is almighty in—uncreating something, for to forget, almightily to forget, is indeed 
to uncreate something.”33 This points to the paradoxical understanding of divine omnipotence 
that Kierkegaard holds, omnipotence as the capacity to give freedom, the capacity to withdraw 
itself and make itself weak for the other, which I will discuss ahead.  
 The point I want to make here concerns Kierkegaard’s reversal of the problematic of 
absolute knowing. The trajectory of idealism, culminating in Hegel, is toward the identity of 
thought and being in which the absolute is an absolute knowing. Subjectivity in idealism enacts a 
knowing or “seeing” that objectively grounds being, that gives being form and determination. 
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This is why Hegel can take up in his own way Eckhart’s statement about the unity of God’s eye 
with the mind’s eye. The mind is capable of an absolute seeing, a total viewing that brings into 
being what it views.  
Kierkegaard reverses this problematic even while staying very close to it. To exist 
“before God” is to exist in relation to an absolute seeing that brings into existence what it sees. 
But it is not, for Kierkegaard, to take up the standpoint of absolute seeing. It is, rather, to face it, 
to be faced by it, face to face, at an infinite proximity, with an absolute intimacy. Absolute 
subjectivity is not the subject’s absolute knowing but its being known absolutely, its being seen 
into existence, its utter transparency to an infinite eye that sees without being seen. This opens a 
gap at the heart of existential subjectivity, the gap that is existential subjectivity, the gap between 
my seeing of myself, which can only be relative and partial, and my being seen absolutely. 
Within this gap stretches the trembling tension and passion of responsibility, that I am claimed 
before I claim myself, that my claiming of myself, my becoming myself, must become a 
hearkening to the other, a dispossession, the task of giving myself in relation, without 
knowledge: “Here I am.” (Gen. 22:1). 
This posture of responsibility, which is an apophatic posture, the self’s irreducibility to 
being, its openness or calling beyond being, to a task, is at the heart of “the ethical” as well as 
what Johannes Climacus calls “Religiousness A.” However, it receives a further, an infinite, 
qualification in Climacus’ “Religiousness B,” a qualification that releases the fully apophatic 
power (or weakness, rather) of Kierkegaard’s thought. It is Religiousness B that introduces the 
infinite quality of forgiveness through which absolute knowing undergoes an even deeper 
reversal. It becomes an absolute un-knowing, God’s un-knowing of the self, which is 
simultaneously the self’s un-knowing of itself, the self’s un-knowing of God, and even God’s un-
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knowing of God, the divine forgetting. This is the direction in which I want to interpret divine 
forgiveness, as the un-seeing of the divine eye, its wink—Øieblikket—that in an instant births the 
self, and the divine life, anew. It is, I might venture, the moment of mystical union in 
Kierkegaard, the moment when my eye and God’s eye become one eye, God and the self 
absolutely one in unknowing, an act wholly God’s and wholly the self’s, the birth of nothing in 
the soul, Gottesburt, Gelassenheit, my eye and God’s eye together seeing nothing. Absolute 
seeing, for Kierkegaard, becomes the absolution of seeing: “everything goes black before my 
eyes.”34 In the oneness and darkness of this instant in which the soul is returned to its abyssal un-
ground there is no articulable difference between God and the self, but there is an infinite 
differenc-ing, the birth of an infinite distance, the infinite qualitative distance between despair 
and joy.   
___ 
When the scribes and Pharisees has seized a woman in open sin, they placed her in the 
middle of the temple, face to face with the Savior; but Jesus stooped down and wrote 
with his finger on the ground. He who knew all things surely knew also what the 
Pharisees and the scribes knew before they told it to him. The scribes and the Pharisees 
quickly discovered her guilt; it was indeed easy, since her sin was open. They also 
discovered another sin, one of which they made themselves guilty as they craftily laid 
snares for the Lord. But Jesus stooped down and wrote with his finger on the ground. 
Why, do you suppose, did he stoop down; why, do you suppose, did he write with his 
finger on the ground? Did he sit there like a judge attending carefully to the prosecutor’s 
speech, listening and stooping down to note the complaint so as not to forget it, so as to 
judge scrupulously; was this woman’s guilt the only thing the Lord put in writing? Or is 
he who is writing with his finger on the ground instead writing in order to erase and 
forget? There the sinner stood, surrounded by those who were perhaps even more guilty, 
who loudly accused her, but love stooped down and did not hear the accusation, which 
vanished into thin air; it wrote with its finger in order to erase what it itself knew, because 
sin discovers a multitude of sins, but love hides a multitude of sins. Yes, even before the 
eyes of sin, love hides a multitude of sins, because with one word from the Lord the 
Pharisees and the scribes were silenced, and there was no accuser anymore, there was no 
one who condemned her. But Jesus said to her: Neither do I condemn you; go and sin no 
more—for the punishment of sin breeds new sin, but love hides a multitude of sins.35 
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___ 
God is this: that I may let go, that I may let the sky tear open and the ground fall from beneath 
my feet. God is this: that with no ground and no horizon, suspended and trembling over nothing, 
I may give myself to the upbuilding, the uplift, of a strong wind, a breath, a becoming, an 
abandon. God is this: that “my self is, as it were, outside of myself, and it has to be acquired, and 
repentance is my love for this self, because I choose it absolutely out of the hand of the eternal 
God.”36 God is this: that the concept is erased by the gentle hand of love. God is this: that an 
outside opens on the inside. God is this: that identity is liquidated with a weeping, a letting, a 
spilling out into an undetermined future. God is this: what sorrow! what joy!   
iii 
Unconditioned, being-in-and-for-itself 
In number of late journal entries, Kierkegaard speaks of “unconditioned, being-in-and-for-itself” 
to refer to God or the absolute.37 To understand the apophatic force of this conceptual compound, 
it is necessary to grasp its origin within idealism, Kant and Hegel specifically. “The 
unconditioned” is a Kantian notion, “being-in-and-for-itself” a Hegelian one. Becoming clear on 
this provenance will allow a greater sense of how Kierkegaard appropriates idealist metaphysical 
notions only by rupturing them. By stringing together “unconditioned” and “being-in-and-for-
itself,” Kierkegaard performs a kind of apophatic alchemy. The terms come to signify an excess 
beyond their idealist determinations.   
 In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, “the unconditioned” is a transcendental idea that 
signifies “how the understanding is to be employed in dealing with experience in its totality.”38 
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All synthetic judgments of the understanding presuppose as the condition of their possibility the 
horizon of totality, that there is a unity that underlies all phenomenal experience. The 
unconditioned is this unity that is given in and with the conditioning that synthesizes experience. 
Synthetic judgments, such as the experience of temporality, would have no ultimate sense if they 
were not directed toward the unconditioned unity or totality of phenomenal experience. The 
conditioned and the unconditioned are therefore given together: “if the conditioned is given, the 
entire sum of conditions, and consequently the absolutely unconditioned (through which alone 
the condition has been possible) is also given.”39 As the “totality of conditions for any given 
conditioned,” the unconditioned is the “ground of synthesis of the conditioned.”40  
The point to highlight here is how the unconditioned functions for Kant as a ground. To 
be sure, this ground as such falls outside of phenomenal experience, and therefore the 
understanding has no concept of it. Totality as such cannot be experienced. The unconditioned 
“prescribes to the understanding its direction toward a certain unity of which it has itself no 
concept.”41 Nevertheless, even though the unconditioned as such cannot be known or 
experienced, it is the principle that directs the understanding toward the trust or faith that 
everything conditioned has a ground and therefore a purpose, an intelligibility, an explanation, a 
sufficient reason, a why. Phenomenal experience is therefore given a teleology. In Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason, this teleology becomes the movement of the understanding toward 
faith in an ethical unity. The ethical is the telos of the understanding. “God” becomes for Kant 
the ground of an unconditioned ethical imperative that applies equally to all. Kierkegaard’s 
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“teleological suspension of the ethical” scrambles and ruptures these coordinates. But first, 
Hegel.   
Whereas Kant speaks of “the unconditioned” in order to refer to the idea of a ground or 
totality, Hegel speaks of “being-in-and-for-itself.” This shift is indicative of Hegel’s desire to 
erase the elements of negative theology that are found in Kant. For Kant, totality is “beyond” 
phenomenal experience. As such, it is unknowable and can only be related to with a kind of faith, 
even if for Kant this must be a rational faith. This split between faith and knowledge is one that 
Hegel wants to overcome.42 Totality, for Hegel, is immanent, not beyond. “Being-in-and-for-
itself” expresses this immanence. It expresses that the absolute, being as such, not only holds 
itself within itself, like Kant’s “thing in itself,” but does this holding by showing itself to itself, 
manifesting itself to itself through its loss and recuperation of itself within finitude, thus 
becoming knowable as such. The relation between ground and grounded, for Hegel, is one of 
identity. What grounds is what is grounded, totality relating itself to itself through itself.  
Kierkegaard will critique Hegel’s “being-in-and-for-itself” only by appropriating it. This 
happens first in Kierkegaard’s dissertation, The Concept of Irony, where his debate with Hegel 
beings as a debate over how to interpret negativity in Socrates. Kierkegaard and Hegel are in 
agreement that Socrates was the first to formulate the problematic of the absolute as a 
problematic of self-consciousness. To know the absolute is always to know oneself in relation to 
it. Hence, the Socratic dictum: know thyself. To know the absolute is to know how to relate 
oneself to the absolute, absolutely. This is the basis for Hegel’s finding in Socrates an implicit 
affirmation of the absolute as being-in-and-for-itself. The absolute is always a self-relating, 
subjectivity manifesting itself to itself. Moreover, both Kierkegaard and Hegel acknowledge that 
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Socrates apprehends the absolute only under the form of negation, as “infinite absolute 
negativity.”43 Socrates arrived at “being-in-and-for-itself only as the infinitely abstract, he had 
the absolute in the form of nothing. By way of the absolute, reality became nothing, but in turn 
the absolute was nothing.”44  
The debate between Kierkegaard and Hegel will turn on the status of this “nothing,” 
which itself turns on how each positions Socrates within the history of thought. Hegel, for his 
part, regards Socrates as the surpassable beginning of the speculative dialectic. He represents the 
beginning of thought in the immediacy of pure abstraction. Socrates’ merit and necessity was to 
have grasped the absolutely pure and abstract formality of being as being-in-and-for-itself. This 
formality, however, must undergo a progressive determination beyond abstract immediacy. 
“Nothing,” for Hegel, is that from which thought departs in order to become rich in speculative 
content. Socrates clears the ground and prepares the speculative soil. 
For Kierkegaard, this is to reverse and negate Socrates’ significance. Throughout the 
entire authorship, beginning in The Concept of Irony, Socrates represents for Kierkegaard a sort 
of outside or perpetual challenge to philosophical and theological knowledge as such. Socrates is 
not a surpassable beginning from which one departs onward toward speculative knowledge. He 
is a non-surpassable beginning one continually returns to in order to derail the speculative project 
by returning all thought and existence to “nothing.” Socrates stands as a perpetual stumbling 
block, a ceaseless call to unknowing.45 In a late journal entry, Kierkegaard writes, “The system 
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in time, as a repetition forwards, rather than a recollection backwards. The eternal future that opens in Christ is even 
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begins with ‘nothing’; the mystic always ends with ‘nothing.’ The latter is the divine nothing, 
just as Socrates’ ignorance was devout fear of God, the ignorance with which he did not begin 
but ended, or which he continually reached.”46 In The Concept of Irony, he writes that Socrates 
lets the “in-and-for-itself work itself out (via negationis) of the qualifications of being in which it 
had been hitherto.”47 Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel will always turn, as I’ve said, on an 
affirmation of an abyssal negativity not recuperable to being, one that “works itself out…of 
being” rather than establishing itself in and as being. “In-and-for-itself” comes to mean for 
Kierkegaard not a movement of determination but an un-determining, the reverse of the Hegelian 
meaning. In order to see exactly how “in-and-for-itself” constitutes an un-determining movement 
it is necessary to turn to “infinite reduplication.” But first, I want to return to “the 
unconditioned.” 
Kierkegaard’s appropriation of the language of “the unconditioned” carries forward some 
of its Kantian meaning, specifically its unknowability as well as the co-givenness of the 
conditioned and the unconditioned. Kierkegaard expresses this co-givenness in his account of the 
self as a synthesis. The self is a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the 
eternal, freedom and necessity.48 Given in and with finitude is its infinite and eternal horizon that 
as such is unknowable. Kierkegaard, however, pushes this idea to an extreme in a way that 
unhinges it from its Kantian meaning. 
For Kant, the unconditioned has a grounding function. Specifically, this means that 
everything given in experience has a necessary and sufficient basis. Phenomenal experience is 
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upheld by a rational harmony, albeit one that cannot itself be experienced. Between the 
unconditioned and the conditioned, between cause and effect, between eternity and time there is 
rational harmony and commensurability. Kierkegaard lets this rational harmony and 
commensurability give way to radical incommensurability. He uses forceful language to gesture 
at the incommensurable relation between the conditioned and the unconditioned. The 
unconditioned is “fatal to relative being,”49 a “sunstroke directly on the brain…It is the infinite 
concentrated in one single blow and one single moment,” which is “something everyone must 
shrink from as more horrible than death.”50 Here the unconditioned ungrounds the conditioned, 
dislodges it from any system of rational harmony, a loss that is more horrible than death. If, for 
Kant, the unconditioned grounds the use of teleological language, for Kierkegaard, the 
unconditioned obliterates teleology, leaving existence without why. I quote again the following 
passage: 
By nature human beings dread walking in the dark—no wonder, then, that they by nature 
dread the unconditioned, getting involved with the unconditioned, of which it holds true 
that no night and 'no darkness is half so black' as this darkness and this night in which all 
relative goals...in which all considerations (the lights we generally use to help ourselves), 
in which even the most sensitive and warmest feelings of devotion—are extinguished, for 
otherwise it is not unconditionally the unconditioned…Only when every ‘Why’ vanishes 
in the night of the unconditioned and becomes silent in the silence of the unconditioned, 
only then can a person venture everything…In the unconditioned all teleology 
vanishes…51 
 
In relation to the unconditioned, the understanding loses itself, loses every “why.” The 
understanding “by nature” would like to understand, would like to be to be able to find an 
immanent link between an ultimate cause and its effects, between ground and grounded, between 
the absolute and the relative. It would like to be able to aim at a telos, climb the analogical ladder 
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that leads from the relative to the absolute. It would like to articulate a reason, a sufficient 
reason, for existence, for living for the absolute. For Kierkegaard, the unconditioned disallows 
all of this. “As far as venturing everything is concerned, I have no ‘Why’ at all; I am controlled 
simply and solely by this unconditional; I must do it, I cannot do otherwise.”52 The most the 
understanding can do is consent to “the impossibility of giving reasons for the unconditioned.”53 
Reasons, in fact, are a hindrance: “As far as the unconditioned is concerned, reasons, the fact that 
there are reasons, is not a plus—no, no, it is a minus, a subtracting which changes the 
unconditioned into the conditioned.”54 “If a person dimly glimpses one ‘Why,’ something is 
impaired, he sees 1,000 ‘Why’s’—watch out, he will never venture a thing but will become a 
professor of the 1,000 ‘Why’s.’”55 And when one becomes a professor of the 1,000 ‘Why’s,’ one 
becomes a ridiculous contradiction: 
Then come the ‘reasons,’ and then ‘scientific scholarship’ appears, whole sciences and 
professors etc., all these enterprises which, themselves dependent on people by needing 
their money etc., are supposed to help people into—the unconditioned! If someone who 
was going to run a race came rolling up dressed in seven overcoats, five pairs of trousers, 
and enormous boots and an open umbrella, everyone would find it ridiculous, but 
scientific scholarship and professors and reasons which are supposed to help people into 
the unconditioned are fundamentally just as ridiculous.56 
 
 The unconditioned shows itself only through the abandonment of reasons, the loss of all why, 
the losing of one’s mind in “the martyrdom of madness,”57 the vanishing of teleology into a dark 
night.  
This loss more horrible than death does not equal hopelessness. It is, for that absurd soul 
ready to venture a bottomless affirmation of life that comes only on the other side of the loss of 
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every why, that which births faith, for “faith sees best in the dark.”58 Specifically, for 
Kierkegaard, this means that religious subjectivity is never identical with a program, a calculated 
agenda, a demand for conversion into a specific religious identity, the protection of an 
institution, or any kind of objective accomplishment. In short, it is never attached to any cause. 
God is the negation of every cause, even the negation of having negation as a cause. Kierkegaard 
writes, “No, no! God has no cause, is no advocate. For him everything is infinitely nothing…in 
this sense he has no cause, is not finitely interested in having it win…This is God’s sublimity.”59 
Rather than winning in the world, God is abandoned to loving the world without why, abandoned 
to the patient and gentle upbuilding of “spirit,” without demand: “Yet here also God is infinite 
love in that he does not suddenly all at once overpower a person and demand that he shall be 
spirit…No, he handles him so gently; it is a long operation, an upbringing.”60 The unconditioned: 
fatal to relative being, the obliteration of teleology, absolute incommensurability, and 
simultaneously, absolute patience, absolute gentleness, a refusal to control, a slow and trembling 
venturing out over 70,000 fathoms. 
 A theological discourse on Kierkegaard’s terms must therefore let into itself a kind of 
anarchy, the loss of the arche, the withdrawal of the unconditioned as a metaphysical first 
principle that would provide order, stability, and teleology to a system of existence. Theological 
discourse must become a witness to the impossible, to the impossibility of subsuming the 
movements of faith, hope, and love under any why, any reason, any calculation, any cause, any 
demand, any drive toward accomplishment, identity, or closure. Before God, they gape open in 
stunned adoration of a trembling darkness.  
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iv 
Infinite Reduplication 
That “being-in-and-for-itself” is “unconditioned,” that the absolute relates itself to itself without 
why, with abandon, that God is nothing but the giving of God as a nothin-ing, is what 
Kierkegaard means by “infinite reduplication.” Here we approach the apophatic core. Its dark 
center.  
 It was not until the last years of his life that Kierkegaard provided an explicit, albeit brief, 
statement of his concept of God. These passages are extremely important even though they tend 
to be unknown or under-interpreted in the secondary literature.61 They make explicit what 
implicitly underwrites the whole authorship, namely, that God is an infinite reduplication of 
subjectivity—pure subjectivity. Here are the passages:   
God is pure subjectivity, ideal, bare subjectivity, has nothing whatsoever of objective 
being within himself; for everything which has objectivity is thereby reduced into 
relativities.62  
 
God has not an element of objectivity in God’s being…for this would limit God and 
relativize God; but God relates himself objectively to God’s own subjectivity, but this 
again is only a reduplication [Fordoblelse] of God’s subjectivity…God is infinite 
reduplication [uendelig Fordoblelse], which of course no human being can be: [the 
human being] can neither totally transcend himself so that he relates objectively to 
himself, nor become so subjective that he can totally consummate what he in his 
objective transcendence over himself has understood with respect to himself—and if he 
could, he cannot unconditionally subjectively render this glimpse of himself.63 
 
What I want to show here is how Kierkegaard, once again, appropriates the idealist notion of 
self-reflexivity only to turn it inside-out, to get it off itself, to let it become a critique of identity 
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rather than its validation. The self-reflexivity that is God is an absolute expenditure, an abandon, 
not a self-knowing, but a self-giving—without why.  
 These passages turn self-reflexivity inside-out subtly and quickly, but also decisively. 
Two moves or turns are made, particularly in the second passage. First, there is the movement of 
inward differentiation within God, which is a movement of self-relation or self-transcendence: 
“God relates himself objectively to God’s own subjectivity.” This move is Kierkegaard’s initial 
appropriation of self-reflexivity as an ontological notion, an objective delimiting of being. To 
relate “objectively” is to open the space of knowledge, the distance between knower and known 
that allows knowledge of the known. So far, God here would simply be the ideality of 
knowledge: in objective and transparent self-relation, God knows God perfectly. But then comes 
the apophatic turn: “…but this again is only a reduplication of God’s subjectivity…God is 
infinite reduplication.” 
 What carries the apophatic force in this second turn is the word “only.” God’s self-
relation is only a doubling of God’s subjectivity. Infinite reduplication is an indicator of pure 
subjectivity, which is the erasure of any objectivity in God. The point is that in relating to God, 
God relates to nothing objective, that is, to nothing. This is a decisive break from the Hegelian 
account of self-reflexivity in which the subject knows itself through a mediation of its own 
objective nature to itself. For Kierkegaard, pure subjectivity is a self-relation without any 
mediation at all. In particular, this means that there is no objective nature that precedes, either 
logically or ontologically, the movement of self-relation. God does not have a nature. God has no 
essence. God is nothing.  
This is not however, some sort of static, accomplished vacuity. The sense of naming God 
as infinite reduplication is to indicate God as a nothingness that moves and acts, as it were, that 
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opens, that gives birth to itself as nothing, that noth-ings, a nothin-ing. It indicates God’s own 
freedom from God, God’s abandonment of every position in being, even every position beyond 
being. One might think of Eckhart’s boiling water, an indeterminate medium in pure motion with 
no stable or fixed center anywhere. Or one might think of dancing: a subject in the movement of 
abandoning any and every fixed position, the body getting off itself, evacuating the self of any 
essence, of any identity. God is the spacing and rhythm, the repetition, of an apophatic opening, 
the movement of abandon. 
 Kierkegaard here is breaking open from within the tradition of naming the absolute as 
self-thinking thought that runs from Aristotle through Hegel. The identity of thinking and what is 
thought in this tradition turns on a kind of dualism, that between the movement of subjectivity 
and what this movement presupposes, what thought thinks, namely, its own objective being. The 
force of “infinite reduplication” is an undoing of this dualism. However, it is not that God is 
simply identified with one pole of the subject-object dualism, or with the dualism itself, as in 
Hegel. Pure subjectivity is a subjectivity formed purely through itself and therefore not by way 
of opposition to objectivity, as if by simply negating objectivity (the world, finitude, the body, 
etc.) one could arrive at God. Pure subjectivity eludes any oppositional or dialectical identity and 
therefore eludes the whole subject-object framework. This means, crucially, that God is not a 
subject at all, not a determinate subject outfitted with the attributes we tend to attribute to a self-
conscious, self-identical, sovereign subject, namely, agency, intentionality, a unified and 
determinate field of consciousness, etc. The subjectivity that is God occurs in excess of all such 
determinations.  
 A self-relating or self-reflecting without a preceding or implicit objective nature 
evacuates even the self or subjectivity doing the relating or reflecting. In God, there is no 
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substantial subject or self who then relates. There is only the event of relating, a reflection in 
which nothing and no one substantial is reflected, like a mirror facing a mirror, which opens up 
an abyss, the infinite event of reflection. What pure subjectivity and infinite reduplication would 
indicate, then, is simply relation itself, limitless, bottomless relation. One might say that the 
divine life is a reflection of itself within itself that occurs always in excess of itself. Such excess 
might be thought of as the movement of an infinite de-flection in which the possibility of a static 
and centered subjectivity is always already, eternally, abandoned in favor of wildly open and 
hospitable field of relationality that offers itself without reserve as the holding environment for 
infinitely diverse and multiple others.64 The absolute, then, would not be a static principle that 
orders being objectively. It is, rather, the instant of relation that opens everywhere, from 
nowhere. God is this: that the spacing of relation never ceases to open, eccentrically. 
 I want to trace two implications of God as infinite reduplication: God’s unknowability to 
God and the impossibility of divine intentions. First, God’s unknowability to God. 
 A subjectivity that relates itself to itself purely as subjectivity has no objective basis 
within itself that could occasion knowledge of itself. There is simply nothing objective to know. 
The movement of the divine life exceeds its own knowability. Eckhart speaks of this 
unknowability in God as the “simple ground”65 of the divine life. It is a “quiet desert, into which 
distinction never gazed, not the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit.”66 This desert is the 
“innermost part, where no one dwells…and there [the divine life] is more inward than it can be 
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to itself, for this ground is simple silence.”67 This deserted ground “is the hidden darkness of the 
eternal divinity, and it is unknown, and it was never known, and it will never be known. God 
remains there with himself, unknown.”68 And further: “The authorities say that God is a being, 
and a rational one, and that he knows all things. I say that God is neither being nor rational, and 
that he does not know this or that.”69 
 I want to suggest that the logic of Kierkegaard’s concept of God leads out into this quiet 
desert. That God is infinite reduplication means that the divine life is so infinitely intimate with 
itself as movement, so immediately in motion, so fully abandoned to itself as a nothin-ing, that it 
does not have knowledge of itself. It cannot gain an objective position on itself. It eternally 
abandons the possibility of such a position by reduplicating itself only as subjectivity. Or its 
“knowledge” of itself, if one prefers, is its living relation to itself as a nothin-ing. God is who 
God is, will be who God will be, a “tautologically…introverted infinity,”70 without the mediation 
of objective self-knowledge, or with a self-relating that is something other than an objective self-
knowing—passion or abandon, one might say. The divine life is a repetition of itself that is a 
self-giving, without reserve.  
Objective self-knowledge here would be a kind of imperfection, a hesitation or halting in 
the divine life that would introduce a detour through objectivity and duality, an abstraction of the 
divine life from itself as gift. God’s unknowability to God is therefore not some kind of lack, as 
if it signified some sort of limitation or finitude within God, as in versions of process theology. 
On Kierkegaard’s terms, knowledge itself would be the lack, the inability to abandon oneself 
entirely into the movement and moment of relation in which objective positions and points of 
                                                     
67 ME, 198. 
68 ME, 196. 
69 ME, 201. 
70 JP, 4898. 
  119 
view are impossible. God’s unknowability to God is the excessiveness of the divine life as 
infinite relation, which is enacted as God’s freedom in self-giving, the freedom to make room for 
infinitely diverse and singular others. God is nothing but the possibility of such others who each 
bear an absolutely unique and unrepeatable—i.e. non-objective—relation to the divine and point 
of view on existence. God is, in other words, the eventfulness and gift of singularity, of singular 
selves who share only their irreducible distance and spacing from each other, a distance and 
spacing, an unknowability, that is precisely the possibility of relation and responsibility, of faith, 
hope, and love. God, I am saying, is the whence of such irreducible multiplicity, of a relationality 
the exceeds knowability, of the wholly otherness of every other that will never, not now, not in 
all eternity, be mediated into a determinate and objective totality.   
This is why Kierkegaard articulates the infinitude reduplication that is God as a 
movement of love, specifically as a movement of love that does not know or mediate itself 
objectively. The love that is God has already, eternally, given itself, made room for singular 
others, and will give itself again, this very instant, radically prior to any possible objective 
knowledge, even of itself. Let me quote here a crucial passage from Works of Love that identifies 
love with infinite reduplication. To understand the full implications of this passage (and so many 
others in Works of Love) it is necessary to keep in mind that “love” in this text is another name 
for “God,” and vice versa: “love is God.”71 This is why love in the text so often acquires its own 
subjectivity. God is love, and love is God, which is why Kierkegaard writes in the opening 
prayer of Works of Love that the “one who loves is what he is only by being in you!”72 That love 
is at once a human work and the very movement of God’s own life points to the apophatic de-
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substantiation of the divine life I have been speaking of. God is the happening of love; love is the 
happening of God. And love is a nothin-ing: “The one who loves discovers nothing.”73  
The passage I will quote comes in the context of Kierkegaard speaking of the 
incalculability of love, its infinitude. He is positioning himself here against “the scholars” and 
“the philosophers” who “are proud of the calculations of the infinite.”74 Kierkegaard writes: 
But what, then, is able to take love out of its element? As soon as love tarries with itself it 
is out of its element. What does it mean, to tarry with itself? It means to become an object 
for itself. But an object is always a dangerous matter if one is to move forward; an object 
is like a finite, fixed point, a boundary, a stopping place, a dangerous thing for infinitude. 
Love can never infinitely become its own object…for infinitely to be an object for itself 
is to remain in infinitude and thus simply to exist or continue to exist—since love is a 
reduplication [Fordoblelse] in itself…When the object of love is thus finite, love 
concentrates on itself, for infinitely to tarry with itself means precisely a becoming; but 
when love finitely tarries with itself, everything is lost. Think of an arrow flying, as is 
said, with the speed of an arrow. Imagine that it for an instant has an impulse to want to 
tarry with itself, perhaps in order to see how far it has come, or how high it is soaring 
above the earth, or how its speed compares with the speed of another arrow that is also 
flying with the speed of an arrow—in that same second the arrow falls to the ground. 
 The same thing happens to love when it finitely tarries with itself or becomes an 
object to itself—which, more precisely determined, is comparison. Love cannot infinitely 
compare itself with itself, for infinite self-comparison would only be a way of saying that 
it is itself; in such a comparison there is no third factor, love is a reduplication 
[Fordoblelse] and therefore there is no comparison.75 
 
The most important line in this passage is Kierkegaard’s claim that “love can never infinitely 
become its own object,” which means that “love cannot infinitely compare itself with itself.” 
And this is so because “love is a reduplication in itself.” To compare itself with itself would be 
for love to know itself. In order to do this, however, there would have to be a “third factor” that 
would mediate such self-comparison. The idea of an objective nature is this third factor. The 
possibility that the relation of love to itself is a knowledge of itself is secured by positing an 
objective nature that would secure its position in being.    
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In its relation of itself to itself, however, love has “no third factor” through which it could 
compare itself to itself. Love, in other words, has no determinate nature. In its self-relation love 
is withdrawn from any position in being, from any objectivity. This is why Kierkegaard at the 
beginning of Works of Love compares the origin of love, its source, to the withdrawn and hidden 
source of a spring. He writes:  
Where does love come from, where does it have its origin and its source, where is the 
place it has its abode from which it flows? Yes, this place is hidden or secret…You 
cannot see this place; however deeply you penetrate, the origin eludes you in remoteness 
and hiddenness. Even when you have penetrated furthest in, the origin is always still a bit 
further in, like the source of the spring that is furthest away just when you are closest to 
it. From this place flows love along many paths, but along none of these paths can you 
force your way into its hidden origin.76  
 
The origin of love is radically withdrawn or hidden, without objective place or purpose either in 
the world or in itself. And yet this is precisely what allows love to flow along “many paths” in 
the world with no one of them being in any way the privileged or objective path to a 
representable origin. The withdrawal of love as origin from objectivity is what releases love into 
existence as a singularizing power, as a power that separates and individuates along infinitely 
many paths, as many paths as there are single individuals. Love, one could say, is hidden 
everywhere, in every neighbor, yet shows itself objectively nowhere. This is why the whole ethic 
of Works of Love is centered around loving forth the love that is hidden in the other, loving it 
forth as hidden, in such a way that the neighbor is allowed to remain hidden in that very love, 
hidden in her or his singularity, which is to say, hidden in God.   
 In this sense, love is the very opening of space and time for the beloved, who is always 
singular, each time absolutely unique and unrepeatable. Love is the opening of space and time 
that itself does not take space and time. This is the sense in which love is eternal, giving itself 
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always in an instant, as the repetition of the instant that withdraws each time as the very opening 
of time. Love is the nothin-ing that allows the beloved to be, that opens time and space for the 
other without demand, without why. Love gives itself not in order to determine itself through the 
other, as in the Hegelian movement of love, not in order to mediate itself into objectivity, but 
only to reduplicate itself. Love gives itself in order to give itself. Love loves in order to love. 
Such reduplication is “a need in love itself,”77 love’s longing to be itself only by giving itself 
freely, with no calculation of a return or recognition. This is the sense in which love “infinitely 
tarries with itself,” which in fact is not a tarrying, a stopping, but a “becoming,” a flowing along 
infinitely singular paths, a movement so infinitely abandoned to itself as the source of 
singularization that all objective calculation is left behind. Like an arrow in flight, or like a body 
that dances, or like a spring that overflows into multiple paths, love exceeds itself as the very 
movement by which it is itself. At every instant it is already beyond its own position, already 
beyond the possibility of its own objectivity, hidden as the withdrawn origin of each other, of 
every other. Love is the redoubling of itself in excess of itself, a throwing open, an infinite 
hospitality that longs to give space and time to each other as if it were the only other. If love 
sought to grasp its position, to posit or mediate itself objectively, to know itself or be known, it 
would immediately collapse into itself and fall to the ground. It would cease to be an opening for 
the other and become instead a closure into itself. Love lives only as the infinite repetition of the 
instant or moment of opening to the singular other. “But to lose the moment,” Kierkegaard 
writes, “is to become momentary.”78 That is, if love sought to catch a view of itself objectively, 
to abstract itself from the moment of its giving, its flying, its dancing, its flowing, it would 
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wither. Love infinitely, eternally, abides in the instant of letting-in time for the other without 
knowledge, yet with infinite faith and bottomless hope. 
 That love’s excess is not an overwhelming of the other but rather a generous making 
room, a hospitality, indicates a coincidence of opposites at the heart of love: the simultaneity of 
excess and withdrawal. To love is to move into relation, to give oneself, only by withdrawing, to 
give oneself as a withdrawal. The excess of love is the excess of the spacing, the temporality, 
that it keeps opening for the other. Love offers itself essentially as patience, a letting be of the 
unique time of beloved, which is simultaneously a kind of weakness, a giving up of control. This 
is the gift of freedom, the freedom given to the other to become singular, in their own time. Love 
longs for nothing more than for the other to become who they are, to be liberated into their 
singularity, into their own intimate line of flight.  
The dialectic that underwrites this longing for the other’s singularity is indicated in two 
more crucial passages in Works of Love:   
When…the eternal is in a human being, the eternal reduplicates itself in him in such a 
way that, at every moment it is in him, it is in him in a double way: in a direction 
outwards, and in a direction inwards back into itself—but in such a way that this is one 
and the same, for otherwise it is not a reduplication.79  
 
What love does, it is; what it is; it does—and in one and the same moment: in the same 
moment that it goes out of itself (the direction outwards), it is in itself (the direction 
inwards); and in the same moment it is in itself, it thereby goes out of itself—in such a 
way that this out-going and this turning-back, this turning-back and this out-going, are 
simultaneously one and the same.80 
 
Kierkegaard here, like Eckhart, collapses the Neoplatonic double movement of emanation and 
return into a single paradoxical movement. Eckhart writes, “what comes out is what stays within, 
and what stays within is what comes out.” This is a movement that at one at the same time goes 
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out of itself and returns back into itself. The going out is the returning and the returning is the 
going out.  
What I am suggesting is that this coincidence of opposites should be understood as the 
dialectic of the hospitality that love is, that God is. God is the holding open of room for the other. 
And “holding open” expresses the simultaneity of an inward and outward movement. The hinge 
that opens and holds open the door to the neighbor turns simultaneously inward and outward. It 
lets the outside in and turns the inside out. The mother that holds an infant withdraws into herself 
in order to hold open an unconditional attention and care. The therapist that provides a holding 
environment for a patient withdraws into herself, often into silence, in order to hold open the 
patient’s presence to himself. The author of edifying discourses withdraws direct communication 
in order hold open truth as the reader’s own subjectivity. The body that dances withdraws from 
every fixed position in order to hold open an excess of movement.81 Such opening is an abiding 
the uncontrollable advent of the other on the strength of the eternal, including the other that is 
oneself.    
The effect here, again, is a radical de-substantiation of the eternal, of love, and of God, 
which are all names substitutable for each other. That love’s staying within itself is its out-going 
and that its out-going it its staying within itself means that love substantializes itself nowhere, 
neither within being nor beyond being. Love is always arriving and departing simultaneously—
making room. Love absolves itself of any place in order to give place to the other. Ahead, I will 
explore how this non-place that gives place is simultaneously God and the soul. The soul in its 
unity with God, to use Platonic terminology, is something like the khora of the self, the quiet 
desert out of which the self is birthed, continually. Out in the nothingness of this quiet desert the 
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soul is absolutely one with God, one in the instant of God’s overflowing withdrawal, one in 
knowing nothing, one in that impossible, unthinkable instant in which the other is birthed, given 
room, and welcomed. But first, Kierkegaard on the impossibility of divine intentions. 
In a striking passage, Kierkegaard denies the possibility that God could have intentions: 
This is why I repeatedly say that God is pure subjectivity, has nothing of objective being 
in himself which could occasion that he has or must have intentions. Whatever is not 
purely transparent subjectivity has at some point or another a relationship to its 
environment, a relationship to an other and has, therefore, must have, intentions. Only 
that which infinitely subjectively has its subjectivity infinitely in its power as 
subjectivity, only that has no intentions.82 
 
The force of this passage is to evacuate all duality from God, all objectivity through which God 
could stand over against an other and therefore be required to exercise intentionality vis-à-vis 
this other. This is accomplished above all in the amazing last sentence of this passage that 
performs the logic of infinite reduplication even on the level of its form: “Only that which 
infinitely subjectively has its subjectivity infinitely in its power as subjectivity, only that has no 
intentions.” This is an even more decisive articulation of the abyssal nature of infinite 
reduplication than occurs in the two passages I quoted at the beginning of this section. There it 
was said that God relates “objectively” to God’s subjectivity. To be sure, Kierkegaard implicitly 
erases this objectivity by saying that this is only a reduplication of subjectivity. But here the 
erasure becomes explicit. God has God’s subjectivity infinitely in God’s power as subjectivity 
infinitely subjectively. God relates to God’s own subjectivity only in an infinitely subjective way. 
This is what prevents God’s subjectivity from turning into an exercise of intentionality. 
Intentions require a delimited subject, a relation of subjectivity to its objective nature through 
which subjectivity can put itself in relation objectively, aiming itself at delimited objects, ends, 
or goals. Kierkegaard denies that God could act in this way, with intention. Intentions are always 
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in some measure a reduction of subjectivity to finitude: “whoever has an intention must also will 
the means…and in that very second he becomes dependent upon finitude.”83 For God to act with 
intention would be for God to stand over against an object, meaning that God would be 
positioned, and this would be a negation of God’s pure subjectivity, which is God’s 
abandonment of every position.  
This means, radically, that God acts neither voluntaristically on the basis of a freely 
determinable will nor necessarily on the basis of a determinate nature. God acts neither 
randomly nor teleologically. God acts infinitely. God’s relation to the other, to the self, is not a 
relation to an object, which would require a position, but a relation to the self’s subjectivity, to 
the soul, to what is eternal and infinite in the self. This relation of subjectivity to subjectivity 
eludes all positioning. It cannot be mapped within a teleological discourse. Within language, it 
will show itself only as the abandonment of teleological discourse, the loss of all why. God 
relates only to reduplicate subjectivity in the creature, only to birth God in the soul, which is to 
say that God relates only to edify, to birth freedom, the power and joy of singularity, never to 
exercise objective intention.  
This is not to deny that God has created a world full of bodies and matter, a world full of 
finitude. It is to say, however, that God absolutely refuses to control that finitude objectively, 
indeed, God cannot. This is God’s “non-relation” to finitude, the absence of intentionality in the 
divine life, God’s weakness in the world. God lets finitude run wild without controlling it, 
without exercising intention over it, for good and for ill, allowing the best and the worst to 
happen. This is a kind of abandonment of creation, a harrowing letting-be. Kierkegaard writes, 
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“In a certain sense it may be said that to feel abandoned by God belongs to the proper emptying 
out of the human being standing face to face before God.”84 And further:  
[God] is in a certain sense like a natural scientist who relates himself to his experiment: 
no doubt he is easily capable of getting at something in another way, but he wants to see 
whether or not it can be produced by the particular procedure of the experiment, and he 
constrains himself in order to watch the experiment; he waits patiently—yet with infinite 
interest—…In a certain sense it can be said that there is no providence at all, just as if 
there were no experimenter or the experimenter were no one, since, after all, he does not 
intervene but merely lets the concatenated forces develop…[God] will not break in with 
power.85  
 
And yet, even as God abandons creation objectively, God remains infinitely subjectively present 
to creation with abandon: “And yet the experimenter is sheer awareness and attention and is 
constantly present.”86 God is absent from creation as some-one, as some determinate sovereign 
or ruler who exercises intention. But God is infinitely present to creation as “no one,” present not 
as a determinate subject outfitted with in-tention, present instead as sheer a-tention, as concern, 
as love. God is a love that will not control, a love that will only set free, a love that will only hold 
by holding open. God relates only by attending to and loving creation with infinite subjective 
passion, unfailingly holding open the space and freedom through which the self, in the moment 
of faith, is given the power to will itself as an opening, to find the strength to continue to hope 
and to love amidst the best and the worst—without why. 
v 
To further elucidate the absence of intentionality in the divine life, I want to turn to 
Kierkegaard’s paradoxical account of divine omnipotence: divine power exercises itself only as a 
withdrawal of itself.  
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 In another striking passage, one of those rare ones tucked away in his journals in which 
his theological presuppositions suddenly burst forth, Kierkegaard sketches the relation between 
divine omnipotence, human freedom, and creation out of nothing. He writes: 
The whole questions of God’s omnipotence and the good’s relation to evil can perhaps 
(instead of the distinction, that God effects the good and merely allows evil) be solved 
quite simply in this way. Above all the highest which can be done for a being, greater 
than anything else one can do for it, is to make it free. In order to do just that, 
omnipotence is required. This seems strange, since it is precisely omnipotence which 
supposedly makes dependent. But if one will reflect on omnipotence, one will see 
precisely that it also must contain the determination of being able to withdraw itself again 
in the expression of omnipotence, in such a way that precisely for this reason that which 
has come into being through omnipotence can be independent. It is for this reason that 
one human being cannot completely make another free, because the one who has the 
power is himself entangled in having the power—and therefore the relation to the one he 
would make free continually goes awry…Only omnipotence can withdraw itself at the 
same time it gives itself away, and this relationship is the very independence of the 
receiver. God’s omnipotence is therefore God’s goodness. For goodness is to give away 
totally; but in such a way that, by omnipotently retracting itself, it makes the recipient 
independent. All finite power makes dependent; only omnipotence can make 
independent: from nothing bring forth that which acquires subsistence in itself through 
the continual withdrawing of omnipotence itself. Omnipotence is not ensconced in a 
relationship to an other, for there is no other to which it relates itself—no, it can give but 
without giving up the least of its power, i.e., it can make independent. This is the 
incomprehensible thing: that omnipotence manages not merely to bring forth that which 
is most impressive, the visible totality of the world, but the most fragile of all things, a 
being independent over against that omnipotence…It is therefore only a wretched and 
worldly conception of the dialectic of power that it is greater and greater in proportion to 
that which it can compel and make dependent…For this reason, therefore, if a human 
being had the slightest independent subsistence over against God in advance (with respect 
to materia [substance]), then God could not make it free. Creation out of nothing is once 
again omnipotence’s expression for being able to make independent. The one to whom I 
owe absolutely everything, even though he has just as absolutely retained everything, 
precisely he has made me independent.87  
 
 The philosophical background of Kierkegaard’s account of divine omnipotence and 
human freedom here is Schelling’s Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom. 
Schelling writes, “Since freedom is unthinkable in contradistinction to omnipotence, is there any 
other escape from this argument than by placing man and his freedom in the divine being, by 
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saying that man exists not outside God but in God, and that man’s activity itself belongs to God’s 
life?”88 With Schelling, Kierkegaard recognizes that no creature could ever be free over against, 
or “in contradistinction to” omnipotence. If the creature were an external object to the divine 
omnipotence, “if a human being had the slightest independent subsistence over against 
God…then God could not make it free.” This would entangle God in a “wretched…dialectic of 
power.” Human freedom can emerge only within omnipotence itself. Yet how can omnipotence 
itself be the very space of human freedom, of what is wholly other to itself? Only, as 
Kierkegaard writes, if it can “withdraw itself at the same time it gives itself away,” since “this 
relationship is the very independence of the receiver.” What this points to is that for Kierkegaard 
(and Schelling), the room held open for creatures is a space that opens within the divine life as 
the divine life withdraws or contracts into itself. This space, I want to suggest, is the “divine 
nothing,” and this nothing is the nothing out of which creatures are birthed ex nihilo. The divine 
life, as it were, eternally abandons itself, “it gives itself away…totally,” abandoning itself as any 
kind of sovereign principle or ground in order to “retain” itself as nothing, nothing but a 
limitlessly open holding environment for infinitely fragile others. 
 On Kierkegaard’s terms, divine creation is an act of resignation, an act that withdraws 
itself as it acts in order to let the creature be. Johannes Climacus writes, “no one is resigned as 
God, because he communicates creatively in such a way that in creating he gives independence 
vis-à-vis himself.”89 To act “creatively” is to act in order to set the other free. Again, God acts 
only to set free, never to control or exercise intention. There is, however, a paradoxical fold or 
double movement here that is crucial. The withdrawal of the divine life is not simply an 
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abandonment of the creature. It is simultaneously God’s communication of the divine life to the 
creature, God’s giving of the divine life as freedom. God withdraws as a self-giving. God gives 
the divine life as a withdrawal. The freedom given to the human being, which is its exposure to 
“the nothing that interlaces existence,” is the very freedom of the divine life that shares itself 
with, that makes room within itself for, the human being. Human freedom vis-à-vis God is a kind 
of hyperbolic effect of God’s own freedom or independence vis-à-vis God, the absence of any 
objective or necessary principle structuring the divine life, the happening of the divine life in 
excess of any objectivity or calculation. Divine creation is an excessive act, a throwing open of 
room without calculation, but not without “concern.”90 The nothin-ing of the divine life, the 
infinite reduplication of itself as subjectivity that is its absolution from any necessary position or 
nature, becomes for the human being, as the gift of its selfhood and freedom, the possibility of its 
own nothin-ing, its “liberating annihilation,”91 its openness, its excess, its longing, its faith, its 
hope, its love, the impossibility of its closure. In withdrawing, therefore, God maintains the most 
intimate proximity to the creature, withdrawing into an absolute intimacy with the self, an 
intimacy through which the self opens out absolutely into nothing, into freedom.  
 At issue here is the un-doing of onto-theological notions of causality, specifically notions 
that ground creaturely effects in a divine cause. The relation between divine cause and creaturely 
effect, for Kierkegaard, is not a relation of grounding. It is a hyperbolic relation, an exposure or 
exposition of the effect within the nothin-ing of the cause, its withdrawal, which constitutes the 
groundlessness of existence. This why Kierkegaard describes God as a poet, rather than, say, as 
an auto-biographer (which is essentially what Hegel’s God is): “God is like a poet.”92 Between 
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divine cause and creaturely effect there is a hyperbolic relation, the way poetic metaphor 
performs a kind of hyperbolic transgression of literal, authorial intention and meaning. Creatures 
are the hyperbolic poetry of the divine life, thrown into existence with abandon.  
vi 
The site of this abandon, I want to now suggest, is the “soul.” Clarifying this will involve 
unpacking Kierkegaard’s claim that “God’s omnipotence is therefore God’s goodness.” Divine 
power relates to communicate the most intimate and delicate freedom, the freedom to will the 
good, which is the freedom to hope and to love without why, to give birth to the opening that is 
God, an opening opened by “sinking down into one’s own nothingness.”93 God births this divine 
opening in the soul specifically, I want to claim, as Sorg, as “longing” or “yearning,” which is a 
kind of broken desire, desire broken open beyond the demand for satisfaction, accomplishment, 
or a definite object. The soul is where God gives the divine life as a withdrawal, abandoning the 
self to itself, opening the self as an unquenchable longing for the divine. “God…draws back his 
hand and opens his arms to receive in them the yearning soul.”94 The yearning or longing of the 
soul, I want to claim, is a reduplication in the self of God’s own longing for God. The soul is the 
site of the apophatic passion of the divine life for itself as nothing, nothing but an infinite 
reduplication of itself as an absolute opening. 
 That the gift of the soul is a gifting into God’s own longing is made clear in 
Kierkegaard’s communion discourse  on Luke 22:15. There he acknowledges to God that 
“longing is your gift; no one can give it to himself; if it is not given, no one can purchase it, even 
if he were to sell everything—but when you give it, he can still sell everything in order to 
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purchase it.”95 He prays, “when longing grasps hold of us, oh, that we may also grasp hold of the 
longing, when it wants to carry us away, that we may also surrender ourselves.”96 Crucially, 
longing is not a gift external to the divine life; it is the gift of the divine life:  
What would better be called God’s gifts than every prompting of the Spirit, every pull of 
the soul, every fervent stirring of the heart, every holy state of mind, every devout 
longing, which are indeed God’s gifts in a far deeper sense than food and clothing, not 
only because it is God who gives them but because God gives himself in these gifts!...in 
the longing itself the eternal is, just as God is in the longing that is for him.97 
 
This parallels a statement in another of Kierkegaard’s discourses where he writes, “Spiritually, 
the fulfillment is always in the wish, the calming of the concern in the concern, just as God is 
even in the sorrowful longing that is for him.”98 Longing here indicates an inceptual birth or 
opening of desire that is not ordered toward any closure or fulfillment, only toward its own 
repetition. God, here, is not an object of desire, but rather the very birth of desire that reaches out 
for nothing, only for an intensification of its own birth—its reduplication. This is why 
Kierkegaard states that, in relation to God, indeed, as God, longing can only be “increased,”99 
never “satisfied.”100 “Longing” indicates an unfinishable economy of excess, one that redoubles 
on itself: the more the divine gift is given, the more there is longing for the gift, for longing is the 
gift, is God as gift, a gift that will never become a possession but one that reduplicates itself, 
eternally, as gift. Longing reaches out for God only by letting the desire for satisfaction become 
broken, and this letting go, this throwing open of desire, this gift of a broken heart, is a sinking 
into nothingness, a becoming capable of nothing, but just so, of everything. It is a becoming 
empty with the passion, the gift, of the divine life. “God is in the longing that is for him.”    
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 There is an implicit, incorporative trinitarian logic operative here, the gifting of the 
human being into God’s own longing for God, one that significantly echoes Pseudo-Dionysius’ 
apophatic trinitarian theology. In the Divine Names, Dionysius speaks of an “ecstatic…divine 
yearning” that is both the ground of creation and God’s gift to the creature. He writes: 
It must be said too that the very cause of the universe in the beautiful, good 
superabundance of his benign yearning for all, is also carried outside of himself in the 
loving care he has for everything. He is, as it were, beguiled by goodness, by love, and by 
yearning, and is enticed away from his transcendent dwelling place and comes to abide 
within all things, and he does so by virtue of his supernatural and ecstatic capacity to 
remain, nevertheless, within himself…God is yearning on the move, simple, self-moved, 
self-acting, pre-existent in the good, flowing out from the good onto all that is and 
returning once again to the good. [The divine love]... shows especially its unbeginning 
and unending nature travelling in an endless circle through the good, from the good and 
to the good; unerringly turning, ever on the same centre, ... always proceeding, always 
remaining, always being restored to itself…This divine yearning brings ecstasy so that 
the lover belongs not to self but to the beloved ... This is why the great Paul, swept along 
by his yearning for God and seized of its ecstatic power, had these inspired words to say:  
“It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me.”  Paul was clearly a lover, and, as 
he says, he was beside himself for God.101 
 
Kierkegaard’s writing of the self in relation to God can be read along these Dionysian, 
Neoplatonic lines. As I have shown, for Kierkegaard, echoing Dionysius, the divine life is an 
outgoing, an exceeding of itself, that nevertheless remains within itself as it exceeds itself. The 
divine life is its excess. Specifically, the divine life is “yearning on the move,” a yearning that 
overflows itself into the creature. And in the creature, in the soul, it does not stop moving and 
overflowing. It reaches no goal or closure or containment. It continues to give birth to itself, 
without goal, without end, infinitely, excessively. In the soul, in the instant of faith, with wild 
hope and limitless love, the Spirit infinitely returns, or in Kierkegaard’s terms, infinitely repeats 
forward, the divine life as an unquenchable longing. The Spirit redoubles the divine life as 
superabundance, as a bottomless economy of gift charged with an infinite passion. “A believer,” 
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Kierkegaard writes, “is a lover; as a matter of fact, when it comes to enthusiasm, the most 
rapturous lover of all lovers is but a stripling compared with a believer.”102 A believer is a lover 
because God is a lover, an infinite lover, abandoned to excess.  
 To unpack the Neoplatonic provenance of longing as the divine self-gift, let me turn to 
Kierkegaard’s appropriation of the language and logic of “the good.” He does so in a number of 
places but perhaps no where more explicitly than in an upbuilding discourse on James 1:17: 
“Every good and every perfect gift is from above and comes down from the Father of lights, with 
whom there is no change or shadow or variation.” Kierkegaard calls this text his “first love,” 
indeed his “only love.” He writes, “I could call this text my only love—to which one returns 
again and again and again and always.”103 This passage of Scripture births a particularly intense 
passion in Kierkegaard. This is so because he hears in it the best word of all: the word of an 
absolute gift, a gift that will never cease to give itself, a gift that one never has to be anxious 
about acquiring or keeping because it will always already have given itself, eternally. This is a 
gift that breaks through all doubt and uncertainty by giving itself as a longing, a passion, for 
nothing. Kierkegaard writes: 
What earthly life does not have, what no person has, God alone has, and it is not a 
perfection on God’s part that he alone has it, but a perfection on the part of the good that 
a human being, insofar as he participates in the good, does so through God. What, then, is 
the good? It is that which is from above. What is the perfect? It is that which is from 
above. Where does it come from? From above. What is the good? It is God. Who is the 
one who gives it? It is God. Why is the good a gift and this expression not a metaphor but 
the only real and true expression? Because the good is from God; if it were bestowed on 
the single individual by the person himself or by some other person, then it would not be 
the good, nor would it be a gift, but only seemingly so, because God is the only one who 
gives in such a way that he gives the condition along with the gift, the only one who in 
giving already has given. God gives both to will and to bring to completion; he begins 
and completes the good work in a person.104 
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The first thing to point out is the trinitarian shape of this passage: God is all at once the giver of 
the good, the good itself, and the very giving and receiving of the good. Kierkegaard 
appropriates trinitarian logic and grammar, however, not in order to arrive at a determination of 
the divine identity, as in Hegel, but only to speak of God as an absolute expenditure into which 
the self is gifted. “It is not a perfection on God’s part that he alone has [the good]”—as if the 
point were that God possessed the good—“but a perfection on the part of the good that a human 
being, insofar as he participates in the good, does so through God.” The divine perfection is not 
God’s possession of the good. Rather, the perfection of the good is God, namely, that the good is 
infinitely self-sharing. God is nothing but the self-expenditure or gratuity of the good. This shift 
from an onto-theological perspective on divine goodness to one in which God is nothing but the 
good’s own self-sharing is crucial, for it names the impossibility of the speculative moment, the 
moment of apprehending the divine identity. God will always already have abandoned the 
possibility of that moment by giving God absolutely and totally. In the passion of the gift, there 
is no time for speculation. There is only the eternal instant of joy, of longing. God is nothing but 
an event of relation that opens itself, eternally, for the other. 
 The crucial line in this passage is the following: “God is the only one who gives in such a 
way that he gives the condition along with the gift, the only one who in giving already has 
given.” That is, the gift that God gives does not become an external object over against either 
God or the self, some appropriable good. This would be to introduce the gift into the milieu of 
objectivity, where it would become uncertain, subject to deconstruction, generating only anxiety 
about itself, about whether it is truly good. Rather, the gift that God gives doubles itself as the 
very condition for receiving the gift. Prior to the giving of the gift, there is already a giving that 
has given itself, and the gift gives itself to this prior, abyssal giving, it doubles itself as this prior, 
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abyssal giving. The gift here maintains itself as a reduplication of itself as it gives itself. That is, 
it does not give itself by mediating itself into objectivity. It reduplicates and gives itself prior to 
objectivity, as subjectivity. “The condition,” that is, the subjective posture of reception, the 
hospitality of the soul that gives itself to receiving the gift, is itself “a gift of God and a 
perfection that makes it possible to receive the good and perfect gift.”105 This forms the gift as an 
excessive feedback loop redoubled on itself, not closed into itself but excessively open and 
generous. In another discourse, Kierkegaard expresses this redoubling of the divine life in its 
gifts by echoing a line of Eckhart’s: “God gives not only the gifts but himself with them.”106 
One could say that the instant the gift gives itself it withdraws into, or doubles itself as, 
the condition for receiving the gift. The condition for receiving the gift is the gift. The gift is 
nothing but its own condition, its own possibility. The gift is nothing but an openness to the gift, 
an openness to itself as openness. The gift is nothing, nothing but a readiness to receive, a 
readiness to receive nothing, nothing but its own readiness to receive. This is infinite 
reduplication. The gift here knows nothing of the distinction between possibility and actuality. 
Its actuality is its possibility, and this possibility is the very possibility of the impossible, the 
impossibility of the gift as any appropriable good. The gift, one could say, is simply hospitality. 
Contra Hegel, the absolute never gives itself into appearance. It never comes under the 
gaze of phenomenological intention. It is always slipping away in order to hold itself away from 
knowledge, in order to hold itself, and the creature, open. On Kierkegaard’s terms, there could be 
no “phenomenology of spirit.” For him, the absolute gives itself only into withdrawal. Or any 
phenomenology of spirit could only proceed by tracing the disappearance of the absolute, its 
infinite withdrawal that shows itself only indirectly in the most fragile of traces, glimpsed and 
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struggled for but not possessed.107 The absolute gives itself only by maintaining itself, 
reduplicating itself, as the instant of beginning prior to any presence, one that never shows itself 
as a result, as anything accomplished or objective. The gift is perfect because it is nothing, 
nothing but an infinite beginning, the instant of opening, the instant of hospitality. 
The final turn to make here is to clarify exactly what the gift as “condition” is. What is 
the condition? In the discourse on the James text, Kierkegaard goes on to develop the condition 
for receiving the gift as the “need” for God. To need God, to need the gift, is the condition for 
receiving the gift and as such is the gift. However, need here needs to be carefully distinguished 
from any kind of lack that seeks its own filling up, fulfillment, or satisfaction. To need God is 
qualitatively different from needing any earthly object, which is why Kierkegaard writes that 
“earthly need is so far from illuminating it by analogy that it darkens it instead.”108 Need here, is 
not a lack. It is a “perfection”—“The need itself is a good and a perfect gift from God…and the 
communication of it is a good and a perfect gift from above.”109 God communicates the divine 
life as a good and perfect gift as God communicates the need for God. God communicates God’s 
own need for God.  
What I want to suggest here is that “need” should be interpreted as longing. To need God 
is to long for God. This is not to desire any specific object or outcome, but to long simply to be 
with and in God, hidden in God’s gentle arms. In an upbuilding discourse titled, “To Need God 
is a Human Being’s Highest Perfection,” Kierkegaard writes: 
Then in a beautiful sense the human heart will gradually (the grace of God is never taken 
by force) become more and more discontented—that is, it will desire more and more 
ardently, will long more and more intensely, to be assured of grace…With respect to the 
earthly, one needs little, and to the degree that one needs less, the more perfect one is…In 
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a human being’s relationship to God, it is inverted: the more he needs God, the more 
deeply he comprehends that he is in need of God, then the more he in his need presses 
forward to God, the more perfect he is…the secret of perfection: that to need God is 
nothing to be ashamed of but is perfection itself, and that it is the saddest thing of all if a 
human being goes through life without discovering that he needs God.110 
 
To long to be assured of grace is to long to know, or rather, to feel, to feel ever more deeply, that 
there is nothing to accomplish, that the good has already been given, that the opening has already 
opened and is opening every instant, that one is already loved, as nothing, that the anxious quest 
for identity and achievement is a desperate illusion, that all there is to do is to become undone 
with gratitude, to sink into one’s nothingness, into the nothin-ing of God’s arms that embrace the 
yearning soul. Kierkegaard writes, “If I am infinitely, infinitely a nobody…then it is eternally, 
eternally certain that God loves me.”111 And further:  
God gives not only the gifts but himself with them in a way beyond the capability of any 
human being, who can be present in the gift only in a feeling or in a mood, not 
essentially, cannot penetrate infinitesimally the total content of the gift, cannot be 
completely present in the whole gift, even less completely present in the least part of it.112 
 
The gift withdraws from presence into the fragility and hiddenness of the heart where it births 
itself, infinitely, as longing, as a longing for nothing. And again, the feedback loop here is 
infinite: God infinitely longs for the creature to feel that there is nothing to accomplish, that it is 
loved absolutely, as nothing. And because there is infinitely nothing to accomplish, because 
existence gapes open without why, as a sheer gift, there is no end to the joy of becoming nothing. 
There are always infinitely deeper depths of the gift, of nothing, into which one may sink. 
___ 
The earnestness lies in God’s passion to love and to be loved, yes, almost as if he were 
himself bound in this passion, O, infinite love, so that in the power of this passion he 
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cannot stop loving, almost as if it were a weakness, although it is rather his strength, his 
omnipotent love. This is the measure of his unswerving love.113 
 
vii 
 
In Adoration: The Deconstruction of Christianity II, Jean-Luc Nancy writes the following: 
“God” could be the name that, as a proper noun, names the unnamable and, as a common 
noun, designates the division dies/nox, day and night, opening the rhythm of the world, 
the possibility of distinctions in general, and therefore of relation and of passage. 
But we can erase this sign if it begins to dominate, take control, subjugate: it then 
becomes contradictory, in effect, as it annuls passage, annuls us as passers-by, attempts to 
fix us permanently before altars, temples, books. This is what happens, perhaps 
unavoidably, in all the theological and metaphysical determinations of “God,” and it is 
perhaps impossible for this name, as for any other, not to be determined in some way. It 
is perhaps impossible for this name to retain the movement, the trembling of the gap and 
the passage. 
“God” should only be named in passing, and as a passer-by.114 
 
This is the apophatic direction in which I want to read Kierkegaard’s concept of God. “God” 
names nothing, nothing but the unconditioned openness of existence, the instant of gift and 
relation that opens everywhere, from nowhere, an opening touched only with longing, not any 
concept. And were “God” to become instead the name of a closure, an object, an objective, a 
binding instead of a loosening, a demand rather than a letting-be, an identity rather than an 
affect—the joy and sorrow of existence—then in the name of God let us erase the name of God, 
let us pray God to rid us of God. Kierkegaard writes, “when the unconditioned does not exist for 
human beings, what good is it to have something one calls God but which is only a name?”115 
God is worthy of adoration not as any name, but only as the unconditioned. Not an 
unconditioned object, “God cannot be an object,” but an unconditioned opening. Before this 
opening, one can only become nothing, nothing but a passer-by, traveling with the speed of 
longing from nothing toward nothing, facing the divine only by facing a wink—Øieblikket—a 
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withdrawal, a passing, a passion, the gift of…nothing…a nihil without –ism, pregnant with 
surprised, unspeakable joy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
FAITH: ACTION TO EXCESS 
 
 
 
…she affirms nothing, she acts… – Kierkegaard1  
 
To become sober is: to come so close to oneself in one’s understanding, in one’s knowing, that all one’s 
understanding becomes action. –Kierkegaard2 
 
To become nothing before God, and nevertheless infinitely, unconditionally engaged.3 – Kierkegaard   
 
 
i 
 
This chapter marks a shift in this dissertation, one toward a more direct look at the so-called 
“theological virtues”—faith, hope, and love. Kierkegaard’s apophaticism, I have been 
emphasizing, is at heart about a lived enactment, a becoming nothing. In this he parallels 
Eckhart, for whom apophasis is not primarily an epistemological problematic concerning the 
unknowability of the divine (although it is this, too) but concerns more centrally an apophatic 
comportment within existence that enacts a de-centering and undoing of the knowing subject 
itself. Eckhart’s categories of Gelassenheit and Gottesburt express the existential core of his 
apophasis. Apophasis is an event, the birth of God in the soul, which is the becoming nothing of 
the soul, its letting go of things, a letting-be, a making room for what cannot be discursively 
known or possessed. I have worked to show that Kierkegaard’s writing of the self before God 
can be read entirely along these lines. 
 What I would like to do with the remainder of this dissertation is hone in on apophasis as 
an existential enactment, to show how the movements of faith, hope, and love are apophatic 
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movements. This will involve showing how these “virtues” negate or release themselves as 
virtues. Anti-Climacus writes, “this is one of the most decisive definitions for all Christianity—
that the opposite of sin is not virtue but faith.”4 Before examining faith specifically, however, I 
would like to speak more generally about how Kierkegaard construes the relationship between 
religious subjectivity and virtue, in particular how religious subjectivity undoes or exceeds 
virtue. This will allow me an opportunity to bring Kierkegaard into conversation with that mystic 
who said farewell to the virtues—Marguerite Porete.  
ii 
Faith, hope, and love, for Kierkegaard, do not name an acquiring of potencies or the supernatural 
elevation of already given natural endowments. They are “not a direct heightening of the natural 
life in a person in immediate continuation from and connection with it.”5 They name instead an 
emptying of the self, a “dying to,” an “annihilation,” in which the self abides in “the continual 
understanding that I am able to do nothing at all.”6 Paradoxically, this self-emptying is 
simultaneously the “ability to do everything,”7 that is, the ability to undertake every movement 
absolutely freely, without why, outside of oneself, eccentrically, without seeking to translate 
one’s action into any kind of result, accrual, momentum, or identity that one would become 
anxious about protecting or perfecting. The annihilated soul lets go of every work the instant it is 
performed. It works only to let go, only to empty, only to sink into nothing. Such annihilation 
does not result in apathy or quietism. It is, rather, the condition for an infinite engagement with 
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existence, yet one without teleological ground: “to become nothing before God, and nevertheless 
infinitely, unconditionally engaged.”8  
 This does, of course, mean that Kierkegaard moves at slant in relation to a significant, 
perhaps the dominant, stream of Christian reflection on the virtues. Representing this stream, 
Paul DeHart writes: 
The Catholic tradition speaks of faith and charity as theological “virtues” precisely 
because they represent the elevation and disposition of already naturally given human 
capacities for knowing and willing. Although this elevation is not merited or effected in 
any way by the human being, once initiated by God it allows a new range and 
efficaciousness to human action, which is related to excellence in cognition, affection, 
and self-direction.9 
 
For Kierkegaard, by contrast, faith, hope, and love are not an elevation into excellence. They are 
more nearly a descent into madness where “lunacy and truth are ultimately indistinguishable.”10 
In Fear and Trembling, Johannes de Silentio writes: 
There was one who was great by virtue of his power, and one who was great by virtue of 
his wisdom, and one who was great by virtue of his love, but Abraham was the greatest 
of all, great by that power whose strength is powerlessness, great by that wisdom whose 
secret is foolishness, great by that hope whose form is madness, great by the love that is 
hatred to oneself.11 
 
In For Self-Examination in a discourse on the Spirit’s gifts of faith, hope, and love, Kierkegaard 
writes: 
Faith is against understanding; faith is on the other side of death. And when you have 
died or died to yourself, to the world, then you also died to all immediacy in yourself, 
also to your understanding. It is when all confidence in yourself or in human support, and 
also in God in an immediate way, is extinct, when every probability is extinct, when it is 
dark as on a dark night—it is indeed death we are describing—then comes the life-giving 
Spirit and brings faith.12 
 
                                                     
8 JFY, 106. 
9 Paul DeHart, in The Gift of Theology: The Contribution of Kathryn Tanner. eds. Rosemary P. Carbine and Hilda P. 
Koster (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 35. 
10 CUP, 194.  
11 FTR, 16-7. Cf. Eckhart’s sermon “He Who Hates His Soul In This World,” translated in full in Shurmann, 
Wandering Joy, 47-50. 
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Kierkegaard’s emptying out of human capability and virtue is not, however, simply a 
function of his Protestantism, of an anxiety about “works righteousness” accompanied by a 
concern to keep human sinfulness or depravity total, that is, without the possibility of elevation 
or healing in this life. Kierkegaard’s break from the virtue tradition, I want to claim, rests on a 
deeper, apophatic negation, namely, the impossibility of either God or the self to be or have 
anything at all. For Kierkegaard, there is simply no substantive self that could accrue virtue, just 
as there is no substantive God who could give virtue. What God gives and what the self receives 
in the movements of faith, hope, and love is the gift, the birth, of nothing, the freedom to become 
nothing. Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses do not build the self up into virtue. They build the 
self upside-down into nothing. They edify by leading the self into its own nothingness. 
Kierkegaard writes: 
The highest is this: that a person is fully convinced that he himself is capable of nothing, 
nothing at all...This is the annihilation of a person, and the annihilation is his truth…To 
comprehend this annihilation is the highest thing of which a human being is capable…yet 
what I am I saying—he is incapable even of this; at most he is capable of being willing to 
understand that this smoldering brand only consumes until the fire of God’s love ignites 
the blaze in what the smoldering brand could not consume…Thus a human being is great 
and at his highest when he corresponds to God by being nothing at all himself…And the 
person who understood this found no pain whatsoever in it but only the overabundance of 
bliss, who hid no secret desire that still preferred to be happy on its own account, felt no 
shame that people noticed that he himself was capable of nothing at all, laid down no 
conditions to God, not even that his weakness be kept concealed from others, but in 
whose heart joy constantly prevailed by his, so to speak jubilantly throwing himself into 
God’s arms in unspeakable amazement at God, who is capable of all things.13 
 
Kierkegaard here is essentially articulating a moment of mystical union, a complete emptying out 
of the self and its abandonment into God. This involves an apophatic emptying out or letting go 
of human capability and virtue, which is, however, simultaneously the discovery of a wholly 
different capability, the capaciousness and roominess of God’s arms that demand nothing and 
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give everything. This is a capability, a throwing open, wholly beyond the possibility of 
possession, use, or conscription into any project or progress toward self-mastery. The self has 
access to this capability, this capaciousness, only as it abides with itself as nothing, nothing at all. 
Again, this is not simply a Protestant gesture. It is a gesture found also on the margins of 
the Catholic tradition, chiefly in the mystics. It is found in Eckhart in his untiring insistence that 
to relate to God is to relate to a nothingness into which the self must sink:  
“Then how should I love God?” You should love him as he is a nonGod, a nonspirit, a 
nonperson, a nonimage, but as he is a pure, unmixed, bright “One,” separated from all 
duality; and in that One we should eternally sink down, out of “something” into 
“nothing.” May God help us do that.14 
 
Such annihilation of the self in God is found also in several of Eckhart’s predecessors and 
teachers, one of which was Marguerite Porete. For Porete, the “annihilated soul” abandoned into 
God abides in a position, or rather non-position, beyond or prior to the acquisition of virtue. She 
explicitly comes out against the virtues in her Mirror of Simple Annihilated Souls and Those 
Who Only Remain in Will and Desire of Love. She writes: 
 Virtues, I take my leave of you forever. 
 I will posses a heart most free and gay; 
 …You know that I was to you totally abandoned; 
 I had placed my heart completely in you, you know well. 
 Thus I lived a while in great distress, 
 I suffered in many grave torments, many pains endured. 
 Miracle it is that I have somehow escaped alive. 
 This being so, I no longer care; I am parted from you, 
 For which I thank God on high; good for me this day.15 
 
The virtues, for Porete, structure human existence toward the formation of a determinate self, a 
formation that for her was full of distress, torment, and pain. The virtues concern the self’s 
acquisition and possession of its own goodness. For Porete, however, goodness possessed, 
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goodness achieved by virtue of some “why,” some need to become something and someone, is 
no goodness at all. The only goodness Porete is interested in is the goodness that arrives “without 
myself,” which is goodness that gives itself “without any why.”16 Such goodness is that which 
was there at the beginning, radically prior to any relationship to a determinate self, the goodness 
that loved the self into existence when it was nothing, nothing at all.  
Porete wants to abide in this beginning ex nihilo, in the instant of this love—a love that 
loves nothings and nobodies. She wants to be loved as absolutely nothing, for no reason at all. 
Through the abandonment of all human capability and virtue, annihilation returns the self to this 
state of nothingness in which the self is without itself, in which the self is nothing but the instant 
of its being given into existence without itself, without why. “And I cannot be in [God] unless he 
places me there of himself without myself, just as when he made me by himself without myself. 
This is uncreated goodness.”17 Such a love births “a heart most free and gay,” a heart that has 
abandoned the quest for achievement, identity, and recognition, a heart that has thrown itself into 
the sheer joy of being nothing. This is a heart alive only on the utter gratuity of its birth out of 
nothing, alive only on the grace of the instant. And so Porete takes leave of the virtues because 
the virtues are not content with letting the self be loved as nothing and nobody. The virtues 
cannot abide annihilation. They are anxious to get beyond being nothing, to produce a self that 
will be loved as something, as someone.  
Having left behind the virtues, having sunk into the nothingness where there is nothing 
but the instant of coming into existence, an instant not aimed at anything beyond itself, 
annihilated souls no longer have any determinate standard by which to measures themselves. 
They are beyond good and evil, set adrift on an open sea. Porete writes, they “do not know how 
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to consider themselves good or evil, no longer possessing understanding of themselves, nor 
knowing how to judge if they are converted or perverted.”18 Annihilation leaves the self unable 
to represent itself to itself, unable to know itself, unable to assure itself of its own goodness or 
condemn itself for any evil.19  
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling is a dramatic staging of a very similar kind of 
undecidability. Is Abraham’s obedience to God in his willingness to slay his son conversion or 
perversion? From the point of view of “the ethical” it is of course perverse, just as Porete’s 
taking leave of the virtues was considered perverse by her inquisitors. Faith, however, 
“suspends” the ethical, takes leave of it, and opens a higher position. To sink into this higher 
position one must radically unknow oneself, leaving behind all calculation and the desire to 
secure and recognize one’s own goodness. Looking into the divine mirror, one does not see one’s 
own virtue. One sees nothing. One “is blinded.”20 In the instant of faith (and hope and love), one 
is carried not by the assurance of one’s virtue, but “by virtue of the absurd, for all human 
calculation ceased long ago.”21 Again, this is not excellence; it is madness, “the divine 
madness.”22 Kierkegaard: “Humanly speaking, Abraham is mad and cannot make himself 
understandable to anyone. And yet ‘to be mad’ is the mildest expression.”23 Porete: “Theologians 
and other clerks, You will not have the intellect for this…No matter how brilliant your 
abilities.”24 
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 To exist beyond virtue, however, is not to exist in opposition to virtue. This would be to 
take a determinate position, the position of evil, perhaps, which is not beyond good and evil. 
Beyond good and evil lies no position at all, “a thing which one cannot say.”25 Or perhaps: the 
tremulous father of faith and the rebellious mystic exist between good and evil, not as some 
happy medium but as the fracture at the heart of this binary that causes the whole edifice of 
virtue to tremble. Each is the short-circuit at the heart of the system that lets it fail, in an instant. 
This is why Porete writes that the annihilated soul “neither wills nor not-wills anything which 
might be named here.”26 And further: “Such Souls possess better the virtues than any other 
creature, but they do not possess the practice of them, for these Souls no longer belong to the 
virtues as they used to.”27 The annihilated soul is so free of the virtues so as to not even be in 
opposition to them. She relates to them absolutely freely, from an unsayable (non)position, 
neither here nor there, neither this nor that.  
Again, a parallel can be drawn with Fear and Trembling. Abraham’s “taking leave” of 
Isaac, his sacrifice of Isaac, which puts him “beyond” recognizable virtue, is always at the same 
instant his getting Isaac back freely, as a gift. This is a gift, however, that is received only 
through its dis-possession, through the gift of dis-possession. Abraham receives Isaac by letting 
him go. The letting go is the reception. This is the posture of Gelassenheit, a posture that will not 
possess anything, not even its own virtue. And yet this refusal to possess is exactly how 
Gelassenheit welcomes and receives everything, only it receives everything beyond 
representational or teleological framing. Abraham receives Isaac back not as a son that he 
possesses, but as a gift, as a neighbor. Dispossessing those most intimate to us, those we are most 
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tempted grasp and control for our benefit is an act of madness, an act of “love that is hatred to 
oneself.”  
The knight of faith, therefore, is neither a slave to the ethical nor its enemy. He is a 
“tightrope dancer”28 within it, without determinate position, trembling on a razor’s edge, dancing 
freely by virtue of the absurd. This is “the one and only marvel.”29 
 For Porete, to take leave of the virtues is not to rise in arrogance above them, but to sink 
below them, into “humility,” which is the “mother of virtues,”30 where she receives her life and 
joy from absolutely beyond herself, not even from her own humility. Porete refuses to rise into 
the “practice” of the virtues, that is, into a teleological trajectory in which growth in virtue 
indicates the formation of a determinate subject outfitted with potency and self-mastery. She 
abides with the mother, not with the mother’s children. That is, she abides in the instant of birth 
that falls always prior to identity, recognition, and self-possession. In the instant of birth one is 
nothing and one has nothing, and yet one is loved absolutely as nothing. For Porete, this is pure 
joy, better than any determinate recognition, better than any quest for identity and achievement. 
The self is freed to love itself absolutely, without why. Porete writes: 
Such [an annihilated] Soul, says Love, swims in the sea of joy, that is, in the sea of 
delights, flowing and running out of the Divinity. And so she feels no joy, for she is joy 
itself. She swims and flows in joy, without feeling any joy, for she dwells in Joy and Joy 
dwells in her. She is Joy itself by virtue of the Joy which transforms her into joy itself.31 
 
Notice here the undoing of self-reflexivity. The annihilated soul feels no joy for she is joy itself. 
The annihilated soul has sunk entirely into her affect, into the sheer joy of existence that births 
itself without why. Affect is not directed toward any end; it is not brought under the domain of 
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reason; it is not conscripted into the production of a determinate subject. It is simply allow to be, 
allowed to expand itself limitlessly, like the open sea. To act out of such joy is to act without the 
anxiety of securing some determinate end, or some determinate self. It is to allow action to 
become reduplicated upon itself, never moving beyond the instant of its beginning. The 
annihilated soul “takes account of neither shame nor honor, of neither poverty nor wealth, of 
neither anxiety nor ease, of neither love nor hate, of neither hell nor of paradise.”32 Such a soul 
withdraws from a calculated relationship to the world, opening existence to the instant of its birth 
in which its joy will always already have been given, and given again—without why. 
 Such joy without virtue is echoed in Kierkegaard’s discourses on the lilies and the birds, 
those “joyful,” “kind,” and “humane” teachers “so worthy of their divine appointment,”33 sent to 
teach the self how to sink into its own joy. In a discourse on “care,” Kierkegaard writes: 
The bird is what it is, is itself, is satisfied with being itself, is contended with itself. It 
hardly knows distinctly or realizes clearly what it is, even less that it should know 
something about others. But it is contended with itself and with what it is, whatever that 
happens to be. It does not have time to ponder or even merely to begin to ponder—so 
contented it is with being what it is. In order to be, in order to have the joy of being, it 
does not have to walk the long road of first learning to know something about the others 
in order by that to find out what it is itself. No, it has its knowledge firsthand; it takes the 
more pleasurable short-cut: it is what it is. For the bird there is no questions of to be or 
not to be; by way of the shortcut it slips past all the cares of dissimilarity. Whether it is a 
bird just like all other birds, whether it is “just as good a bird” as the others of the same 
species, indeed, even whether it is just like its mate—of all such things it does not think 
at all, so impatient it is in its joy of being. No young girl on the point of leaving for a 
dance can be as impatient to leave as the bird is to set about being what it is. It has not a 
moment, not the briefest, to give away if this would delay it from being; the briefest 
moment would be a fatally long time for it if at that moment it was not allowed to be 
what it is; it would die of impatience at the least little objection to being summarily 
allowed to be. It is what it is…It lets things take their course, and so it is. This is indeed 
the way it is.34 
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The bird has the immediate joy of being what it is without the detour through achievement, 
without the anxiety of identity rooted in comparison. The bird abides in the inceptual instant of 
its existence, in the sheer joy of existing. This is its “fortunate privilege,”35 that it simply is what 
it is, always already reduplicated upon itself. Human beings, however, have the burden of being 
always already past their own immediacy, past the instant of their birth. Human consciousness is 
structured by “care,” by the projection of temporal possibilities and by the anxiety of needing to 
be and achieve something in the world in comparison with others. “On what is its care based? On 
existing only for the others, on not knowing anything but the relation to the others.”36 Such is 
human consciousness’ despairing alienation from itself, its desire to be something in comparison 
with others rather than nothing. “Oh, what a slyly concealed snare, one that is not set for any 
bird!”37  
The movements of faith, hope and love, however, are not an “elevation” of this care 
structure, its infusion with supernatural potency. They are, rather, its undoing, its annihilation. 
They move the self away from care, toward its own nothingness, throwing the self toward an 
opening not framed by care in which the self becomes “like the free bird when it soars highest in 
its joy over existing.”38 This is a movement in which one lets go of care (Porete: “I no longer 
care”), gives up one’s potency for temporal projection, one’s virtue, and sinks into the eternal, 
purely reduplicated instant of one’s coming into existence, into joy itself. Faith does not, in care, 
appropriate the self’s death in order to discover its “ownmost possibility,” as in Heidegger’s 
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Being and Time. Faith appropriates—sinks into—the self’s birth prior to care, the instant of 
Gottesburt, in order to abide in the joy of releasement, even in the moment of death.39 
 This is, for Kierkegaard, to abide “at the beginning,”40 working continually to let go of 
every projection, every desire to be something or someone that would carry one out of this 
beginning into the anxiety of care. This is a supremely difficult beginning to sink into and 
maintain—indeed, it is impossible, humanly speaking. It is the self’s “difficult beginning in 
reduplication [Fordoblelse] to be itself.”41 The self must struggle backward toward itself, toward 
the instant of beginning prior to care. This is the struggle for repetition.  
Yet everything in the self wants to put itself ecstatically past itself, past the instant of 
beginning, past the sheer joy of existence into the anxiety of care that always concerns itself with 
preserving and enacting its capacity to be and do something. To learn faith and hope and love, 
however, is to learn a different ecstasy, a different becoming, a different spacing of the self from 
itself—an apophatic ecstasy, becoming, and spacing that is infinitely, qualitatively different. 
Faith, hope, and love abide in an eternal beginning that infinitely reduplicates itself, a beginning 
without end, an opening without closure, a departure without arrival. Faith, hope, and love move 
forward only by moving backward; they move outward only by moving inward; they rise high 
only by sinking deep.42 Or rather, they undo all directionality and teleology. This is not the virile, 
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potent ecstasy of virtue that appropriates its own possibilities. It is the “liberating annihilation”43 
of “jubilantly throwing [oneself] into God’s arms in unspeakable amazement.”44 Within such 
unsayable, jubilant thrownness, the self is repeated and reduplicated not as something or 
someone, but as nothing and nobody, as an open sea of joy 70,000 fathoms deep. 
iii 
I want now to turn specifically to faith. The central point I wish to make here is that faith, for 
Kierkegaard, is an eternally reduplicated beginning, and as such an inexorable enactment, a 
work, a movement, an action. It is action, however, without object, without objective, action 
redoubled on itself, action without why. Precisely because it has no object faith is nothing but 
action, an activation, a tension without intention, a movement without rest, or a resting in 
movement that stretches out toward what will always elude any grasp or apprehension. Faith is 
apophatic action, action as releasement, as Gellasenheit. It is the motion in which the self wills 
itself as nothing, nothing but the instant of beginning, of opening, departing before an absolute 
incommensurability.  
Faith, therefore, is to be distinguished from any determinate belief. Faith is an active 
open-ing that will not rest content with or limit itself to any determinate doctrine, concept, 
religious object, or religious work—to any person, image, book, institution, sacramental system, 
charity project, social cause, etc. It orients itself to what is beyond determination, to the 
unsayable, unachievable, and unenforceable. It is not, however, that determinate belief (or 
practice) is simply absent from the movement of faith, as if faith simply substituted “nothing” or 
“indetermination” for its object. Faith is so radically without object, so unable to impose itself, 
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that it cannot simply oppose belief. It is rather that, insofar as faith is at work within determinate 
belief, which will always in some form be present, belief is opened beyond itself, toward what it 
cannot contain or represent or enforce, toward what can only be lived as an undergoing, a 
passion, an unknowing, a risk, an uncertainty. Faith is the trembling of belief. 
 It is here where I would like to address the issue of Kierkegaard’s christology and its 
relationship to the apophaticism I have been tracing. Does not Kierkegaard, as a Christian, regard 
Jesus as an object of belief? I would like to offer a reading of Kierkegaard’s christology, by no 
means exhaustive, that hones in on its apophatic and kenotic moment, the moment in which 
Jesus withdraws as an objective telos of belief and becomes instead an opening of apophatic 
action beyond belief. This is, I want to suggest, the existential heart of Kierkegaard’s christology, 
the moment when faith lets go even of Jesus as any kind objective grounding point, the moment 
when faith relates to Jesus not as a given object, or as an indemnification against the terror of 
existence, but as an opening of existence onto action, an opening that releases itself from any 
determinate objectification. Jesus names not any determinate revelation, or even salvation 
understood as a fullness of presence, but the “divine incognito,” “the most profound incognito,”45 
God’s giving of the divine life in time and history only as a withdrawal that opens the passion of 
faith. Kierkegaard’s writing of Jesus as the “prototype” [Forbillede] of faith, that which faith is 
to “re-image” [For-billede] or repeat, names this withdrawal of Jesus as a determinate object of 
belief and the opening of a space of apophatic action, an opening Kierkegaard calls 
“contemporaneity,” the silent birth of the present in action.   
My reading of faith as action here is simply a further a elaboration of Johannes Climacus’ 
slogan, “truth is subjectivity.” Truth is not anything that faith could apprehend as an object or an 
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objective, even when it is named “Jesus.” Jesus, Kierkegaard writes, is nothing but “the silent 
and voracious eloquence of action.”46 Jesus communicates no objective content or purpose, only 
the silent opening of his action that exceeds purpose. “Christ did not establish any doctrine; he 
acted.”47 Moreover, Jesus’ action is a descent into “abasement,” where he abides and hides as a 
“sign of contradiction,”48 as Anti-Climacus puts it. Such a sign signifies no-thing; it refers to no 
transcendental signified, one could say. It signifies—reduplicates—only itself as an absolute 
coincidence of opposites, the paradoxical simultaneity of the eternal truth and a singular, frail 
human being who gives himself in love to the least. Such a paradox cannot be grasped by the 
understanding or made the foundation of a system of knowledge or belief. It will not underwrite 
the production of any sovereign, self-possessed subject, a “faithful believer” or an “accomplished 
theologian.” In relation to Jesus there can be no faith-fullness, no accomplishment. There is only 
the trembling of faith before an absolute paradox.  
The paradox of the eternal opening itself in time, as the time of the abased Jesus, a time 
pregnant with eternity, full only with expectancy and therefore withdrawn from any drive toward 
accomplishment or possession,49 cannot be digested by thought. It can only be apophatically 
willed and re-birthed in the passion of faith, repeated in one’s own lived existence as the 
paradoxical simultaneity of one’s own singular, frail existence and its eternal validity and 
weight, a weight and seriousness that makes itself felt in the exigency to give oneself in love and 
mercy as Jesus did. Truth is the very passion of faith (and hope and love). It is the silent and 
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voracious eloquence of action that occurs as a singular relation to that which withdraws from 
objective apprehension or use. Action here has nothing to do with busyness or with projects. God 
is not useful. Faith does not simply get things done. “If inwardness is truth, results are nothing 
but junk with which we should not bother one another.”50 Faith names a movement that exceeds 
every determinable project.  
One of the more direct articulations of this non-objective passion occurs in the Postscript, 
where Johannes Climacus offers his (in)famous unhinging of the passion of faith from objective 
belief. He writes that one is brought into relation with God: 
not by virtue of any objective deliberation but by virtue of the infinite passion of 
inwardness…If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with knowledge of 
the true idea of God, the house of God, the house of the true God, and prays, but prays in 
untruth, and if someone lives in an idolatrous land but prays with all the passion of 
infinity, although his eyes are resting upon the image of an idol—where, then, is there 
more truth? The one prays in truth to God although he is worshiping an idol; the other 
prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore in truth worshipping an idol.51 
 
What Climacus writes here applies also to christology and its liturgical and ethical extensions. 
The most doctrinally impeccable representation of Jesus as the truth, one that would arouse the 
admiration of the most brilliant of theologians, or a perfectly executed eucharistic liturgy to the 
delight of the bishop, or an absolutely faithful exposition of the Bible, or even a work of love that 
moves a crowd to tears, if it does not communicate the apophatic passion of faith, but rather the 
assurance of rightly articulated and practiced belief, is in fact untruth, an idol, a noisy gong or 
clanging symbol, as Paul puts it (1 Cor. 13:1). All such performances fall under aesthetic 
representations of the truth, which are never as such edifying, or are edifying only as they allow 
themselves to be undone in a passion that exceeds them: “To see the great artist finishing his 
masterpiece is a glorious and uplifting sight, but it is not upbuilding. Suppose this masterpiece 
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was a marvelous piece; if, now, the artist, out of love for a person, smashed it to pieces—then 
this sight would be upbuilding.”52 The truth is always only that which is lived apophatically, 
beyond positive articulation in the passion of faith that shatters objective belief and practice.53  
This is simply another way of saying that all theological discourse, including christology, 
and all religious practice, must always put itself under erasure, under the sign of the cross. Even 
theologies of the cross, to which Kierkegaard’s christology belongs, and the practices that flow 
out of them, no matter how “radical” or “faithful” or “shattering,” must also put themselves 
under the sign of the cross where they are to tremble with their own uncertainty and 
undecidability. Theological discourse and practice can claim no stable or determinate position or 
faithfulness, not even when they take up the position of critique (which itself must always come 
under critique). They live toward the truth only by virtue of the passion of faith they cannot 
contain but that, at their best, they can only work to release, letting go of the anxiety to keep the 
movement of faith within proper, safe, delimited boundaries. This is, of course, to allow the 
passion of faith, its enactment, to overflow the bounds of Christian orthodoxy—or any 
orthodoxy54—not because Christian orthodoxy is an enemy to destroy, but because it contains 
within itself an uncontainable event, an opening, an action, a passion that is alive only as it 
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transgresses the boundaries that bring it to articulation. Kierkegaard everywhere works to release 
this passion rather than to contain it.55 
___ 
Before continuing on with my direct exposition of Kierkegaard, I would like to turn to the 
thought of Jean-Luc Nancy, specifically an essay of his on faith. Nancy is exemplary among 
contemporary thinkers in giving voice to the passion of faith that exceeds any conceptual 
delimitation. In the essay to which I am turning, he explicitly articulates this passion as an excess 
of action. What Nancy offers is a way of powerfully articulating the apophatic energy of faith 
that resonates significantly with the energy I want to unearth and release from Kierkegaard’s 
texts.  
Further, having read Kierkegaard backward into conversation with medieval mystics 
(Porete and Eckhart), I also want to show that he can be read forward into conversation with 
thinkers of deconstruction. This is one of the untapped powers of Kierkegaard: that he is a 
juncture and meeting point in which the energies and gestures of both traditional negative 
theology and deconstruction can mingle and feed off each other without antagonism or the 
anxious need to protect their respective intellectual turfs. More often than not representatives of 
traditional negative theology and deconstruction feel the need to protect themselves from each 
other. Such identity anxiety, however, is against the spirit and deepest possibilities of both 
negative theology and deconstruction. Kierkegaard, I want to claim, makes possible an opening 
beyond this anxiety and its antagonisms.   
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Nancy’s essay, “The Judeo-Christian (on Faith),” in Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of 
Christianity, is a reading of the book of James, which he reads as a deconstructive text within the 
New Testament. It is deconstructive not because it destructs some already formed content of 
belief but because it concerns itself with what occurs prior to the full formation of a determinate 
object of belief, such as the christological object of belief in Paul’s letters. It concerns itself, in 
other words, with what occupies a certain gap or passage, the dash “-” of “Judeo-Christian,” an 
unstable moment in the passage from Judaism to Christianity. The book of James stands 
“between two theological elaborations, and thus perhaps also between two religions, the Jewish 
and the Christian, like their hyphen and their separation, but also of their com-possibility, 
whatever the status of this ‘com-’ might be: like their construction and their deconstruction taken 
together.”56  
The movement of faith in the book of James, on Nancy’s reading, is not directed toward a 
stable object or accomplishment that would “cut faith off from all action”57 and let it rest in an 
object or achievement, as in certain interpretations of Paul to which James is responding. Faith, 
rather, is nothing but a passage or movement, one that is doubled on itself, forming and 
maintaining itself as action or work. Faith is reduplicated upon itself as nothing but its work, its 
self-activation without object or objective. Nancy writes, “it is not the economy of a Christo-
centric salvation that organizes James’ thought: it is, as it were, directly, a certain relation of [the 
human being] to holiness that becomes an image [of God]…The epistle is wholly given over…to 
the act of faith.”58 
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 Nancy’s exposition of this holiness resonates significantly with Kierkegaard’s own 
exposition of the book of James that I unpacked in the last chapter, specifically with 
Kierkegaard’s reflections of the good and the gift. It is this that I would like to home in on, how 
the gift of the good, the good as gift, as grace, is nothing but the activation of the self in excess of 
itself.  
Reflecting on James’ naming of God as the “Father lights” from whom comes every good 
and perfect gift, Nancy writes: 
God is first the giver…He gives not so much some thing as the possibility of the clarity in 
which alone there can be things. If the logic of the gift is indeed, as the other James 
[Jacques Derrida] enjoys thinking, that the giver abandons him- or herself in his or her 
gift, then that is what is taking place here. In giving, in fulfilling the gift, God gives 
himself just as much as he remains in himself without shadows, since it is in this 
dissipation of the shadow, this clearing of light that he gives, and since he ‘gives to all, 
simply’ (James 1:5). To give and to withhold, to give oneself and to withhold oneself, 
these are not contradictories here, and correlatively, to be and to appear would be 
identical here: a phenomenology that is theological, but not theophanic.59 
 
“Father of lights,” for Nancy, names an event of giving within which creation opens, specifically 
as an event of “clearing” in which things or beings are allowed to appear. God is this event of 
giving, purely, without shadow, withdrawn into an unapproachable light that lights all things. 
God is the sheer gratuity of the world that withdraws in order to let the world be, in grace. This 
perfectly parallels Kierkegaard’s own reading of the name “Father of lights,” which for him 
names the withdrawn gifting in which the self is gifted into itself as an absolute openness, into 
itself as a hospitality to the gratuity of existence. 
 Faith in the Father of lights, for Nancy, does not name a movement in which the human 
being apprehends this gifting as an object, or as the gift of any object, but a movement in which 
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the human being becomes itself an image, or “trace” or “vestige,”60 of the invisible gifting that is 
God. He writes: 
This gift gives nothing that might be of the order of an appropriable good. (We must also 
remember…that this epistle is the most vehemently opposed to the rich in the entirety of 
the New Testament). This gift gives itself, it gives its own gift’s favor, which is to say, a 
withdrawal into the grace of the giver and of the present itself…To be in the image of 
God is therefore to be asking for grace, to give oneself in turn to the gift. Far from 
coming out of an askesis, one may justifiably say that this logic of grace arises out of 
enjoyment, and this enjoyment itself comes out of an abandon. That supposes, no doubt, 
according to the letter of the text, ‘unhappiness’ and ‘bereavement,’ ‘weeping’ and 
‘humiliation,’ but these are not a sacrifice: they are the disposition of abandon, in which 
joy is possible. To be sure, something is abandoned, and it is lack, along with the desire 
for appropriation. But that is not sacrificed: it is not offered and consecrated to God. 
James is not preaching renunciation here: he is laying bare a logic separated as much 
from envy as from renunciation. And this logic is that of what he calls faith.61 
 
The parallels here with Kierkegaard here are striking, so much so that one begins to wonder 
whether Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses on James are operating in the background for 
Nancy. What is given in the gift is its withdrawal through which the self is opened as an asking 
or longing for the gift. Kierkegaard: “Then in a beautiful sense the human heart will gradually 
(the grace of God is never taken by force) become more and more discontented—that is, it will 
desire more and more ardently, will long more and more intensely, to be assured of grace.”62 
This longing for the gift is the gift. It is in longing for the gift that the human being comes to 
image the gift (and its giver, who is nothing but his gift), to image it negatively or apophatically, 
becoming the trace of its withdrawal in the world, a withdrawal that keeps existence open with 
and through longing. And for Nancy (and Kierkegaard), to give oneself over to this longing is 
not to “sacrifice” existence but to abandon oneself into its openness, into its joy beyond any 
appropriable good or goodness. What propels and activates existence here is not desire driven by 
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lack, which is what James identifies as the envy that leads to murder (4:2), but rather longing 
thrown open by the joy of a non-appropriable gift that never ceases to give itself. 
 Such a relation of the self to the gift and its giver (each always reduplicated as the other) 
is the work of faith, faith as work, faith as the activation of the self by and through and as the 
unfinishable setting-in-motion-without-possession of the gift. This is how Nancy reads James 
2:18-9: “Show me your faith without works, and I will show you my faith by my works. You 
believe that there is one God. Good! Even the demons believe that—and shudder.” Faith is not 
belief. Faith is not the apprehension of any content. Faith is the activation of the self, its working 
from and in and with and toward the gift. Nancy’s commentary on this passage is as follows: 
These works do not stand in the order of external manifestation, or in that of a 
demonstration through the phenomenon. And faith does not subsist in itself. This is why 
what is in question here is to show faith ek ton ergon, on the basis of works, and coming 
out of them. Instead of works proceeding from faith, and instead of works expressing it, 
faith here exists only in the works: in works that are its own and whose existence makes 
up the whole essence of faith, if we may put it that way. Verse 20 states that faith without 
works is arge, that is, vain, inefficient, and ineffective…Argos is a contraction of aergos, 
which is to say without ergon. James is thus stating a quasi-tautology. But it means: the 
ergon is here existence. That also means, then, that the ergon is understood in a general 
sense, as effectivity much more than as production; it is understood as being-in-act much 
more than as the operari of an opus. 
This logic is so precise and so restrictive that it obligates us to set aside a certain 
comprehension of the ergon to which we are more habituated, and even our Platonic and 
Aristotelian understanding of poiesis—a word that appears in 1:25, tied to ergon, and 
which everything makes us think, following several translators, in the sense of “practice” 
(thus, of “praxis”), that is, if praxis is indeed action in the sense of by or of an agent and 
not the praxis exerted upon an object.63 
  
What Nancy is reading here out of the book of James is an approach to the work of faith, its self-
activation, as non-teleological action. It is non-teleological because faith does not act upon any 
object nor does it work to produce any object, such as its own merit (which is perhaps the 
temptation of Aristotelian inflected Catholic readings). Faith works, simply. Faith is its own 
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work, an activation not directed toward any result. Again, this parallels perfectly Kierkegaard’s 
approach to the subjectivity of faith that is propelled by a passion, a motion that has abandoned 
the need for results. Faith works only to keep the self in motion, apophatically beyond any 
objective position or achievement. Faith: abandoned to the gift, arriving at myself only as a 
departure, I cannot say what or where I am, only that I am in becoming, moving I know not 
where—this is my trembling, my sorrow, my joy. 
 Nancy goes on to translate this reading of work in the book of James into his own 
philosophical idiom. It is here where what I want to call an “apophasis of action” comes clearly 
into articulation: 
One might say: pistis is the praxis that takes place in and as the poiesis of the erga. If I 
wanted to write this in a Blanchotian idiom, I would say that faith is the inactivity or 
inoperativity that takes place in and as the work. And if I wanted to pass from one James 
to the other [to Jacques Derrida], I would say that faith, as the praxis of poiesis, opens in 
poiesis the inadequation to self that alone can constitute “doing” and/or “acting” (both 
concepts implying the difference within or unto self of every concept or the irreducible 
difference between a lexis and the praxis that would seek to effectuate it). Extrapolating 
from there, I would say that praxis is that which could not be the production of a work 
adequate to its concept (and thus, production of an object), but that praxis is in every 
work and it is ek tou ergou, that which exceeds the concept of it. This is not, as we 
commonly think, that which is lacking in the concept, but rather that which, in exceeding 
it, thrusts the concept out of itself and gives it more to conceive, or more to grasp and 
think, more to touch and to indicate, than that which it itself conceives. Faith would thus 
be here the praxical excess of and in action or in operation, and this excess insofar as it 
aligns itself with nothing other than itself, that is to say, also with the possibility for a 
“subject” (for an agent of actor) to be more, to be infinitely more and excessively more 
than what it is in itself and for itself.64 
 
The lines I want to highlight here are, “the inadequation to self that alone can constitute “doing” 
and/or “acting,” as well as the last sentence: “Faith would thus be here the praxical excess of and 
in action or in operation, and this excess insofar as it aligns itself with nothing other than itself, 
that is to say, also with the possibility for a “subject” (for an agent or actor) to be more, to be 
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infinitely more and excessively more than what it is in itself and for itself.” This is exactly the 
logic of Kierkegaardian repetition and reduplication. For the self to repeat or reduplicate itself is 
to open within itself, to let into itself, an absolute incommensurability or distance that becomes 
the inadequation of the self to itself, its releasement beyond, or the annihilation of, self-identity. 
This inadequation of the self to itself is the opening of the self as an unfinishable operation given 
over to its own excess. It is that which forms subjectivity as passion, tensed and stretched across 
an infinite distance beyond all resolution.  
Nancy describes this passion, again with perfect Kierkegaardian logic, as “the being-
unto-the-other of its being-unto-self.”65 The gap or between or passage that is the relation of the 
self to itself, its inwardness, is, in the instant of faith, thrown open by an absolute otherness, a 
distancing, a spacing, a gifting, a joying that keeps the self in unending motion, in action. This is, 
for Kierkegaard, what it means to exist “before God”: “To become nothing before God”—split 
open beyond identity—“and nevertheless infinitely, unconditionally engaged.”66 Faith: “to come 
so close to oneself in one’s understanding, in one’s knowing”—knowing only the inadequation 
of the self to itself that is its being-unto-God—“that all one’s understanding becomes action.”67     
 Nancy continues: 
In this sense, faith cannot be an adherence to some contents of belief. If belief must be 
understood as a weak form or analogy of knowledge, then faith is not of the order of 
belief. It comes neither from a knowledge nor from a wisdom, not even by analogy. And 
it is also in this sense that we should understand Paul’s opposition of Christian “madness” 
to the “wisdom” of the world: this “madness” is neither a super-wisdom nor something 
symmetrical to wisdom or to knowledge. What James, for his part, would have us 
understand is that faith is its own work. It is in works, it makes them, and the works make 
it. Taking a step further, even a short step, we could extrapolate from James a declaration 
like the following: “It is false to the point of absurdity to see in a ‘belief,’ for example, in 
the belief in redemption by the Christ, that which characterizes the Christian; only 
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Christian practice is Christian, a life like that lived by him who died on the cross”—a 
declaration that we could read in Nietzsche.68 
 
And of course in Kierkegaard! Kierkegaard, after all, titled the book where he elaborates most 
fully a Christian point of view Practice In Christianity. Christianity is nothing but its lived 
enactment, its enactment to excess “with the silent and various eloquence of action,”69 beyond 
any reduction to belief. 
 Going on to offer a reading of James’ reading of the story of Abraham and Isaac in 
Genesis 22, reading it as a story of the work of faith beyond belief, Nancy writes: 
Contrary to Paul (Romans 4), James maintains that Abraham is justified by his work, 
designated as the offering of Isaac…According to Paul, what is important is that 
Abraham believed that God could give him a son, against all natural evidence. His act 
thus depended on a knowledge postulate…For James, on the contrary, Abraham did. He 
offered up Isaac. It is not said there that he judged, considered, or believed…In a certain 
sense, James’s Abraham believes nothing, does not even hope (Paul says that he ‘hoped 
without hope’: even this dialectic is absent in James). James’s Abraham is not in the 
economy of assurances or substitutes for assurance. Abraham is neither persuaded nor 
convinced: his assent is not in the logismos. It is only in the ergon. If the notion of “faith” 
must be situated in the “logical” or “logistical” order…then this faith resides in the 
inadequation of one’s own “logos” to itself…Faith resides in inadequation to itself as a 
content of meaning. And it is in this precisely that it is truth qua truth of faith or faith as 
truth and verification. This is not sacri-fication but veri-fication…Faith, according to 
James, is effected entirely in the inadequation of its enactment to any concept of that act 
even if it be a concept formed by analogy, by symbols, or by an “as if.” The work of 
Abraham is the acting or the doing of this inadequation: a praxis whose poiesis is the 
incommensurability of an action (to offer up Isaac up) and its representation or its 
meaning (to immolate his son).70 
 
This might as well be a commentary on Fear and Trembling. “I cannot think myself into 
Abraham,”71 writes Johannes de Silentio. “By his act he transgressed the ethical altogether.”72 
Silentio cannot form any concept of Abraham’s act, cannot translate it into any framework of 
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meaning. Abraham’s faith remains apophatically mute—“Abraham cannot speak.”73 His faith 
speaks only in the silence of its action. “He speaks in a divine language, he speaks in tongues.”74 
Silentio’s Abraham opens up an absolute incommensurability between action and meaning, 
between the logos of belief and the ergon of faith.  
Faith, in Fear and Trembling, is nothing other than the enactment of this inadequation, 
which is articulated as the inadequation between the ethical and the movement of faith. The 
ethical meaning of Abraham’s act can only be murder. If one could assign that meaning to 
Abraham’s action, then he could be placed within the ethical, albeit negatively. Or if one were to 
supply his action with religious meaning, in order to rescue it from its ethical meaning, it would 
be sacrifice, a consecration of Isaac to God. Faith, however, transcends or transgresses the order 
of meaning altogether. It has no logos, only its ergon. As Nancy puts it, “faith resides in 
inadequation to itself as a content of meaning.” This is why Silentio, who is continually reduced 
to silence even though he “strains every muscle to get a perspective,”75 can only call Abraham’s 
act “absurd” and “mad.” He is bewildered and undone by Abraham: “I am shattered…I become 
paralyzed.”76 Abraham’s act is without articulable meaning. It is even without articulable un-
meaning. It is neither murder nor sacrifice. It is action, as Nancy puts it, as “an exposition to 
what cannot be appropriated, to what has outside itself, and infinitely outside itself, the justice 
and truth of itself.”77    
One could say that the inadequation of the ethical and the religious here is nothing other 
than the enacted inadequation of the ethical to itself. Faith, in Fear and Trembling, does not 
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abide simply outside the ethical in a self-contained religious sphere. Faith, rather, is the opening 
of an outside within the ethical itself, opening the ethical to its own inadequation to itself. Absent 
of faith, the ethical is “the universal,” the totality of relations that “rounds itself off as a perfect, 
self-contained sphere,”78 perfectly adequate to itself, self-identical. Faith is the trembling of this 
self-contained sphere that exposes it to an outside, disrupting its immanent continuity and 
identity with itself.  
This is not, however, simply a destruction of the ethical. It is a repetition of the ethical, its 
disjointing from itself that opens within itself the gap and passage of faith, which traverses the 
ethical with apophatic action, leaving the trace of a non-appropriable gift. This is why I have said 
previously that Abraham’s exit from the ethical is nothing but his re-entrance into it otherwise, 
its repetition off itself. Silentio writes:  
From this it does not follow that the ethical should be abolished; rather, the ethical 
receives a completely different expression, a paradoxical expression, such as, for 
example, that love to God may bring the knight of faith to give his love to the neighbor—
an expression opposite to that which, ethically speaking, is duty.79 
 
The hidden message of Fear and Trembling, what “the son understood but the messenger did 
not,”80 is that faith, by passing to the other only by passing apophatically through the blinding 
but absolutely non-hostile darkness of God, is the opening within the ethical of a non-acquisitive 
love born of grace, a love that embraces the neighbor as a non-appropriable gift. This is a love 
infinitely, qualitatively different than a love that would keep the neighbor, even if it is a child, or 
a lover, as one’s own. This is a love that could never have or arrive at anything, again, not even 
its own virtue. It could never take stock of and calculate its responsibilities in order to assure 
itself of its own goodness, or determine when it has loved enough, or when it can be satisfied and 
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proud of its results. Faith lets the incommensurability of the eternal into the commensurability of 
the ethical and in doing so lets every calculable goal undergo an annihilating emptying into a 
dark night. Faith keeps the ethical infinitely tensed and in motion, trembling with passion and 
risk, given over to a work, an action never commensurate with any concept of it, never identical 
with any result, telos, or merit, abandoned absolutely to the gift of the other beyond possession.  
____ 
It is supposed to be the most difficult feat for a ballet dancer to leap into a specific 
posture in such a way that he never once strains for the posture but in the very leap 
assumes the posture. Perhaps there is no ballet dancer who can do it—but this knight [of 
faith] does it. Most people live completely absorbed in worldly joys and sorrows; they are 
benchwarmers who do not take part in the dance. The knights of infinity are ballet 
dancers and have elevation. They make the upward movement and come down again, and 
this, too, is not an unhappy diversion and is not unlovely to see. But every time they 
come down, they are unable to assume the posture immediately, they waver for a 
moment, and this wavering shows that they are aliens in the world. It is more or less 
conspicuous according to their skill, but even the most skillful of these knights cannot 
hide this wavering. One does not need to see them in the air; one needs only to see the 
instant they touch and have touched the earth—and then one recognizes them. But to be 
able to come down in such a way that instantaneously one seems to stand and to walk, to 
change the leap into life into walking, absolutely to express the sublime in the 
pedestrian—only that knight [of faith] can do it, and this is the one and only marvel.81 
 
v 
I would like to conclude this chapter by returning to christology. Rather than provide anything 
like a thorough reading of Kierkegaard’s christology (which always withdraws itself from any 
kind of fully developed christology anyhow), I simply want to sketch the possibility of an 
apophatic reading, a sketch I have already begun.  
I want once again to let Nancy’s reading of the book of James lead the way. In the same 
essay I have been quoting, he offers a reading of the name “Jesus-Christ” that occupies its dash 
“-”, the deconstructive or apophatic gap in which “the proper name does not turn into a 
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concept”82 around which one could organize a system of belief. This gap is the opening or 
emptying of the name of Jesus into an action or work, one that “purely and simply gives itself, 
and precisely as that which is not appropriable.”83 That Jesus is nothing but a giving without 
concept means, for Nancy, that “there would no longer be any messianism here, but charisma, an 
inappropriable gift.”84 Commentating on James 2:1 that reads, “my brothers, you who have faith 
in our Lord Jesus the Christ of glory,” Nancy writes:  
Faith in glory or faith of glory is faith in the inappropriable: and once again, as the 
inadequation of the work or the inadequation at work. This faith receives itself from 
inappropriable glory, it is in glory in the sense that it comes from glory, where that glory 
provides faith its assurance, which is not a belief. The doxa of Jesus is his appearing: the 
fact that he is come, that the glory of his reign has appeared, already given as faith. Jesus 
is thus the name of this appearing—and he is this doxa qua name: the proper name of the 
inappropriable (that is, as we know, the very property of the name or, if you prefer, its 
divinity). And it is thus a name for any name, for all names, for the name of every other.85  
 
What is at work in the name of Jesus, what Jesus names, is the work by which every other is 
named, and named as other. Jesus is the name that mingles with every other name, touches every 
other name and in touching names every other, to excess. The name of Jesus is emptied out into 
every other name as the glory of every name, its divinity, its unspeakability. One would privilege 
the name of Jesus not in order to maintain an object of belief but only in order to return to and 
repeat ever again this emptying. In Jesus, every other, every name, is de-nominated. The name of 
Jesus puts itself under erasure, under the sign of the cross, in order to name the excess of every 
other. This is its glory, the silent eloquence of its action.  
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This is very close to the logic of “abasement” in Kierkegaard’s Practice in Christianity. 
Anti-Climacus does, to be sure, sharply distinguish “abasement” from “glory,” insisting that 
Jesus is met only as the abased one:  
One cannot become a believer except by coming to him in his state of abasement…He 
does not exist in any other way, for only in this was has he existed…What he has said 
and taught, every word he has spoken, becomes eo ipso untrue if we make it appear as if 
it is Christ in glory who says it. No, he is silent; the abased one is speaking.86 
 
This sharp distinction from glory, however, which repeats Luther’s opposition between a 
“theology of the cross” and a “theology of glory,” is simply a way of indicating that Jesus is only 
ever encountered through the work of his abasement, his kenotic self-emptying, rather than in his 
elevation into an accomplished object of belief. “Glory,” for Anti-Climacus, is the name of an 
accomplishment; “abasement” is the name of an ongoing apophatic action. If one were to reclaim 
“glory” within a Kierkegaardian idiom, faith could be the glory of abasement, its silent self-
communication in action.  
 Anti-Climacus writes movingly about this abasement in the opening to Practice in 
Christianity, which, to my mind, is one of the most tenderly apophatic, or apophatically tender 
passages in all of the authorship. Commenting on Jesus’ “releasing words”87 in the gospels, 
“Come here to me, all you who labor and are burdened, and I will give you rest,” Anti-Climacus 
writes, “he does only one thing: he opens his arms.”88 Jesus is nothing but an opening to others. 
“Ah, where there is heart-room, there is indeed always room, but where was there heart-room if 
not in his heart!”89 Jesus is nothing but an unconditional hospitality. He is nothing but an infinite 
roominess held open to the frailty and suffering of the world. His “inner being is like an infinite 
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abyss of sadness.”90 Jesus sets absolutely no conditions on his love. “He makes no condition 
whatsoever.”91 Jesus is an opening that effaces itself of any identity, of any distinction or 
limitation that would exclude anyone. Jesus “abandons himself”92 in hospitality: 
These words, which seem to have been designed for him from the beginning of the world, 
he does in fact say: Come here, all you. O human self-sacrifice, even when you are most 
beautiful and noble, when we admire you the most, there is still one more sacrifice—to 
sacrifice every qualification of one’s own self so that in one’s willingness to help there is 
not the slightest partiality. O love—thus to set no stipulation whatever of price upon 
oneself, completely to forget oneself, so that one is someone who helps, completely blind 
to who it is that one is helping, seeing with infinite clarity that, whoever that person may 
be, he is a sufferer—to be unconditionally willing to help all in this way, alas, therein 
different from everyone!93 
 
To be different by way of one’s indifference to the objective differences that separate one 
sufferer from another is to be absolutely different, infinitely, qualitatively different, different 
with a difference that cannot announce its difference or form itself into an identity around which 
a border could be drawn. This is a difference that gapes open as an unconditional love that longs, 
without any concept, for each and every one. “This invitation blasts away all distinctions in order 
to gather everybody together.”94 Yet this invitation does not gather everybody into a crowd, into 
a religious herd. It calls out to each single individual in her or his singularity. “He who opens his 
arms and invites all…wants to help all—his method of treating the patient is just as if intended 
for each one individually, as if in each patient he had only this one patient.”95 To encounter what 
is at work in the name of Jesus is to hear nothing but the absolute, singularizing declaration: that 
I love only you.96 
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 To let oneself be loved absolutely in one’s singularity, to be embraced by Jesus’ 
apophatic arms that will never enclose one into an identity, to receive from such unconditioned 
hospitality a name that cannot be named, a name above all naming, is the most profound form of 
self-denial, profound because it coincides with an absolute self-affirmation. Such self-emptying 
into the infinite abyss of Jesus’ abasement, at the heart of which is a denial that any crowd or 
objective identity could tell me who I am, is neither the self-abnegation that thrives on self-
accusation and shame nor the heroics of an askesis that longs for its own virtue—both of which 
Nietzsche rightly derided. It is an affirmation undergone in secrecy and silence, an affirmation 
perhaps more profound than any Nietzsche knew. To let oneself be denied the identity and 
recognition of the crowd in favor of being loved as absolutely nothing, nothing but the singular, 
unnamable instant of one’s existence, is a denial of any and all relative value, which is always 
the condition of identity and the objectification of one against another: rich against poor, male 
against female, free against slave, citizen against foreigner, saint against sinner, Christian against 
Jew, Christian against Muslim, etc. In the name of Jesus, there is only ever the absolute value of 
“that one” [hiin Enkelte], of each one, of every one, which is always the annihilation of the 
relative value of bordered identity, of “mine” or “yours” or “ours.”  
This is, perhaps, the transvaluation of all value, a way of valuing otherwise than through 
the representational logic of money, a logic that has driven Western civilization into nihilism and 
despair. The love of God, for Kierkegaard, “is infinitely unrelated to money,”97 that is, to any 
relativizing or calculating schema of valuation that always prefers the ninety-nine sheep, the 
crowd and its capital, to the feeble one with no appropriable good who has wandered away. 
Living out the singularizing love of God in its infinite unrelatedness to money and the 
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calculation of returns undergirded by perverse incentives is perhaps the most exigent vocation of 
faith as the sun goes down on Western civilization. As Nancy writes, “the absolute must be 
affirmed without its relative counterpart, the absolute of each ‘one,’ of each ‘here and now,’ of 
each instant of eternity. This is how a different evaluation could be opened up: in the fact that 
there is no value besides what has absolute value.”98 The love at work in the name of Jesus is 
precisely this: that there is only ever the absolute value of this instant in which I am to love “that 
one.” This is a love that apophatically exceeds all naming and appropriation. It is alive only in 
the silent and voracious eloquence of action. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
HOPE: KEEPING TIME ABSURDLY OPEN 
 
 
 
Life is one nightwatch of expectancy. –Kierkegaard1 
 
That hope whose form is madness. –Kierkegaard2 
 
 
i 
 
Fear and Trembling concludes by leaving its reader with what is perhaps an unexpected image 
given the harrowing image of Abraham on his way to slay Isaac around which the book is 
organized. The book concludes with a rather more innocent scene, that of children at play on 
holiday. Silentio writes: 
When children on holiday have already played all the games before twelve o’clock and 
impatiently ask: Can’t somebody think up a new game—does this show that these 
children are more developed and more advanced than the children in the contemporary or 
previous generation who make the well-known games last all day long? Or does it show 
instead that the first children lack what I would call the endearing earnestness belonging 
to play?3 
 
What we are given at the end of Fear and Trembling is a parable of beginning. Children who 
have become bored with their games before twelve o’clock are children who have become bored 
with the morning, the beginning of the day. The morning of a holiday, like childhood itself, 
stands as an excessively open and undetermined beginning. It is holy, absolved from the projects 
and calculations that structure ordinary days. Yet the children in Silentio’s parable cannot abide 
this indeterminate opening. They cannot sink into the beginnings that they are. They can only 
approach themselves and their games as projects that act as defenses against this opening by 
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becoming diversions from it, as is the case with A’s rotation project in “Rotation of the Crops.” 
The opening, however, cannot be closed. One cannot will the closure of the day. Time keeps 
coming, excessively. Eternity will always hold the day open. In relation to the eternal it is always 
morning, the day is only ever just beginning, time remains “young and beautiful,”4 and “no one 
goes further”5 than beginning. And so the children’s games-turned-projects inevitably founder 
and exhaust themselves before this infinite opening. The supposedly “advanced” and 
“developed” children (Kierkegaard is alluding here to his modern, bourgeois, liberal age) will 
spend the day anxiously trying to discover new projects that will move them past or distract them 
from this excessive, indeterminate beginning. They will search with an anxiety fuelled by 
despair. Unable to let go of the need to determine the day, they lack “the endearing earnestness 
belonging to play.” They lack the patience that belongs to play, the patience that sinks into the 
morning, the beginning, with no need to get anywhere. 
Other children, however, children of the holy-day, the day unhinged from any calculative 
economy, are capable of making well-known games last all day long. They have no need to 
advance beyond the beginning, or beyond simple games, such as “love.”6 They have learned to 
repeat the beginning the whole day long, to stay with the morning and sink into its excess, its 
holiness. Such repetition is “the highest passion.”7 These children do not anxiously project 
themselves into time in order to secure the future against its open-endedness. Absorbed in the 
present, abandoned to the gift of the moment, the instant of beginning, they play themselves into 
the future, having let go of what it will be.  
___ 
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My claim in this chapter is that hope, for Kierkegaard, is an attunement to temporality and 
temporalization that keeps time by keeping it open, absurdly open, apophatically open, by virtue 
of the eternal. Hope, rather than anticipating some determinate end or outcome, is a movement 
that abides in an infinitely reduplicating beginning, a beginning that lets go of teleology and the 
need to posit the movement of time as a determinate totality with an ideal meaning. Eternity is 
not the ideal, universal meaning of time. In the instant of its synthesis with time—Øieblikket—
eternity is the source and power of temporalization as a singularizing power, a power that opens 
the movement of temporalization as a living event undertaken and undergone intimately and 
secretly. Eternity is the gift of one’s own intimate line of flight.  
To hope, therefore, is not to project an ideal future for the crowd, the polis, or the 
ecclesia. It is to become the singular and infinite beginning that one is right here, right now, with 
apophatic motion and contingency, split open on the most intimate levels of lived existence by 
and toward the silent gift of one’s becoming. To hope is to affirm and love one’s own 
temporalization absolutely, even amidst suffering, even though temporalization is suffering. 
Such self-love is not solipsism but a breaking open, an opening that hopes for itself only as it 
hopes also for “the neighbor,” for “that one,” for her or his own intimate line of flight. To hope is 
to make room by virtue of the eternal for the other-ing of time, for time not projected or 
calculated but as the space in which what is other is allowed to come, in time. This is to make 
time within oneself for love, to make love with time with a passion, a patience, that holds the 
present open with possibility, birth, and beginning—even when everything would speak of one’s 
right to sink into closure and despair. To hope is simply to love existence madly, without why, to 
love one’s own time as a time of possibility, a time intersected and re-launched by the time of the 
other, the timing of eternity.  
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In the discourse in Works of Love titled, “Love Hopes All Things—And Yet Is Never Put 
to Shame,” Kierkegaard writes: 
Lovingly to hope all things signifies the relationship of the loving one to other people, so 
in relation to them, hoping for them, he continually holds possibility open with an infinite 
partiality for the possibility of the good. That is, he lovingly hopes that at every moment 
there is possibility, the possibility of the good for the other person.8 
 
To hope is to hold the present open with possibility, not the possibility of this or that, which 
could always come to shame, but possibility as such, possibility as the good. “The good” is not a 
determine goal or outcome but the very relation of possibility to itself (its reduplication) within 
which actuality comes to birth, within which actuality is nothing but the instant of its birth and 
beginning, its releasement into existence without determinate teleology. To hope is to long, for 
oneself and for the other, that actuality would never cease to come to birth apophatically, that ex-
istence would never cease to be an ex-it from closure, an ecstasy—the movement, motion, and 
emotion of abandon in which joy is possible, even amidst pain. Hope is thus an “infinite task” to 
be undertaken and undergone “as a little child,” as one who knows nothing but the miracle and 
madness of beginnings. 
 In what follows, I will turn to a few of Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses to develop 
this apophatic approach to hope. It is above all in his discourses on patience that Kierkegaard 
develops an apophatic attunement to temporality. What I want to draw from these discourses is 
the way in which they regard patience, paradoxically, as a certain kind of fulfillment. It is 
through patience that one enters the “fullness of time,” a relation to temporality as a whole. The 
wholeness or fullness entered through patience, however, is not any kind of determinate totality. 
It is not any completion that patience apprehends or anticipates but rather time as a reduplicating 
beginning, an opening. Patience “fills” time not with any determinate content but with its own 
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openness, or it lets time be the openness that it is. “Let it bring what it will and must bring.”9 
Time is fulfilled not through its completion or closure that would allow it to arrive at its ideal 
meaning. It is fulfilled, paradoxically, in the instant of its beginning. Time as a whole takes the 
“form” of an infinite beginning. This is an “overturning of thought and speech”10 that is 
“madness.”   
 An attunement to temporality as an infinite beginning is what Kierkegaard calls “the 
expectancy of faith.”11 In an upbuilding discourse that goes by this title, he develops the category 
of “expectancy” by distinguishing it from what might called “anticipation.” If anticipation relates 
to the future through the projective power of consciousness, filling the future with determinate 
content, expectancy holds itself open before the future as absolute, the future withdrawn or 
absolved from any determinate apprehension. What faith expects is simply time as openness, 
time as beginning. This is to expect “an eternity”12 and “victory.”13 But again, the eternity and 
the victory here are nothing determinate. “The person who expects something particular or who 
bases his expectancy on something particular,” Kierkegaard writes, “does not have faith.”14 It is 
the very openness of faith that simply is the victory and the eternity. “The expectancy of 
faith…is victory.”15 “Expectancy is victory.”16 Faith as expectancy wins an eternal victory over 
time as structured by anticipation. By virtue of the eternal, faith enters into a released attunement 
to time, an apophatic attunement, and this is its victory, its liberation of the present that fills it 
with possibility, with hope.   
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Before turning directly to the discourses on patience, I want to raise a question that harkens back 
to what I have said about form and content in Kierkegaard’s writing: why must thinking a 
proper—an apophatic—attunement to temporality take the form of an upbuilding discourse 
rather than, say, a scientific philosophical treatise? The reason is that the communication of 
patience must itself take the form and mood of patience. The author who would seek to attune 
the reader to expectancy must write patiently and not “tempt” the reader “to impatience in 
listening.”17 This involves writing with what Heidegger would come to call Verhaltenheit, 
“restraint.” What must be restrained, on Kierkegaard’s terms, is the projective drive of 
consciousness, its desire to possess itself by positing time (or being or existence) as a 
determinate totality. Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses enact restraint and patience in multiple 
ways but perhaps most structurally by writing for and toward what slips away from any 
determinate totality, namely, hiin Enkelte. To write for “that one” requires patience and 
unknowing, a restraint that lets what is singular be in order to let it become, that opens the space 
of silent edification. It could be that ontology and metaphysics, at least certain kinds of ontology 
and metaphysics and styles of performing them, are essentially impatient, determined by an 
anxiety that cannot abide an apophatic beginning. To be sure, one could also be impatient in 
one’s opposition to ontology and metaphysics, knowing too much about what comes after (or 
before) them. At his best, Kierkegaard resists both kinds of impatience, patiently holding open a 
space of edification that is not anxious about getting anywhere too quickly.  
 It is not only the upbuilding discourse, however, that enacts patience through its style and 
form. In 1844, the year Kierkegaard published two of his three discourses on patience, he also 
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published Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety, and Prefaces. The later three texts, 
written by Johannes Climacus, Vigilius Haufniensis, and Nicolaus Notebene respectively, are 
also texts of patience, if not explicitly in theme then certainly in style and mood of performance. 
Prefaces performs patience by repeating the form of the preface, the beginning prior to 
beginning, throughout the whole book, indeed as the book. Nicolaus enacts a released relation to 
the book. Likewise, Vigilius, in the preface to The Concept of Anxiety, informs his reader that he 
has published his text “carefree and at ease and without any sense of self-importance, as if he had 
brought everything to a conclusion or as if all the generations of the earth were to be blessed by 
his book.”18 Vigilius does not seek to “embrace the whole contemporary age with his paternal 
solicitude or assume that era and epoch begin with his book.”19 He does not hold out his book 
like “the New Year’s torch of his promise or with the intimations of his farseeing promises or 
with the referral of his reassurance to a currency of doubtful value.”20 He writes, “I frankly 
confess that as an author I am a king without a country and also, in fear and trembling, an author 
without any claims.”21 Vigilius wishes to be regarded as “a layman who indeed speculates but is 
still far removed from speculation.”22 He does not insist that anyone read his book, sending 
greetings and a “well meant farewell” to “everyone who reads the book and also everyone who 
has had enough in reading the Preface.”23 And this farewell was indeed well meant: we never 
hear from Vigilius again in the authorship.  
 Climacus establishes a similar mood in the preface to Philosophical Fragments. He 
writes: 
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What is offered here is only a pamphlet, proprio Marte, propriis auspiciis, propio 
stipendio [by one’s own hand, on one’s own behalf, at one’s own expense], without any 
claim to being a part of the scientific-scholarly endeavor in which one acquires 
legitimacy as a thoroughfare or transition, as concluding, introducing, or participating, as 
a co-worker or as a volunteer attendant, as a hero or at any rate as a relative hero, or at 
least as an absolute trumpeter.24  
 
Rather than a scientific scholar, Climacus is a “writer of half-hour pieces” that eschew “world-
historical importance.”25 He is “a loafer” who compares himself to the ancient Diogenes who in 
the midst of a siege of Corinth, “belted up his cloak and eagerly trundled his tub up and down the 
streets”26 just to have something to do. Such authorial loafing is a disengagement from the 
“howling madness” of Climacus’ age “symptomized by yelling, convulsive yelling, while the 
sum and substance of the yelling are these words: era, epoch, era and epoch, epoch and era, the 
system.”27 Climacus prays: “Heaven preserve me and my pamphlet from the meddling of such an 
uproarious, bustling oaf, lest he tear me out of my carefree contentedness as the author of a 
pamphlet.”28 Rather than a convulsive, anxious, scholarly oaf, Climacus wants to be a dancer: “I 
have trained myself and am training myself always to be able to dance lightly in the service of 
thought.”29 And a lover: “the paradox is the passion of thought, and the thinker without a 
paradox is like a lover without passion: a poor model.”30 
 Vigilius’ and Climacus’ mocking detachment from official scholardom is, I want to 
claim, a kind of patience, even if it is also an impatience with the madness of the present age. 
Their patience is not the kind of patience it takes to write the system, but the kind of patience that 
thinks and writes non-teleologically and non-acquisitively, that holds the time of writing open 
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with a passion irreducible to speculative reinscription. This is a kind of thinking that does not use 
patience to achieve an end, but is patience, patience before what it cannot acquire, control, or 
enforce. It is the kind of patience communicated “directly” in the upbuilding discourses of 1843 
and 1844, to which I turn.  
ii 
Kierkegaard’s discourse “To Gain One’s Soul in Patience” is a commentary on Luke 21:19: “In 
your patience you will gain your souls.” The discourse, at heart, is a discourse on the soul, on the 
paradox that the soul must be gained. A paradox presents itself here because it would appear that 
“soul” names what the self simply is in its distinction from temporal change and becoming. The 
soul is what the self “possesses,” its home and presence to itself that abides amidst every change. 
The soul is the a priori condition of selfhood in time, one could say, its singularity and 
difference that does not allow it to be “lost” amidst the infinite flux of time, absorbed into “the 
infinite heartbeat of the sea.”31 One can, of course, “lose” one’s soul by attempting to gain “the 
world,” that is, by living only for a temporality closed in on itself, for what does not abide in 
difference but only for what passes into empty sameness. Attempting to gain the world would be 
a denial of one’s singularity, a singularity that must be lived as an ever increasing difference 
from and within the world: “If a person wants to gain his soul, he must let this resistance [to the 
world] become more and more pronounced and in so doing gain his soul, for his soul was this 
very difference: it was the infinity in the life of the world in its difference from itself.”32 
 But what does it mean to gain one’s soul, to gain precisely what, as eternal, must be 
distinguished from gaining, from the logic of and movement of “the world.” That is the paradox. 
It is a paradox because Kierkegaard takes with full seriousness that the soul must come into 
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existence in time. That is, it must be gained on the plane of temporal becoming. The soul does 
not preexist temporality, nor does one gain it by fleeing temporality. If such was the case, then 
“recollection” would be the path to the soul, which would not in a strict sense be a gaining of 
one’s soul, its birth, but a return to one’s soul, a soul that would be eternal through its opposition 
to temporality. Kierkegaard does not oppose the soul to temporality. He wants to think the soul 
as a certain kind of infinite difference or opening within temporality—“the infinity in the life of 
the world in its difference from itself.” The eternal soul takes temporal form, the form of a 
temporal attunement that detaches or differs itself within temporality not in order flee it, but in 
order to abide with it and in it as difference, differently, with faith and hope rather than despair.  
 But again, the paradox: to gain what is eternal precisely in and through time. To gain 
what in some sense cannot be gained. To possess what must be gained. Kierkegaard states the 
paradox with the following:  
But if a person possesses his soul, he certainly does not need to gain it, and if he does not 
possess it, how then can he gain it, since the soul itself is the ultimate condition that is 
presupposed in every acquiring, consequently also in gaining the soul. Could there be a 
possession of that sort, which signifies precisely the condition for being able to gain the 
same possession?33 
 
And further: 
  
What is there to live for if a person has to spend his whole life gaining the presupposition 
that on the deepest level is life’s presupposition—yes, what does that mean?34 
 
It means, precisely, that life or existence is not structured teleologically, that is, toward a 
determinate end-goal, toward the gaining of a coherent, narratable identity. Life or existence is 
ordered toward its own presupposition, that is, toward its own infinite beginning that will always 
interrupt the installation and articulation of identity. In a certain sense, there is nothing to live 
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for. Or what there is to live for is what escapes every “for,” what withdraws from conscription 
into any project of self-mastery. Life is without why, reduplicated upon its own presupposition, 
infinitely withdrawing from determinate ends and goals out into an infinite opening. Kierkegaard 
acknowledges that such an “overturning of thought and speech” is “strange” and “alarming.”35 
He writes: 
Is it not alarming to tread this path where…one almost never gains anything; not the 
attainment of the goal, not the laying down of the burden, not the rich harvest, not wealth, 
not a wonderful catch, not the happiness of a child, not people’s favor, has not benefited 
others but gains only himself, a reward so small that even the little infant that dies at birth 
apparently possesses the same thing.36 
 
To gain one’s soul in time, to allow what is eternal to come into existence in time, means gaining 
nothing, nothing but the instant of time’s beginning, its commencement, its birth—which is 
always its re-commencement, its re-birth, the gaping and gap-ing of time, the spacing and 
repetition that holds open difference.  
 Kierkegaard further expresses this paradox of gaining one’s soul by offering a definition 
of the soul: “The soul is the contradiction of the temporal and the eternal.”37 The soul is not in 
contradiction to the temporal but is itself the very contradiction of the temporal and the eternal, 
which is the same thing as saying that “it is to be possessed and gained at the same time.”38 
Everything hinges on the meaning of “contradiction.” “Soul” here names the site of an 
unmediated coincidence of opposites, the happening together of the temporal and the eternal in 
which, as The Concept of Anxiety puts it, there is “no third factor” in which they are synthesized. 
Referring to the synthesis of time and eternity—Øieblikket—Vigilius writes: 
The latter synthesis has only two factors, the temporal and the eternal. Where is the third 
factor? And if there is no third factor, there really is no synthesis, for a synthesis that is a 
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contradiction cannot be completed as a synthesis without a third factor, because the fact 
that the synthesis is a contradiction asserts that it is not.39 
 
The soul is a synthesis that “cannot be completed.” It is a synthesis that “is not,” a synthesiz-ing 
that remains open-ended, structured by a gap, an opening, a nothing that it cannot close. 
Specifically, this means that the eternal cannot be assimilated into time. It will not submit to 
mediation. But not because it remains simply “outside” of or “beyond” time. In its coming into 
existence in time, the eternal comes into existence as a “contradiction” within time, as an 
inassimilable difference within time’s relation to itself, as an incommensurable opening, a 
beyond and spacing that happens right here, intimately, one that splits the present open.  
 Another way to say this is that eternity cannot be reconciled with any representation or 
concept of time, with any anticipation of time’s totality, closure, or end. In relation to 
“representation” and “anticipation,” writes Vigilius, Øieblikket can only be thought as a 
“moment of destruction.”40 The moment or instant is the withdrawal of the eternal from from the 
possibility of its representation, and this impossibility is “that ambiguity in which time and 
eternity touch each other.”41 The soul is not the site of the synthesis of opposites in the concept 
that drives toward absolute knowing. It is, rather, the site of an absolute touching, a caressing of 
opposites, a touching that opens and confirms an infinite distance, a distance traversed only in 
affect, in longing, in passion. This is why Kierkegaard describes the reconciliation of time and 
eternity as nothing representable and externalizable but as an intimate rendezvous: “Now we are 
separated; we do not see each other every day, but we meet secretly in the victorious moment of 
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faithful expectancy.”42 Eternity is found in time only in the secret moment of expectancy, only 
when time is allowed to gape open in the instant of its birth without concept or conclusion.   
 If the soul, then, is this “contradiction,” if it is structured by non-completion and as such 
is the site where time is released into an infinite beginning, how does one gain one’s soul? “In 
patience you will gain your souls.” It is in an attunement of non-completion that the soul is 
gained, namely, in patience. Kierkegaard stresses that it is “in” patience and not “through” or “by 
means of” patience that the soul is gained. Patience is not a “third element”43 that stands between 
the lack of the soul and its being gained, as if the condition for gaining the soul, patience, and the 
soul itself were two different things. They are one and the same: 
In this gain, the very condition is also the object and is independent of anything external. 
The condition, therefore, after it has served the gaining, remains as that which is gained; 
this is different from what happens when the merchant has sold his merchandise and the 
fisherman has caught his fish—they lay aside patience and also their tools so that they 
may enjoy what has been gained…The condition that made possible the gaining of the 
soul was precisely the possession of the soul.44  
 
Continuing: “In these words [‘It grows in patience’], the condition and the conditioned are again 
inseparable, and these words themselves suggest duplexity and unity. The person who grows in 
patience does indeed grow and develop. What is it that grows in him? It is patience. 
Consequently, patience grows in him, and how does it grow? Through patience.”45 This is the 
movement of infinite reduplication, a movement of subjectivity infinitely doubled on itself 
without any mediation through objectivity, now taking place in and as the soul. Kierkegaard 
names it exactly as such in this discourse. Gaining one’s soul in patience is a “reduplicating 
repetition” [fordoblende Gjentagelse],46 the soul doubled on its instant of beginning and opening. 
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“It is all a repetition.”47 Mystical union, one might say, happens here as the instant of patience. 
The soul is one with God as it sinks into patience.  
 Such sinking, however, is again not a disengagement from existence, a mystical flight 
from temporality. It a movement and work of temporality. Gaining patience is a “quiet but 
unflagging activity.”48 Not activity with a determinate goal, however, but an apophatic activity: 
It is a question not of making a conquest, of hunting and seizing something, but of 
becoming more and more quiet, because that which is to be gained is there within a 
person, and the trouble is that one is outside oneself, because that which is to be gained is 
in the patience, is not concealed in it so that the person who patiently stripped off its 
leaves, so to speak, would finally find it deep inside but is in it so that it is patience itself 
in which the soul in patience inclosingly spins itself and thereby gains patience and 
itself.49 
 
“Inclosingly spins itself,” like a dancer in movement who moves non-linearly, breaking the 
present open to an excess to which it abandons itself. To sink into oneself, into one’s soul, is not 
to find some concealed inner core. It is to become the very movement of patience that moves and 
spins in the moment without any need to get anywhere or gain anything except its own patient 
movement. To gain one’s soul in patience, one might say, is to become the nothing that one is, 
the nothing that in the moment of its touch and caress by eternity becomes a nothin-ing, the 
repetition of an apophatic beginning. Such gaining of an apophatic soul is not, crucially, an 
exercise of power. “The soul can obtain nothing through power.”50 It is, rather, an abandon, a 
giving up of power, a becoming weak, “weaker and weaker in regard to the life of the world,”51 
the way one becomes weak through the caress of a lover. And yet this is the soul’s paradoxical 
strength, the gift of the soul’s singularity, its “being stronger than the world through its 
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weakness…in its inability to gain anything but itself unless it wants to be deceived, and in its 
being able to gain itself only by losing itself.”52  
____ 
“But what, then, is a human soul?” Kierkegaard imagines someone asking at the end of his 
discourse. He will not answer the question, though, detecting in it an “impatience” in which “one 
person hurries forward to explain to everyone what the soul is and [in which] a second person 
waits impatiently for him to explain it, [in which] the hearer impatiently expedites the speaker’s 
explanation and then in turn becomes impatient because he finds it inadequate.”53 Knowledge of 
the soul will not as such move one closer to becoming a soul. “To know what a human soul is, 
what this means, is still a long way from beginning to gain one’s soul in patience, and it is a 
knowledge that exhibits its difference from that gaining inasmuch as it does indeed grow in 
impatience.”54 The soil of knowledge is impatience, whereas the soil of the soul is patience, a 
patience that does not rush to know itself, or knows itself only as a patient un-knowing. “In 
knowledge patience is not simultaneously the condition and the conditioned.”55 That is, 
knowledge is not a reduplication in itself. Knowledge is always a mediation that at best can use 
patience to gain what it wants but it cannot be the patience that gains only its own patience. “The 
person who wants to be patient only in order to know his soul will not gain his soul in 
patience.”56  
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 Kierkegaard therefore concludes “To Gain One’s Soul in Patience” by submitting even 
his own discourse to an apophatic negation. “The description itself,” that is, the discourse the 
reader will have just read, is capable of being “taken away without taking away the patience and 
the gain that is in patience.”57 Indeed, the discourse must submit to its own negation lest it 
“tempt” its reader to “impatience.”58 
iii 
Kierkegaard’s third discourse on patience, “Patience In Expectancy,” turns its attention to an 
exemplary patient soul, namely, Anna, who makes her brief appearance in the biblical narrative 
in Luke 2:36-38: 
There was also a prophet, Anna the daughter of Phanuel, of the tribe of Asher. She was of 
a great age, having lived with her husband seven years after her marriage, then as a 
widow to the age of eighty-four. She never left the temple but worshiped there with 
fasting and prayer night and day. At that moment she came, and began to praise God and 
to speak about the child to all who were looking for the redemption of Jerusalem. 
 
As is typical of Kierkegaard’s treatment of biblical and other literary figures, he engages in an 
elaborate imaginative reconstruction in order to stage the performance of a particular modality of 
subjectivity. In Anna’s case, it is the coincidence of patience and expectancy that he has her 
perform. Before turning directly to this reconstruction, however, I want to note here again the 
issue of form in Kierkegaard’s writing. The discourses of 1843-4 that treat expectancy and 
patience unfold as dialectical movement, one in which time and eternity are simultaneously 
distinguished and allowed to coincide. “The Expectancy of Faith,” one could say, corresponds to 
the temporal side of the dialectic while “To Gain One’s Soul in Patience” corresponds to the 
eternal side. “Patience in Expectancy” performs their synthesis. This is, of course, the movement 
of Hegelian dialectic: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. But as always, Kierkegaard re-performs this 
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dialectic in order to break it open, in order to expose the synthesis to the impossibility of its 
completion. Crucially, the synthesis of the dialectic here occurs not in a concept but in a single 
individual, namely, Anna, and what occurs in her is not the presentation or externalization of a 
scientific idea but the hiddenness and upbuilding of a lived movement that cannot as such be 
represented in discourse. Anna does not represent the completed synthesis of time and eternity. 
She is not the “third factor” in which the poles of the dialectic are synthesized. She is, rather, a 
“contradiction,” a paradox, an apophatic soul, the hole in the heart of the dialectic in which time 
gapes open as it is caressed by eternity. She is a vanishing act in the movement of holding herself 
open to a future that withdraws from conscription into any knowledge or anticipation. 
Kierkegaard’s treatment of Anna in 1844 parallels his treatment of Abraham in 1843 in 
Fear and Trembling. Both are figures of apophatic beginnings. Their names both begin with the 
silent beginning of the alphabet in which the mouth must gape open before it utters any speech. 
Both perform the silent rupture of the dialectical production of ideal meaning. In the movement 
of his faith, “Abraham remains silent.”59 Likewise with the movement of Anna’s patience: “‘She 
is in silence’ with her expectancy.”60 Moreover, both perform an apophatic comportment to the 
future, an apophatic hope, through their relation to children—Abraham to Isaac, Anna to the 
infant Jesus. Abraham lets Isaac go into a future from which he will return only by virtue of the 
absurd, that is, unexpectedly, freely, no longer (because he never was) Abraham’s possession but 
a miraculous gift. And as I will show, Anna enacts a similar letting go, a Gellasenheit, in relation 
to the coming of the messiah. It will remain for her a coming without end, a future from which 
she demands no fulfillment, a future that fulfills itself in the present only by filling the present 
with expectancy, with apophatic hope.   
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____ 
Kierkegaard’s imaginative reconstruction of Anna is perhaps the most subversive proto-feminist 
gesture in his entire authorship, a gesture that, significantly, coincides with one of its most 
interesting apophatic moments. Not only is a woman brought forward as a paragon of faith 
within a culture in which “women were regarded as more imperfect than men,”61 but 
Kierkegaard presses the point that Anna is a woman who has no attachments either to men or to 
children. Anna is a widow who has lived the majority of her life as such, having lost her husband 
after a short seven year marriage that yielded no children. For her, “every external bond was 
dissolved.”62 From the point of view of a culture and society in which a woman’s attachments to 
men and to children are what make her, “her life was finished, her expectancy disappointed—she 
who had expected to live a long time with her husband and to die remembered by a family and 
relatives.”63 Nothing surrounds Anna by means of which she can obtain proper identity and 
recognition. She stands alone. Yet precisely in this solitude she is the mother of faith. 
 Kierkegaard also emphasizes that Anna’s life has been given over to the work of 
mourning and grieving her late husband. What she has chosen to do with her solitude is remain 
with her grief and not seek new attachments. And in this way “she chose to remain true to 
herself.”64 Kierkegaard fiercely defends Anna’s choice to remain true to herself by abiding with 
her grief over against voices that would pity her or would counsel her to act differently, perhaps 
to get over her grief and seek new attachments. He writes: 
Let us not upset the venerable woman with our plans; let us not seek to console with the 
sagacious advice of people who do not know what inconsolableness is. Eighteen 
centuries and more have passed; she does not need our help now any more than she 
needed it then. We shall not hinder her in following the inclination of her heart; we shall 
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not be in a hurry to attire her in the victorious armor of despair or in the mourning weeds 
of slow deterioration. After all, she is the object of our contemplation, and there are 
things in life into which we should not seek to poetize our thoughts but from which we 
ourselves should learn; there are things in life over which we should not weep but from 
which we should learn to weep over ourselves. 
 Her choice is made. It did not happen yesterday or the day before yesterday so 
that we should be ready with our assistance to get it changed. Her choice is made.65 
 
Anna has made the choice of patience with her grief, and let no reader take that away from her or 
pretend to know how she should act.  
It is possible, parenthetically, to hear in this passage not only a defense of Anna but also 
an act of self-defense and self-care coming from Kierkegaard’s pen. Kierkegaard was no stranger 
to the grief of the premature end of an intimate relationship, the grief of a synthesis that was “not 
completed.” This discourse was written only two years after his break from Regine Olsen, a 
break whose grief clearly stayed with him the rest of his life. And like Anna, he sought no new 
public attachments. He patiently abided with his grief, holding it and working with it in the 
solitude of his writing, the way Anna “never left the temple but worshiped there with fasting and 
prayer night and day” (Luke 2:37). Like all of Kierkegaard’s writing, his own self is at play 
here—and I do mean play—this time hidden under the guise of a grieving woman.      
I venture this reading not in order to indulge in speculation about Kierkegaard’s personal 
life but in order to open up a particular point of view on his authorship, one that relates to the 
peculiar kind of apophasis at work within it. Kierkegaard’s practices of reading and writing, what 
one might loosely call his hermeneutics, are rooted in the impossibility of ever getting away from 
the self, from its never ceasing interpretation, reformulation, and need for care. Kierkegaard’s 
authorship is one long exercise in self-care, in “the care of the self” as Foucault would call it. 
And the particular self that Kierkegaard was called to care for is one riven by scenes of rupture 
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and non-completion, scenes endlessly restaged throughout the authorship. What is staged in these 
scenes, at times explicitly and at times more indirectly, is that particular apophatic affect I have 
been tracing throughout this dissertation, namely, Sorg, which should be translated equally as 
“longing” and “sorrow,” or “sorrowful longing.” In the most abstract sense, it is the touching, or 
what I have called the caressing, of time by eternity that gives birth to such sorrowful longing, 
for it is eternity that simply is the event of non-completion and withdrawal, that which holds time 
open in and through longing. Such caressing, however, is never abstract. It never takes place “as 
such.” It always touches and plays itself out within the most intimate folds and movements of a 
lived existence, folds and movements that are the endless preoccupation of Kierkegaard’s 
writing. If Franke is right that apophasis concerns ultimately “what refuses to yield itself fully to 
scientific research and demands rather something of the order of personal witness,”66 then it is 
possible to hear Kierkegaard’s authorship as an apophatic performance through and through, 
even and especially when it is most intimate and singular. 
Back to Anna. It is a “woman who is busy consoling herself over the loss of her late 
husband” who appears “as the witness of expectancy in the hour when the expectancy of the 
human race has its fulfillment.”67 In other words, it is precisely one faithful in mourning who 
becomes a figure of faithful expectancy, of openness to the coming of the messiah. The 
connection between mourning and expectancy is not made explicit in the discourse, but I want to 
offer an interpretation. It is because Anna is faithful to an absence that she also becomes faithful 
to the coming of the messiah. It is as if her faithfulness to the loss of her husband is also her 
faithfulness to the messiah, to the messiah not present but to come. Crucially, however, the 
relation between Anna’s mourning and her expectancy is not structured by an economy of lack 
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or wish fulfillment. Anna does not hope that the messiah will make up for the lack she now 
suffers with the loss of her husband. Rather, one might say, the messiah is simply this: that her 
loss does not become lack and therefore despair but, miraculously, an occasion to remain open, 
opened out toward a future and a coming of which she makes no demands but before which she 
waits patiently.  
Kierkegaard paints a picture for the reader of Anna’s patient expectancy rooted in 
mourning: 
My listener, let your thoughts dwell on this venerable woman, whose mind is among the 
graves and now, although well on in years, nevertheless stands as the eternal’s young 
fiancée. This tranquility in her eyes that nevertheless is expectant, this gentleness that is 
reconciled to life and nevertheless is expectant, this quiet integrity that is femininely 
occupied with recollection and nevertheless is expectant, this humble self-denial that 
nevertheless is expectant, this devout heart that covets nothing more and nevertheless is 
waiting in suspense; beyond flowering nevertheless still vigorous, forsaken nevertheless 
not withered, childless nevertheless not barren, bent with years and stooped nevertheless 
not broken—a widow, nevertheless betrothed, ‘she is in silence’ with her expectancy.68 
 
The refrain of “nevertheless” is this passage signals the transformation of her loss into patient 
expectancy, a transformation that has no logical or ontological mechanism, no necessity. It is not 
the outcome of any dialectical synthesis or immanent process. It is, rather, an event, an event of 
becoming and remaining open with possibility, “waiting in suspense” before the future even 
though everything in time would speak of Anna’s right to close up in despair. Kierkegaard 
writes: 
My listener, however you judge concerning that which is indeed up to each one to decide 
on his own in such a way that one who makes the opposite choice can be no less 
praiseworthy, this much is nevertheless certain—the eyes of the woman who speedily 
recovers from the pain of the loss of her husband are hardly open to the expectancy that is 
not the fruit of temporality but that awakens only in the person who gave up the temporal 
to gain the eternal and then found the grace to see eternity as an expectancy in time.69 
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It is grace that is the event of Anna’s transformation, grace that holds time and eternity together 
in the secrecy of her heart, grace that births possibility and patience amidst suffering, grace that 
keeps her open with expectancy in time even though she no longer expects anything determinate 
of time. It is grace that suspends logical and ontological necessity as well as “probabilities and 
calculations”70 with an expectancy that opens itself to the in-coming outside. Anna is by grace 
“the eternal’s young fiancée,” her life reduplicated into an infinite beginning that each instant 
renews itself as patience, as a silent waiting in suspense.  
 In Luke’s narrative, the messiah, Jesus of Nazareth, arrives. The fulfillment comes. In 
Kierkegaard’s discourse, however, it is a mark of Anna’s expectancy and patience that she does 
not attach herself to the messiah upon his arrival. She remains detached or released from Jesus 
even as he arrives. Kierkegaard writes of Anna and Simeon that “they were not concerned about 
the fulfillment in the same way as the person who meets its coming with a greeting of welcome, 
but they were like one who bids the fulfilment farewell.”71 One could say that Anna’s expectancy 
remains for her a messianism without a messiah, even as she sees Jesus with her own eyes. Anna 
lets go of precisely that which she awaits. She remains released even in relation to the arrival of 
that which she expects. Not even the arrival of the messiah is an occasion to transform 
expectancy into apprehension, repetition into recollection, an open future into a determinate past 
and present. The arrival of Jesus only confirms her in her expectancy, in her suspense.  
 Indeed, Kierkegaard raises the question of whether Anna’s expectancy would have been 
disappointed if the messiah had failed to come, if the fulfillment had not presented itself to her 
eyes. Kierkegaard answers: 
And even if it had failed to come, she still would not have been disappointed. The 
fulfillment came; at the same moment, just like Simeon, she desires only to depart, that 
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is, not to remain with the fulfillment and yet in another sense to enter into the 
fulfillment…By failing to come, the outcome could not essentially deceive her, and by 
coming too late it could not disappoint her…Her joy was precisely those many years in 
which she had been faithful night and day to her expectancy!72 
 
Anna “departs” from the fulfillment in order to enter it. Quite the paradox! Again, the paradox is 
that the posture of expectancy is the fulfillment, and not even the arrival of Jesus is allowed to 
fill expectancy with anything else than redoubled expectancy. Jesus does not become the arrival 
of presence. Or the arrival of Jesus’ presence presses Anna further into her expectancy, into a joy 
that lives only through its reduplication upon itself, the joy of patient waiting, a joy that does not 
defend itself against grief by attempting to apprehend an object, but a joy that mingles with grief 
as it remains faithful to and moves toward an absence.    
 “Patience in Expectancy,” I want to suggest, ought to be regarded as an apophatic 
christological text, a text in which Jesus is not yet that which secures a Christian identity over 
against other identities, religious or otherwise. With this discourse we are in that apophatic or 
deconstructive gap between Judaism and Christianity, in the passage from one to the other that I 
examined in the last chapter through Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading of the book of James. Anna is 
this passage, a breaking open to the coming of the messiah that has not yet closed down into an 
identity. Anna wanders away from any Christian identity in order to hold herself in this gap, in 
this suspense.  
iv 
Turning to Jean-Luc Nancy once again, I want to conclude my reading of Kierkegaard’s Anna by 
considering the relation between her expectancy and her relation to her late husband. I want to 
suggest that Anna’s relation to the coming of the messiah as an apophatic in-coming is at heart, 
in her heart, a certain keeping-alive of her relation to her husband, a way of holing the relation 
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open to a “living on” or a “survivance” as Derrida would put it. The messiah, I might say, is this: 
that our relations, even to the dead, never cease to live and survive. They are never shut down or 
finished but remain open to a future we cannot anticipate or secure but in relation to which we 
may remain expectant.    
 In Adoration, Nancy considers the living-on of relation, that “relation does not die,” by 
recounting a conversation with his mother “on resurrection several years after the death of my 
father.”73 Nancy recounts his mother saying to him: “‘Allow me to think that there is a place 
where I shall find him again.’”74 He notes that “she was right,” relating his mother’s request to 
Derrida’s words spoken through his son at his funeral: “‘I love you and I am smiling at you from 
wherever I might be.’”75 Nancy goes on to say that even the dead occupy “a place and a being as 
a place and a being of relation, of encounter or a happy encounter.”76 He continues: 
Of course, the dead are definitively, irreversibly, and unbearably absent, and more than 
absent: disappeared, abolished. Of course, no work of mourning ever reduces this 
abolition. Yet if we do not sink into melancholy, which is to die in our turn in the midst 
of life—becoming one of the living dead but not rejoining the life of the dead person for 
all that, instead petrifying our relation to him—we live, we survive ‘our dead’ (as one 
says), and this cannot be reduced to an egotistical instinct. It is the continuance of 
relation, and it can be the awaiting and the approach of a happy encounter in an unheard-
of place and according to an unknown mode of being. 
 Insofar as I think it is important to keep faith apart from belief, I think one can say 
that. It does not proceed from an illusion or from an assurance in the complete absence of 
any representation. And what passes between the two regimes is concerned with affect, 
not with the concept. And affect is relation, one could say.77 
 
Anna’s patience in expectancy, her relation to the messiah, is the keeping alive of her affect, her 
joy colored with mourning, which is to say the keeping alive of her relation to the one whose 
absence she mourns. She does not allow the relation to petrify, which would be to allow herself 
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to sink into despair. Nor does she demand its full or fixed presence, which would simply be 
another form of despair. Her soul, writes Kierkegaard, “remains gentle,”78 open to the one 
toward whom she goes as toward an absence, awaiting a happy encounter of which there is no 
concept, only an unknown, unheard of hope. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
 
LOVE: HOLDING NOTHING IN COMMON 
 
 
 
You hold nothing; you are unable to hold or retain anything, and that is precisely what you must love and 
know. That is what there is of a knowledge and a love. Love what escapes you. Love the one who goes. 
Love that he goes. – Jean-Luc Nancy1 
 
The one who loves discovers nothing. – Kierkegaard2 
 
 
 
i 
 
In this last chapter, I’d like to turn my attention to Kierkegaard’s Works of Love. It would have 
been possible, perhaps, to have written this entire dissertation as a conversation with Works of 
Love. Every major theme I have addressed in the previous five chapters—time, eternity, form, 
style, indirection, reduplication, action, faith, hope, love, etc.—is in some way performed in this 
text. Works of Love is an enormous textual landscape, a universe unto itself. It is so full of 
subtlety and richness, philosophically, theologically, and spiritually, that any commentary should 
probably admit its defeat before it begins. I say this not in order to hold the text beyond criticism 
but to confess non-mastery of Works of Love. I cannot offer anything like an exhaustive reading 
of it, and this chapter is not an attempt at such.  
Thankfully, Kierkegaard’s texts do not ask to be mastered. They ask to be given a chance, 
a hearing or viewing that might move, disrupt, and edify the reader in some singular way. Love, 
moreover, and perhaps more importantly, is the non-masterable par excellence. In the preface to 
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Works of Love, Kierkegaard confesses his own non-mastery and sets an apophatic stage for what 
follows: 
[These deliberations] are about works of love, not as if hereby all its works were now 
added up and described, oh, far from it; not as if even the particular work described were 
described once and for all, far from it, God be praised! Something that in its total richness 
is essentially inexhaustible is also in its smallest work essentially indescribable just 
because essentially it is totally present everywhere and essentially cannot be described.3 
 
Love will not submit to any mediation or objectification. It withdraws itself from the possibility 
of any reflective determination by consciousness. Love is this withdrawal, a withdrawal that is 
simultaneously an excess, an excessive opening that is “inexhaustible,” inexhaustibly present 
everywhere. As such, love is essentially indescribable, indescribable even in itself and for itself. 
It is not as if love could be described if one could only gain a speculative position on it, which is 
the goal of Hegel’s treatment of Christianity, summed up in the Johannine dictum “God is love,” 
in his Philosophy of Religion. Love, rather, is the impossibility of its being thought, and this 
impossibility is what thought must expose itself to. For Kierkegaard, thought must allow itself to 
be undone in and through and with love. This requires that any discourse on love acquire a 
doxological rather than a speculative style and mood. Love is not an object of thought. It is a 
movement of praise, a joyous abandon. Works of Love is itself a work of love, a lover’s 
discourse, a “work of love in praising love.”4 Love is thought only in its being praised, in 
speaking from and in and with love. Content, again, reduplicates itself in and through form, a 
form that withdraws from the desire for speculative mastery.  
 What I would like to do in this final chapter is a little praising of my own. This will 
involve a reduplication or repetition of some of the territory I have traversed in previous 
chapters. Specifically, I want to return to “reduplication” itself in order to clarify how love, for 
                                                     
3 WL, 3.  
4 WL, 345. 
  201 
Kierkegaard, is the site of the mystical union between God, the soul, and the neighbor, a union 
that is simultaneously an infinite difference and distance. In Kierkegaard as Negative 
Theologian, David Law denies that mystical union plays any role in Kierkegaard’s thought. I 
want to open the possibility of a different reading, one in which mystical union is at the heart of 
his thought. What Law misses is the ethical inflection that mystical union acquires in 
Kierkegaard, an inflection already present in Eckhart.5 Mystical union is an action, an activation 
of the soul, a repetition of its joyous abandon into the movement of love. What God activates in 
the soul, indeed as the soul, is a splitting open between self and other, an opening that self and 
other share and into which they are abandoned, yet one that is precisely the confirmation of an 
irreducible difference and distance. Self and neighbor are “identical” or “equal” [Ligelige] in 
God, for Kierkegaard, yet what they share identically in God, indeed as God, is the absence of 
any common being or position, a radical alterity, the breaking out and birth of singularity. This is 
what Kierkegaard means by calling God the “middle term” between self and neighbor. God is the 
infinite qualitative difference between self and neighbor.    
To love, therefore, is not to share a common position but to share the impossibility of a 
common position, the impossibility of the reduction of relation to anything closed and 
determinate. This is not to give up being in common in favor of a closed solitude. It is, rather, to 
resolve to be in common only by holding nothing in common, by holding open the space within 
which singularity, and therefore relation and responsibility, is absolute. Kierkegaard’s polemic 
against Elskov (romantic or erotic love) in Works of Love is at heart a critique of the anxious 
drive to close up the spacing of difference between self and other, the drive to turn love into a 
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as St. Paul was (2 Cor. 12:2-4), and if he knew of a sick person who needed a bowl of soup from him, I would 
consider it far better if you were to leave that rapture out of love and help the needy person out of greater love.” 
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completion. It is a critique of the fantasy that self and other could merge into a closed “one,” a 
closure that is equal to the desire for death and mastery, the death of relation as irreducible and 
un-masterable difference. (It is a critique, parenthetically, that in a very different context could 
be turned to address that disgusting eros or desire that reduces entire populations to the unity of 
ashes and mass graves, which is the forced denial of relation and difference, a denial of the self 
as an event of relation, essentially vulnerable, fragile, and exposed.)         
To love is to grant to oneself and to the neighbor an irreducible and absolute uniqueness, 
to continually hold open the possibility of an intimate and singular line of flight for oneself and 
the other, a possibility that is the only possibility of relation, of life rather than death. Love lets 
the neighbor, even the most intimate neighbors, our lovers, our friends, our children, be passers-
by in flight, those whom we cannot possess or penetrate or grasp, whom we can only touch and 
caress as they pass by, as they leave us with nothing but infinite longing. God is nothing other 
than the happening of this passage, this caress, this longing, this holding nothing in common. 
God is this: “I love you more than all that has been thought and can be thought. I give my soul to 
you.”6 
 In this chapter I also want to turn one final time to Jean-Luc Nancy, to his essay 
“Shattered Love” [L’Amour En Éclats]. This essay is Nancy’s own work of praising love as the 
breaking out and birth of singularity. All the way down, irreducibly, existence is shattered with 
love, with a love that does not gather itself into or proceed from a totality or completion but that 
is itself only a shattering, a breaking. “Shattering,” however, does not translate fully the richness 
of éclater, which in the French has connotations of bursting, shining, glittering, and sparking. 
Rather than a shattered pane of glass, one might think of the bursting and glittering of a firework 
                                                     
6 Henriette Vogel to Heinrich von Kleist, quoted in Jean-Luc Nancy, “Shattered Love,” in A Finite Thinking 
(Stanford: Standford University Press, 2003), 245. 
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across a night sky. Love is the spasm and opening of the night sky that in an instant, and only for 
an instant, releases a glittering and shattered multiplicity, a melee of sparks, each with its own 
line of flight, holding in common only the night sky against which they shine with the eternity of 
the moment. For Kierkegaard, too, existence, all the way down, all the way into its bottomless 
“ground,” is the breaking out of love “along many paths.”7 Existence comes to birth from a 
“gushing spring”8 that overflows into infinitely singular tributaries and streams, each slipping, 
twisting, and dancing with its own movements. Existence is a melee of single individuals who 
hold nothing in common, whose duty it is to hold that nothing, and in holding to keep each other 
in existence, in an “unfathomable connectedness,”9 for the instant we are given together. “To 
love people is the only thing worth living for, and without this love you are not really living.”10 
ii 
The most immediate predecessor to Kierkegaard’s Works of Love is Fichte’s 1806 text, Die 
Anweisung zum seligen Leben [The Way Towards the Blessed Life], which Kierkegaard would 
have had exposure to through the teaching of Hans Martensen. In this text, Fichte aims to think 
love as the “bond” of existence, that which bonds existence to the absolute. Fichte’s text sets up 
in significant ways what Kierkegaard would go on to do in Works of Love. It is this Fichtean 
background of Works of Love that can be helpful in clarifying the kind of mystical union 
operative in Kierkegaard, for it is Fichte who most fully transforms the mystical subject, in 
particular an Eckhartian mystical subject, into an ethical subject whose unity with the ground of 
                                                     
7 WL, 9.  
8 WL, 10.  
9 WL, 9.  
10 WL, 375.  
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existence through love expresses itself through infinite action and striving.11 What I want to 
show here is how Works of Love both appropriates and critiques this Fichtean transformation.12  
 Fichte’s text is premised upon a reappropriation of Neoplatonism, specifically an 
Eckhartian Neoplatonism, in two central respects: in its affirmation of an apophatic absolute and 
in its affirmation of the inherently self-manifesting nature of the absolute in human subjectivity 
as love. These two affirmations are expressed by a fundamental distinction that runs through the 
text, that between being (Seyn) and existence (Daseyn). “Being” refers to the absolute that as 
such is hidden and unknowable, “being in itself enclosed and hidden,”13 as Fichte puts it. 
“Existence” refers to the absolute insofar as it is “outside of its being,”14 insofar as being stands 
out—ex-ists—and appears. Being reduplicates itself into existence through “reflection,” by 
becoming conscious of itself, or “for itself.”  
However, unlike Hegel, Fichte does not allow consciousness to perform a synthesis 
between the in-itself and the for-itself. He allows them to remain opposed, absolutely. Entering 
into reflection, being shows itself only by hiding itself. Being becomes what Fichte calls essence, 
it “absolutely immediately changes its incomprehensible form, which can only be described as 
pure life and action, into an essence (Wesen).”15 This distinction between being and essence, 
between the in-itself and the for-itself of the absolute, does not undergo mediation. Being 
remains hidden as existence stands out and appears within it and from it. There remains an 
unsublated alterity within the absolute itself. Moreover, for Fichte, it is love that holds open and 
traverses, but does not sublate, this alterity within the absolute. It is love that both distinguishes 
                                                     
11 See Katharina Cemig, Mystic und Ethik bei Meister Eckhart und Johann Gottlieb Fichte (Peter Lang, 1999). 
12 For what follows on the relation between Kierkegaard and Fichte, I am dependent also on David Kangas’ essay, 
“Like for Like: The Metaphysical Problematic of Kierkegaard’s Works of Love,” in Ethik der Liebe: Studien zu 
Kierkegaards “Taten der Liebe” (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 123-138. Hereafter, “Like for Like.”  
13 Kangas, “Like for Like,” 125. 
14 Kangas, “Like for Like,” 125.  
15 Kangas, “Like for Like,” 125.  
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and unites being and essence, or being and reflection, allowing the former to remain hidden even 
as it manifests itself in the latter. Love is the “bond of pure being and reflection.” It is “the 
immediate self-supporting and self-maintaining life of the absolute itself.”16 
This alterity within the absolute, for Fichte, is the opening within the absolute of an 
inwardness or interiority that in turn is the condition for the self-manifestation of the absolute. 
Were there not a self-reflexivity within the absolute, the division between being and essence, 
manifestation could not occur. However, and this will be absolutely crucial for Kierkegaard, in 
the movement of manifestation, the duality of being and essence is not mediated such that 
manifestation becomes the manifestation of the concept on its way to the Idea, a manifestation 
that banishes hiddenness. That is the path Hegel will take. For Fichte, the self-manifestation of 
the absolute in and through human subjectivity maintains the alterity between being and 
reflection, or being and knowledge, an alterity that constitutes the self-manifestation of the 
absolute as a manifestation of life that exceeds the concept, action that exceeds reflection, what 
both Fichte and Kierkegaard will call the “hidden life” of love. Fichte writes: 
Love divides the in-itself dead being into a two-fold being, setting itself forth in front of 
itself. It makes itself thereby into an “I” or self that beholds itself and knows of itself. In 
this “I-ness” lies the root of all life. Again, love reunites and inwardly binds together the 
divided I…The latter unity, in which duality is not sublated (aufgehoben) but eternally 
remains, is precisely life.17 
 
Human subjectivity, for Fichte, is the site of a divided I, an I divided between being and essence, 
or being and knowledge. This division is bound together in love with a binding that is never 
sublated. This is the movement of life, life as the movement of eternal or absolute love, a 
movement in which the self manifests or gives itself in love, as love, in excess of any reduction 
to knowledge.  
                                                     
16 Kangas, “Like for Like,” 126.  
17 Kangas, “Like for Like,” 126. 
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This is a binding or union does not result in any identity on the on the plane of reflection, 
the identity between subject and object, or thought and being, that would yield knowledge of the 
absolute. The movement of love transcends reason. It transcends all knowledge, reflection, and 
essence. It occurs essentially prior to them as their origin and possibility. Again, this is an 
apophatic move standard in Neoplatonism: the origin is essentially withdrawn and hidden. Fichte 
writes, “love is therefore higher than all reason; it is itself the source of reason and the root of all 
reality.”18 Love cannot enter into the reflective determination of consciousness. Human 
subjectivity maintains its bond to love, to the absolute, only in an “affect,” in an affect that keeps 
reason alive, opened beyond itself. Kierkegaard will appropriate all of this.19    
 He will appropriate it, though, only by radicalizing it. Kierkegaard carries forward 
Fichte’s distinction between being and essence, what he will call the distinction between the 
eternal and the temporal. He also, with Fichte, regards love as the binding between the temporal 
and the eternal that occurs in excess of knowledge. Kierkegaard writes, “What is it, namely, that 
binds the temporal and eternity, what else but love, which for that reason is before everything 
and remains after everything is gone.”20 Radically prior to and in excess of the temporal, love is 
“heterogeneous”21 or incommensurable with the temporal, an incommensurability that keeps the 
temporal alive, open beyond any closure into itself.  
However, this disjunction between being and essence, eternity and time, undergoes two 
essential transformations in Kierkegaard. The first is that Kierkegaard posits sin as the 
disjunction between the temporal and the eternal, a rupture in the fabric of the absolute more 
                                                     
18 Kangas, “Like for Like,” 126.  
19 As will Schleiermacher, for whom human subjectivity is bound to the absolute not in cognition but via the 
“feeling of absolute dependence.” 
20 WL, 6.  
21 WL, 6.  
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radical than what Fichte posits between being and essence. This is what allows Kierkegaard to 
think the real possibility of despair, the temporal closed into itself, the self-mutilation of the 
finite. It is also what allows him to think the bond of love more radically. For Fichte, being and 
essence are simply and as such bound by love. Existence is always already, transcendentally, 
held together with love as a “bare fact.” For Kierkegaard, by contrast, love must traverse the 
rupture opened by sin in order to establish the bond between the temporal and the eternal, a bond 
that is continually threatened by sin, by the drive of the temporal to close into and destroy itself. 
The bond of love, the origin of time, paradoxically, must come into existence in time. Love must 
come into time and establish its bond there by exposing itself to the horror of sin and by holding 
onto the beloved, maintaining its touch with the beloved even when the beloved only knows how 
to despairingly hate itself and its others. This love, of course, comes to bear a name: Jesus. In the 
name of Jesus, the bond of love traverses every distance, enters into every despair, even the most 
intimate and unspeakable of despairs, and there offers its touch, its caress, its opening. This 
opening is the (re)birth of affect, but again radicalized, subjectivity raised to an infinite pitch, 
undone with gratitude, with weeping, longing, sorrowing, joying, and abandon. 
The second transformation that the relation between being and existence will undergo in 
Kierkegaard relates to his apophatic concept of the absolute as infinite reduplication. In Fichte, it 
is the very relation between being and existence that is a reduplication. Being reduplicates itself 
into existence even though being as such remains hidden. This is also the case for Kierkegaard in 
the relation between the eternal and the temporal. However, Kierkegaard turns the apophatic 
screw one turn tighter. The eternal, for him, is also a “reduplication in itself,”22 that is, pure 
subjectivity. This is what makes Kierkegaard’s absolute irreducible to any order of being, not 
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even Fichte’s apophatic being that is pure act. Fichte’s absolute is the be-ing of beings. 
Kierkegaard’s absolute is the nothin-ing of beings, beings thrown into existence with abandon, 
without ground, without why.  
This is what puts Kierkegaard closer to Eckhart, who affirms that as reduplication, God 
has neither being nor existence because God is the cause of being and existence.23 For Fichte, 
existence is simply there, Da-seyn, eternally set over against being, standing out into appearance. 
The alterity between being and existence remains for him an immanent alterity within an order of 
being. For Eckhart and Kierkegaard, existence is not simply there. It is only in the instant of its 
being given. The alterity here is that between a transcendent origin and its effects, an origin 
whose transcendence does not ground its effects but rather is their un-ground, their gratuity. 
Kierkegaard thinks origin more radically than Fichte, as gift-ing rather than be-ing, as grace 
rather than fact. As Kangas puts it, “the ‘bond of eternity’ (love) acquires a double sense: it 
refers not merely to the relation between the temporal and the eternal, but to the activity that 
makes the relation possible.”24 Reduplication is that apophatic activity within the absolute, the 
activity that is the absolute, that makes the relation between the temporal and the eternal an 
economy of gift and excess. Actuality here names not the bare fact of existence but the instant of 
coming into existence, the instant of gratuity and grace that escapes both anticipation and 
recollection. Within this economy ethical striving is set within a wholly different light. The bond 
of love becomes the work of abandon, a loosening, a letting, an exposure or exposition before a 
wild opening. 
iii 
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To understand the form that mystical union takes in Kierkegaard, it is necessary to see how 
reduplication becomes an activity in the soul, indeed, the activity of the soul, God as the soul. 
The unity of God and soul, however, is not transcendental, as in Fichte, where God comes to 
name the immediate identity of the ego with itself, the transcendental ground of subjectivity, 
what Heidegger will call “onto-theo-egology.” The sort of union Kierkegaard affirms, rather, is a 
transcendent event, the self-gifting of the divine that follows the logic laid down by Eckhart in 
his sermon on eternal birth: 
All must well up from within, out of God, if this birth is to shine with a really clear light. 
Your own efforts must cease and your faculties must serve God’s purposes, not your 
own. If this work is to be done, God alone must do it, and you must undergo it. Where 
you truly abandon your willing and knowing, God with his knowing truly and willingly 
goes in and shines there clearly…Do not fondly imagine that your reason can grow to the 
knowledge of God, for no natural light can help God to shine in you divinely. Your light 
must be utterly extinguished and go out of itself altogether, then God can shine in with 
his light, bringing back with him everything you forsook and a thousandfold more, 
besides the new form containing it all.25 
 
There is perhaps no more Kierkegaardian passage in all of Eckhart. The logic here is exactly that 
of the “double movement” of faith in Fear and Trembling, the movement in which Abraham 
gives up Isaac and receives him back in the same instant. Eckhart writes, “It is one flash, the 
being-ready and the pouring-in.”26 The “being-ready” corresponds to the movement of 
“resignation” in Fear and Trembling, the becoming-ready to receive existence as a gift. In this 
becoming-ready the self gives up everything temporal and external in order to discover its 
“eternal validity.” Silentio writes, “Infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that 
anyone who has not made this movement does not have faith, for only in infinite resignation do I 
become conscious of my eternal validity, and only then can one speak of grasping existence by 
                                                     
25 Eckhart, Sermon IV, in Pfeiffer, Franz, Meister Eckhart trans. C. de B. Evans (London: John M.Watkins, 1924), 
21.  
26 Eckhart, Meister Eckhart, 23.  
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virtue of faith.”27 To relate to existence in faith, one must have broken with it and become 
identical to its eternal ground. However, this ground, for Kierkegaard (and Eckhart), is the un-
ground of infinite reduplication. Becoming identical with this ground is immediately, in an 
instant, to be released back into existence without ground, “by virtue of the absurd.” The 
absolute is nothing but this event of releasement, the event of beings abandoned into existence 
without ground in which God is the “pouring-in” or “gushing” of their abandon. “Abandon” and 
“bringing back” are “one flash,” the instant of eternal return or repetition, the eternal repetition 
of abandon. In faith, one’s break with existence is never a breaking away. It is always a breaking 
through, a birth. Or as Silentio likes to say, a “dance.”  
 This Eckhartian logic is repeated in Works of Love in its affirmation that to love God is 
immediately to be given over to the work of loving the neighbor. Love of God has no meaning 
other than love of neighbor, loving one’s abandon or offering to the neighbor. To break with the 
temporal in order to gain the eternal is in the same instant to be given back into the temporal as a 
gift of love. Kierkegaard writes:  
A person should begin with loving the unseen, God, because then he himself will learn 
what it is to love. But that he actually loves the unseen will be known by his loving the 
neighbor he sees; the more he loves the unseen, the more he will love the people he sees. 
It is not the reverse, that the more he rejects those he sees, the more he loves the unseen, 
since in that case God is turned into an unreal something, a delusion…As if God were 
envious of himself and of being loved, instead of the blessed God’s being merciful and 
therefore continually pointing away from himself, so to speak, and saying, “If you want 
to love me, then love the people you see; what you do for them, you do for me.” God is 
too exalted to be able to receive a person’s love directly, to say nothing of being able to 
take pleasure in what can please a fanatic…If you want to show that [your gift] is 
intended for God, then give it away, but with the thought of God. If you want to show 
that your life is intended to serve God, then let it serve people, yet continually with the 
thought of God. God does not have a share in existence in such a way that he asks for his 
share for himself; he asks for everything, but as you bring it to him you immediately 
receive, if I may put it this way, a notice designating where it should be delivered further, 
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because God does not ask for anything for himself, although he asks for everything from 
you.28 
 
One might say that God is the absolute outside of existence, “the unseen,” that opens itself 
absolutely within existence, as its beating heart, the repetition of its opening with love. To serve 
God is to serve this opening, to love the neighbor as a gift from the outside, as a gift to be opened 
under an open sky that “at every moment creates fresh air and a prospect.”29 God reserves none 
of this outside as a position over against existence to which existence would be bound through a 
logic of sacrifice. “As if God were envious…God does not have a share in existence…God does 
not ask for anything for himself.” God eternally empties this outside into existence where it 
becomes not the dialectical production of Sittlichkeit (Hegel) but the infinite opening of 
existence. Love is the work of letting the outside of time return to and touch every time, making 
every moment an instant of beginning, love’s beginning. 
 Kierkegaard articulates the logic of this outside that empties itself into existence through 
the image of a hidden spring giving birth to a lake, an image Eckhart also uses.30 There is 
perhaps no more Eckhartian passage in all of Kierkegaard than the following: 
Where does love come from, where does it have its origin and its source, where is the 
place it has its abode from which it flows? Yes, this place is hidden or is secret. There is a 
place in a person’s innermost being; from this place flows the life of love, for “from the 
heart flows life.” But you cannot see this place; however deeply you penetrate, the origin 
eludes you in remoteness and hiddenness. Even when you have penetrated furthest in, the 
origin is always still a bit further in, like the source of the spring that is further away just 
when you are closest to it. From this place flows love along many paths, but along none 
of these paths can you force your way into its hidden origin…It is love’s desire and wish 
that its secret source and its hidden life in the innermost being may remain a 
secret…Love’s hidden life is in the innermost being, unfathomable, and then in turn it is 
an unfathomable connectedness with all existence. Just as the quiet lake originates deep 
down in hidden springs no eye has seen, so also does a person’s love originate even more 
deeply in God’s love. If there were no gushing spring at the bottom, if God were not love, 
then there would be neither the little lake nor a human being’s love. Just as the quiet lake 
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originates darkly in the deep spring, so a human being’s love originates mysteriously in 
God’s love. Just as the quiet lake invites you to contemplate it but by the reflected image 
of darkness prevents you from seeing through it, so also the mysterious origin of love in 
God’s love prevents you from seeing its ground.31 
 
God’s love, here, is an un-ground, a ground that continually withdraws itself into secrecy in 
order to release love as a gushing spring that fills existence with its own emptying, its own 
nothin-ing. The withdrawal of the ground is simultaneously the instant of life gushing into 
existence, or existence as the gushing of life. God is this: that life springs into existence in the 
absence of any necessity or principle, from nothing, without reason, without why. The “secrecy” 
of the absolute is nothing but this absence of necessity and principle, the without-whyness of 
existence, its absolute gratuity of which there can be no concept, only the heart’s abandon.  
Mystical union, here, acquires a thoroughly ethical or existential form. The without-
whyness of existence, its absolute gratuity, becomes in Works of Love the ethical duty to love the 
neighbor without preference, without why. This is to love only by holding nothing in common 
with the neighbor, by holding in common the nothing that is our “unfathomable connectedness.” 
To love the neighbor out of preference, because they reflect back to me my own determinate ego, 
is to give love a principle, a foundation, a ground, a why. Works of Love deconstructs or 
destructs this onto-theo-egological ground of ethics. The neighbor, writes Kierkegaard, is not 
“the other self, the other I.” Rather, “the neighbor is the other you.”32 The other you, a self 
equally and identically addressed by God, that is, by the gratuity of existence, and as such an 
absolute secret, a singular line of flight infinitely irreducible to my line of flight, although by 
grace, with mercy, in love, touching my flight, making it swerve with longing.  
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This is not to banish reflection or recognition from the scene of love. It is to reconfigure 
the scene of love as an exposure to its own groundlessness, a scene of exposure to the beloved as 
a gratuitous gift. What is reflected back to me in the neighbor I see is not a determinate self or 
ego but our mutual exposure and abandon, the absolute gratuity of the instant of existence we 
share. In love, re-flection becomes de-flection, self and neighbor together turned toward an 
infinite outside rather than locked in a battle for recognition. This is what Kierkegaard means 
when he writes, “the neighbor is the utterly unrecognizable dissimilarity between persons or is 
the eternal equality before God.”33 And further: “love is recognizable only by love.”34 What I 
“see” in the neighbor, in the beloved, is not any objective dissimilarity but an utterly 
unrecognizable dissimilarity, a singularity, a single individual who as such is hidden from any 
objective recognition. Kierkegaard speaks of a “hidden anxiety that makes erotic love and 
friendship dependent upon their objects, an anxiety that can kindle jealously, the anxiety that can 
bring one to despair.”35 This is why he writes that “one sees the neighbor only with closed 
eyes.”36 Love sees the neighbor apophatically, released from the anxious, objectifying gaze 
whose secret is its “morbidity.”37 Love sees only love within the neighbor, loving forth that love 
rather than attaching itself to and smothering the beloved with objective characteristics, 
demands, and expectations.  
Such apophatic seeing is a repetition and loving forth in the neighbor of the love that God 
is in the self. Kierkegaard writes, “It is infinite loving that…no one, no one, so lovingly 
discovers the slightest love in you as God does. God’s relation to a human being is at every 
                                                     
33 WL, 68.  
34 WL, 66.  
35 WL, 66.  
36 WL, 68.  
37 WL, 66. 
  214 
moment to infinitize what is in that human being at every moment.”38 This is Kierkegaard’s 
version of Eckhart’s line, “the eye with which I see God is the same eye with which God sees 
me.” The work of God in the soul is to infinitize the self as a gift of love, to redouble the love in 
a person to excess. In every soul there is a spark of love, the spark of singularity, the spark that is 
the ground of the soul, as Eckhart puts it. God is this spark—and its reduplication into a blaze. 
Or God is the hidden spring deep within a person’s innermost being—and its gushing overflow. 
Such reduplication in the self becomes immediately a breaking out of love for the neighbor in 
which the self joins God in loving forth the love in that “other you.” Such a self abandoned to 
love “does not need people just to have someone to love, but he needs to love people.”39 This is 
the logic of mystical union in Kierkegaard, the self given birth within God’s longing to love, 
birthing in turn that very love in the neighbor, reduplicating the divine life into existence, to 
excess. This is exactly the logic of Eckhart’s Gottesburt, only with Kierkegaard one gives birth 
to God simultaneously in oneself and in the neighbor as the joyful gushing of their infinite 
difference.  
iv 
Nancy’s essay “Shattered Love” in so many ways beats with a Kierkegaardian heart, with the 
rhythm and abandon of an exposure to an infinite outside that shatters the dialectical mediation 
of the self in the other. I want to conclude with this essay not only because Nancy is such a fun 
dance partner—one should always end with dancing!—but also because this essay can help set 
up an articulation of what I might tentatively call Kierkegaard’s apophatic ontology. I have been 
resisting ontology throughout this dissertation, and I don’t intend to undo that here, to go back on 
my claim that edification exceeds ontology. But I also want to open the possibility that the claim 
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that edification exceeds ontology is also a kind of ontological claim, specifically about the 
absolutely singular nature of being. Being is always only singular, always only shattered into an 
irreducible (i.e. apophatic) multiplicity. Kierkegaard’s hiin Enkelte, “that one,” is, one might 
venture, an ontological category, yet one that as such insists on the impossibility of any general 
ontology. Hiin Enkelte, as Nancy puts it, is “the theft of generality.”40 This is why, for Nancy, 
and I would claim also for Kierkegaard, the very name of the absolute is “I love you.”41 That is, 
the absolute is without name. The absolute, being as such, is nothing other than the joy and 
wonder of “I love you.” I, this absolutely singular being, love you, this absolutely singular other.  
To be unable to say, or rather be, “I love you” is to be closed into oneself with the self-
mutilation of despair, engaged in the self-annihilation of one’s very being. The possibility of 
despair, then, would be an ontological possibility, not merely a “psychological” one, the real risk 
and trembling at the heart of being, its lack of guarantee, the possibility that one can pass through 
existence without discovering one’s self, that is, one’s “I love you.”42 Faith, conversely, would 
be nothing but this discovery, the birth of love in the self. Again: “To love people is the only 
thing worth living for, and without this love you are not really living.”43 “One would thus 
define,” writes Nancy, “an ontological necessity of love.”44 Such necessity, however, “is not 
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known and it binds you to yourself in despair.” 
43 WL, 375.  
44 Nancy, “Shattered Love,” 273.  
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established as a structure of being or as its principle, and even less as its subjectivity [in the 
Hegelian sense]. One would thus define a necessity without a law, or a law without necessity, 
thus: the heart of being within love, and love in surplus of being.”45 There is no “as such” of 
love, no structural necessity that schematizes its birth. “But there is this brilliant, shattering 
constitution of being.”46 When Kierkegaard says that “love is the fulfilling of the law,”47 he 
means that love is the filling of the law with such shattering, with the absolutely free necessity 
that I, this absolutely singular self, may love you, also an absolutely singular self, with a love 
irreducible to any generality, as that one.   
____ 
At the heart of Nancy’s essay is a claim about—but more than a claim, a discourse offered in 
praise of—the heart, the heart of being, being as a heart. He writes:  
The Absolute loves us…Love is at the heart of being. Again it is necessary that being 
have a heart, or still more rigorously, that being be a heart. “The heart of being” means 
nothing but the being of being, that by virtue of which it is being. To suppose that “the 
being of being,” or “the essence of being,” is an expression endowed with meaning, it 
would be necessary to suppose that the essence of being is something like a heart—that is 
to say: that which alone is capable of love.48 
 
The essay also turns on a further claim or cadence, namely, “Now this is precisely what has 
never been attested by philosophy.”49 The heart of being, being as a heart, has not been attested 
by philosophy not because philosophy has not attempted to think love. On the contrary, Nancy 
acknowledges that the West has been and remains obsessed with love. Yet precisely in this 
obsession something has escaped or been missed by philosophy, namely, that love as such 
escapes and slips away from philosophy, from a return to itself in thought. In its very attempt to 
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47 WL, 91.  
48 Nancy, “Shattered Love,” 251-2. 
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think love, philosophy has missed love as the unthinkable, and this is what must be thought. 
What must be thought is love as “inexhaustible” and “essentially indescribable,” as Kierkegaard 
puts it.  
 Nancy locates this missing, the missing that occurs in philosophy’s attempt to master 
love, at the source of the Western discourse on love, Plato’s Symposium. He writes:  
For all its generosity, the Symposium also exercises a mastery over love. At any rate, we 
cannot fail to read or to deduce here, in the order and the choices of philosophical 
knowledge, a truth regarding love, one that assigns its experience and hierarchizes its 
moments by substituting the impatience and conatus of desire for its joyous abandon.50 
 
Nancy claims that this desire for mastery runs right through the Western tradition, climaxing, one 
might say orgasming, in Hegel, but still very much alive today in the form of “sexology, 
marriage counseling, newsstand novels, and moral edification.”51 In the West, love has been put 
into a “schema” in which it has been given a fundamental determination. “If if were necessary to 
take the risk of grasping this schema in a formula, one might try this: love is the extreme 
movement, beyond the self, of a being reaching completion…Philosophy always thinks love as 
an accomplishment, arriving at a final and definitive completion.”52 This is not at all to say that 
in the West there is no moment of excess in love, that is, a moment of extremity or passing 
beyond the self. Western discourses on love, philosophy, theology, poetry, literature, are 
saturated with such extremity. And yet, for Nancy, there is an inevitable moment, even if entirely 
implicit, in which such extremity is turned into the dialectical production of identity, in which 
the movement of love is turned, impatiently, by virtue of the impatience of desire, into the 
becoming of a subject, the production of identity in and through difference. Again, Hegel is the 
one in the West who thinks this most explicitly, but this dialectic is everywhere for Nancy, “from 
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51 Nancy, “Shattered Love,” 267.  
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the Grand Rhetoricians to Baudelaire, from the troubadours to Wagner or Strauss, from Saint 
John of the Cross to Strindberg, and moving through Racine or Kleist, Marivaux or Maturin, 
Monteverdi or Freud.”53  
 Nancy’s aim is not, nor is Kierkegaard’s, simply to step outside of this dialectic. As if 
one could! It is the very air we breathe in the West. The aim, as Nancy puts it, is to perform a 
“repetition”54 of the dialectic in order to expose it from within to an outside that it cannot gather 
back into itself. This is, of course, a Kierkegaardian move, even down to the name Nancy gives 
it, repetition. Kierkegaard’s whole authorship is a repetition of the Western dialectic of love. 
Beginning with Socrates and moving through multiple figures of love—the seducer of Either/Or, 
Cordelia, Don Juan, Judge Wilhelm, the young man in Repetition, Nicolaus Notebene of 
Prefaces, Abraham, Anna, and of course, Jesus—Kierkegaard works to set the dialectic in 
motion, to get its heart pounding, its palms sweaty, its engine puffing and roaring, but not so that 
the train can reach its destination, but in order to run the train off a cliff, as in the climactic scene 
of Back to the Future III, itself a narrative of repeating time forward. But, of course, even Back 
to the Future III succumbs finally to the power of the dialectic. It performs a synthesis in which 
“the future” is wholly determined by the ideal of Western, romantic love safely confined to the 
nuclear family. Perhaps a better movie here would be Snowpiercer, which much more radically 
runs the train off a cliff in order to expose the dialectic of the inside—quite literally the 
master/slave dialectic!—to an un-masterable outside in which the white, Western nuclear family 
has been annihilated. Kierkegaard’s “attack on Christendom” was something like an attempt to 
storm the front of the train in order to derail it.  
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Of course, one could get stuck here in an idealization or romanticization of the outside, 
an idealization that would simply confirm the longing for identity. Even annihilation can become 
an identity, a place to plant one’s flag. As Foucault puts it, “We have to determine the extent to 
which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which 
he stands, motionless, waiting for us.”55 Hegel is prepared to turn even the mutilated Jesus on the 
cross of Golgotha into the confirmation of identity. Such is the work of his “speculative Good 
Friday.” It is important, I think, not to underestimate the way in which even our apocalyptic and 
“radical” longings are perhaps inescapably haunted by Hegel’s ghost, by the impatient desire to 
produce an identity in and through negativity.  
 The work of breaking open the dialectic or schema in which love has been placed cannot 
at heart be a loud, boisterous, pompous work, even if shouting and laughter and perhaps even 
violence have their place. These extremities might be thought of as the work of “resignation” or 
“being-ready,” a breaking away that at best is a setting up for a breaking through, although there 
can be no calculation here. At its heart, the breaking through is much more tender and intimate, 
absolutely tender and intimate, a work of love, the work of the heart, the work of touching that 
most tender and fragile of openings which only as such—tender, fragile, trembling without 
guarantee—escapes the dialectic. Nancy writes: 
That which has the power of the dialectic is not a heart, but a subject. Perhaps one could 
find a heart in the subject. But this heart (if there is one) designates the place where the 
dialectical power is suspended (or perhaps shattered). The heart does not sublate 
contradictions, since in a general sense, it does not live under the regime of 
contradiction—contrary to what poetry (or perhaps only its philosophical reading?) might 
allow us to believe. The heart lives—that is to say, it beats—under the regime of 
exposition. 
 If the dialectic is the process of that which must appropriate its own becoming in 
order to be, exposition, on the other hand, is the condition of that whose essence or 
destination consists in being presented: given over, offered to the outside, to others, and 
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even to the self…[The self] is not completed by this process, it “incompletes itself” to the 
outside; it is presented, offered to something that is not it nor its proper becoming.56  
 
And further: 
The heart exposes the subject. It does not deny it, it does not surpass it, it is not sublated 
or sublimated in it; the heart exposes the subject to everything that is not its dialectic and 
its mastery as a subject. Thus, the heart can beat at the heart of the subject, it can even 
beat in a movement similar to that of the dialectic, but it does not confuse itself with 
that.57  
 
The heart, to borrow Kierkegaard’s language, is the infinite qualitative difference at the heart of 
the subject, a non-recuperable difference that leaves the subject exposed to what will not ground 
an identity, not even an identity established across difference. Nancy therefore denies that the 
heart is to be equated with desire. “Desire is not love.”58 Desire is the engine of subjectivization, 
the power that drives the becoming of the subject, its self-mediation through an object. As such, 
desire is always caught up in one or another movement toward mastery, what Kierkegaard would 
call “sin.” Love, however, exposes desire. The heart is the exposition of desire, the exposure of 
desire to an outside before which it no longer desires itself as movement toward identity, but 
only as an opening.  
The heart, therefore, is always a “broken heart,”59 for Nancy, a heart in which desire is 
broken open with what Kierkegaard calls Sorg, longing. “In the broken heart, desire itself is 
broken.”60 Being is a broken heart, a break, the infinite repetition of a break, each time infinitely 
singular, infinitely intimate, infinitely finite, infinitely fragile, infinitely exposed. “The love 
break simply means this: that I can no longer, whatever presence to myself I may maintain or 
that sustains me, pro-pose myself to myself (nor im-pose myself on another) without remains, 
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without something of me remaining, outside of me.”61 Love is the undoing and the unknowing of 
oneself, a splitting open, “a blade thrust in me, and that I do not rejoin, because it disjoins me (it 
does not wound, properly speaking: it is something else, foreign to a certain dramatics of 
love).”62 Love is the breaking out of difference within the self and therefore between the self and 
an other. Such difference “is sexual, and it is not: it cuts across the sexes with another 
difference…that does not abolish them, but displaces their identities. Whatever my love is, it cuts 
across my identity, my sexual property, that objectification by which I am a masculine or 
feminine subject.”63 The heart, one might is say, is always queer. 
 It is not, however, that the heart, or being, is a whole that awaits or undergoes breaking. 
This would be the logic of the dialectic. For Nancy: 
The heart does not exist before the break. But it is the break itself that makes the heart. 
The heart is not an organ, and neither is it a faculty. It is: that I is broken and traversed by 
the other where its presence is most intimate and its life most open. The beating heart—
rhythm of the partition of being, syncope of the sharing of singularity—cuts across 
presence, life, consciousness.64  
 
It is here where the distinctiveness of Nancy’s ontology emerges, summarizable as the “syncope 
of the sharing of singularity.” “Syncope” carries multiple senses, primary among them being the 
abbreviation of a word by removing a syllable, sound, or letter from the middle of the word, as 
well as a sudden loss of consciousness due to a drop in blood pressure. In both senses a break 
occurs. In the first, a word is broken as it is spoken or written. In the second, a gap occurs in the 
pressure that the heart is supplying to the body. But in the case of the heart (and undoubtedly 
language too), each beat always in some sense involves a syncope. There is always that instant 
prior to every beat, the break in-between each beat, in which the heart, as it were, stops, for an 
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instant, as the possibility of its repetition into a new beat. This syncope, this break, this moment 
of possibility that as such is nothing, this utter vulnerability of the heart as it waits in suspense, is 
what makes every beat the coming into existence of the heart, its birth, every beat a miracle, a 
singular instant of existence. The syncope of the heart is the heart’s exposure and exposition, the 
nothin-ing at its heart that is the be-ing of the heart, its breaking, its beating.   
 Being, for Nancy, is the infinite repetition of that gap, that nothing, that originary break 
that is always the breaking out of singularity and the space(ing) of its sharing. Being is what 
allows simultaneously absolute singularity and absolute sharing. Being is always only a being-
with, a touching that is not an absorption into any generality but rather the infinite confirmation 
of singularity, the breaking out of the infinitely finite distance between each self, the infinitely 
finite distance between each instant of existence, a distance that is traversed, but never 
completed, only in love. Being is the distance and “transparency”65 of an infinite beginning.66 
Nancy writes elsewhere, “Issuing forth out of nothing, created, that is, not produced, not formed, 
not constructed, but the alternation and spasm of the nihil, the world is the explosion and 
expansion of an exposition (which we may call ‘truth’ or ‘sense’)…The world is a strangeness 
that is preceded by no familiarity.”67 The syncope of being is the spasm of the nihil from which 
the world explodes with utter strangeness, with no ideal template or schema, with no familiarity 
to which it is destined to return or recollect, with nothing at its heart but the beating of the heart, 
each time strange, each time new.  
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 It is with this thought of the irreducible strangeness or singularity of being that Nancy 
goes on to distinguish himself from Levinas in “Shattered Love.” Nancy finds in Levinas, “in a 
rather classical manner,” the re-inscription of love into a “teleology.”68 He writes, “This 
teleology proceeds from the first given of his thought, ‘the epiphany of the face’: love is the 
movement stressed by this epiphany, a movement that transcends it in order to reach, beyond the 
face, beyond vision and the ‘you,’ the ‘hidden—and never hidden enough—absolutely 
ungraspable.’…Love thus retains at least certain traits of a dialectical moment.”69 Levinas 
opposes and “pre-poses” the face “‘to the unveiling of Being in general,’ a Heideggerian theme 
in which he sees ‘the absolute indetermination of the there is—of an existing without existents—
incessant negation, infinite limitation,’ ‘anarchic.’”70 Nancy’s critique is the following: 
I can be in solidarity with Levinas’s distaste for certain accents, shall we say, of 
dereliction in Heidegger’s discourse. But in the es gibt (“it gives [itself]”) of Being, one 
can see everything except “generality.” There is the “each time,” an-archic in fact…, of 
an existing, singular occurrence. There is no existing without existents, and there is no 
“existing” by itself, no concept—it does not give itself—but there is always being, precise 
and hard, the theft of generality. Being is at stake here, it is in shatters, offered dazzling, 
multiplied, shrill and singular, hard and cut across: its being is there…And the crossing—
the coming-and-going, the comings-and-goings of love—is constitutive of the 
occurrence. This takes place before the face and signification. Or rather, this takes place 
on another level: at the heart of being.71 
 
The critique here is that Levinas allows the face to stand out from the generality of being only in 
order to turn the face into an occasion to recollect (my word) what is beyond being, namely, an 
ethical obligation and demand that comes from an infinite height. The problem here is the 
affirmation of the generality of being, a generic there is, an existing without existents, against 
which the face is opposed. This sets up a dialectic in which the beyond-being of ethical demand 
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becomes something like its sublation, even if quite differently than a strictly Hegelian sublation. 
The relation between self and other is one in which the self is held is “hostage” by the other. The 
other is not, as in Kierkegaard, the “other you,” an absolute and singular equal, but the site of an 
infinite, general demand from on high. Nancy, for his part, wants to deny absolutely that there is 
any generality of being, any existing without existents. Being is always only the occurrence of 
singular existents, shattered, dazzling, multiplied, shrill and hard. And as he will go on to 
develop in other works, being is always only the occurrence of singular bodies, the movements 
of their touching, folding, and intertwining.  
 It is here in Nancy’s ontological refusal of generality that I hear an echo, a repetition 
forward, perhaps, of Kierkegaard, one that might allow one to glimpse an ontology in 
Kierkegaard, his own ontological refusal of generality. “Shattered Love” ends with a passage 
that resounds with Kierkegaardian echoes: 
What appears in this light, at once excessive and impeccable, what is offered like a belly, 
like a kissed mouth, is the singular being insofar as it is this “self” that is neither a subject 
nor an individual nor a communal being, but that—she or he—which cuts across, that 
which arrives and departs…What is offered through the singular being—through you or 
me, across this relation that is only cut across—is the singularity of being, which is to say 
this: that being itself, “being” taken absolutely, is absolutely singular (thus it would be 
that which remains “self” when nothing comes back to the self).72 
 
Being is only ever the arrival and departure, the arrival of the departure, the crossing, of “that 
one,” Kierkegaard’s hiin Enkelte. Both Nancy and Kierkegaard affirm the absoluteness of that 
one, that self, that existent. There is no existence as such. Kierkegaard writes, “abstractions 
simply do not exist for God; for God in Christ there live only single individuals...God has no 
concept. God does not avail himself of an abridgment; he comprehends actuality itself, all its 
particulars; for him the single individual does not lie beneath the concept.”73 As infinite 
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reduplication, God has no general relation to existence. “There is really only one quality—
singularity. Everything revolves around this.”74  The absolute is the absolute theft of generality. 
God is the always singular break at the heart of existence, its repetition, its beating, the birth of 
each self, each instant of existence, as utterly strange and new. And therefore “every self 
certainly is angular, but that only means that it is to be ground into shape, not that it is to be 
ground down smooth.”75 The self is always, each time, a strangeness that is preceded by no 
familiarity. The vocation of the self, its divine vocation, is to let itself be strange—shrill and hard 
and angular in its singularity, not ground down smooth into any general shape. If it is not to 
mutilate itself in despair, the self must—this is the “law” of love—absolutely affirm and become 
its singularity, the break at the heart of its being, the break that is the heart of being, its shattered 
love. Such love, the abandon in which I am given over to myself, never ascends beyond “you,” 
beyond the singular other to whom I am given as a gift of love. God is the impossibility of an 
ascent beyond “you,” beyond “I love you.” God is the very gift of that “other you,” that 
neighbor, that one I touch as she passes by. 
 This is to receive the gift of “an absolute self,” as Nancy puts it, a self whose being 
“emerges in outbursts of joy. One could say: being joys.”76 Such joy is always a shared joy, a 
touching and being touched by the presence of the other. “The self that joys joys of its presence 
in the presence of the other. He, she, is only the presence of the reception of the other 
presence…To joy, joy itself, it to receive the burst of a singular being.”77 This not in anyway to 
lose oneself in or gain oneself from the other. “Love is faithful only to itself,”78 a reduplication in 
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itself. To love is to dance with the other, with abandon. “It is by oneself also that he, she who 
joys is bedazzled. It is in himself thus that he is delighted. But he does not belong to himself, and 
he does not come back to himself: he is shared, like the joy he shares.”79 Such joy is the joy of 
the break, the nothing at the heart of being, the nothing that is being, its beating, its joying. As 
Kierkegaard puts it, “If, however, a person knew how to make himself truly what he truly is—
nothing—knew how to set the seal of patience on what he had understood—ah, then his life, 
whether he is the greatest or the lowliest, would even today be a joyful surprise.”80 The heart of 
existence is the joyful surprise that I am given over again, always again, to the work of love. And 
“the one who loves,” writes Kierkegaard, “discovers nothing,”81 a joyous abandon. 
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CONCLUSION: BEGINNING AGAIN 
 
 
 
----So how are you going to conclude your dissertation? 
 
----Oh I refuse to conclude.  
 
----What? You refuse to conclude your dissertation? 
 
----Yes, I refuse. 
 
----Why? You are so close to getting the Ph.D. and being a doctor. One little conclusion and you 
are there! 
 
----I refuse. 
 
----Why? 
 
----I do not want to be the kind of doctor who sedates the fever and furor of discourse, who lulls 
it to sleep with a conclusion.  
 
----But don’t you need to state directly, objectively, properly, what it is that you have achieved 
and accomplished in the dissertation?  
 
----If anything, this dissertation has been a long prayer that I might be delivered from the horizon 
of accomplishment.   
 
----So if you are not going to conclude the dissertation, what are you going to do?  
 
----I am going to reduplicate it.  
 
----You’re gonna do what? 
 
----Reduplicate. Re-du-pli-cate. Repeat it. Give it another go. 
 
----You’re going to repeat the dissertation? 
 
----Yes.  
 
----The whole dissertation? 
 
----Yes. 
 
----You’re going to repeat the whole dissertation? 
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----Yes. 
 
----You’re going to write the whole thing again? 
 
----Sort of.    
 
----Please explain! 
 
----I am going to go back through the whole thing and give it a new form, a reduplicated form. 
 
----Ok…. 
 
----Like Eckhart says in a sermon of his I quoted: “Your light must be utterly extinguished and 
go out of itself altogether, then God can shine in with his light, bringing back with him 
everything you forsook and a thousandfold more, besides the new form containing it all.” 
 
----Sounds spooky. 
 
----And like Johannes Climacus says at the beginning of his book on doubt: “I…by means of the 
form seek to counteract the detestable untruth that characterizes recent philosophy.” 
 
----So what is this new form that you are going to give your dissertation?  
 
----One that gets it off itself.  
 
----Sounds a bit wild.  
 
----Exactly.   
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